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In the last decade, the European Union has been increasingly active in the maritime 
domain. Based on the achievements that the European Union has accomplished in the 
international maritime security domain, the thesis claims that the European Union is a 
sea power from the perspective of modern sea power theory. Sea power theory is a 
branch of geopolitical theory. Modern sea power theory is based on the widest 
interpretation of the concept of sea power, arguing that sea power includes not only a 
military element but also geographical, economic, political, and strategic considerations, 
and possesses three functions: to protect maritime shipping, to maintain control of the 
sea and to influence events on land by naval means. Sea power has inputs and outputs. 
 
Through the lens of sea power theory, the thesis analyses the different elements of 
European Union sea power, explores how this is generated and carries out a thorough 
investigation of its practice through four detailed case studies, including three maritime 
Common Security and Defence Policy missions ‒ Operation Atalanta, Operation 
Sophia and Operation IRINI ‒ EU-funded Critical Maritime Routes programmes and 
the planned Coordinated Maritime Presences in the Gulf of Guinea, as well as the 
practice of ‘soft sea power’ in the South China Sea. Ultimately, the thesis presents the 
findings that the generation of European Union sea power is the consequence of the 
integration procedure as well as the demands of globalisation, and that this is a regional 
sea power with limited military strength, focusing on the fight against non-traditional 
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The seas are Europe’s lifeblood. Europe’s maritime spaces and its coasts are central 
to its well-being and prosperity – they are Europe’s trade routes, climate regulator, 
sources of food, energy and resources, and a favoured site for its citizens’ residence 
and recreation (European Commission, 2007, p.1). 
 
This PhD thesis seeks to provide a robust understanding of why the European Union 
(EU) is a sea power. In the last decade, the EU has been making its mark in the maritime 
domain. Geographically, due to the several rounds of enlargement, the EU has 
expanded its maritime status as the territory covered by the Member States has stretched 
to the shores of the Atlantic, the Mediterranean Sea, the Baltic Sea, and the Black Sea. 
Economically, as a global trading power, the EU is extremely reliant on maritime 
shipping, because “90% of its external and 40% of its internal trade is seaborne” 
(ec.europa.eu, 2017). Politically, the EU has clearly demonstrated the aspiration to be 
a global maritime security provider. In 2008, the EU launched its first naval Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) mission, European Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) 
Somalia - Operation Atalanta (henceforth Operation Atalanta). In 2015 it launched its 
maritime military mission EUNAVFOR Med - Operation Sophia (henceforth Operation 
Sophia) and then in 2020 launched Operation IRINI in the Mediterranean Sea. In the 
Gulf of Guinea, the EU uses the Instrument contributing to Security and Peace and the 
European Development Fund to fund the maritime security cooperation projects with 
western and central African countries. In addition to this, the EU decided to launch the 
first pilot case of the Coordinated Maritime Presences concept in the Gulf of Guinea. 
And the EU is also involved in another maritime hotspot in Asia-Pacific region – the 
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South China Sea. Based on these observations, the thesis claims that the EU is a sea 
power.  
 
Traditionally, however, the EU seems to like not to be seen as a sea power on the world 
stage. There are reasons for this. “Unlike the Asia-Pacific region, seen primarily as a 
maritime environment, Europe is most often thought about in terms of its land, as a 
continent whose destiny is firmly embedded in the great Eurasian landmass” 
(Nordenman, 2016, p.22). Moreover, there is a common belief that only independent 
sovereign states can have sea power, as all the discussions on sea power are based on 
the assumption that sea power originates in independent sovereign states. The EU is an 
international organisation composed of 27 Member States. Can an international 
organisation have sea power? There is generally a narrow understanding of sea power, 
which claims that sea power equals naval power. If we are to follow this logic, because 
the EU has no integrated naval force, the EU is not a sea power. As “puzzlement arises 
when things do not fit together as anticipated, challenging existing knowledge” 
(Gustafsson and Hagstrom, 2018, p.639), so the overarching puzzle of this thesis is: 
Why is the EU a sea power? To address this overarching puzzle, the following research 
question will be answered: What are the theoretical and empirical considerations which 
can explain why the EU is a sea power? 
 
To begin the investigation, this chapter is divided into five Sections. The Section 
following this Introductory Section lays out the research aims of the thesis, arguing that 
there is a gap in the literature on EU sea power. The Third Section presents the research 
design and the methodology of the thesis. Section Four explains the data gathering, 
noting the combination of primary data sources and secondary evaluations from the 
existing literature. Finally, the outline of the thesis will be stated. 
 
1.2  Research Aims 
Oceans matter to the EU and its Member States in every aspect: economically, the EU’s 
international trade and energy security replies on the security of surrounding waters and 
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strategic maritime routes; politically, the EU’s aspiration to be a global actor in the 
world arena cannot be achieved without sufficient maritime capabilities; militarily, the 
existing and emerging traditional as well as non-traditional maritime threats challenge 
Europe’s safety and stability. In addition, the EU’s border safety is challenged by the 
crisis in the Mediterranean Sea, which in turn poses an immediate challenge to the 
security and solidarity of the EU and its Member States.  
 
Hence, the first aim of the thesis is to apply a holistic investigation of the EU’s capacity 
in the maritime security field. This thesis challenges the notion that the EU cannot be 
seen as a sea power in the world. Based on the observations in 1.1 above, the thesis 
poses three inter-related questions: Is the EU a sea power in the making? If so, what 
kind of sea power it is? And to what extent? 
 
To answer the first question depends on how we benchmark ‘sea power’ – whether it is 
a narrowly defined military term or a broader geopolitical term. To do so, the core 
concept of ‘sea power’ needs to be critically analysed. As one of the most important 
geopolitical concepts, the idea of ‘sea power’ was coined a hundred years ago. Like all 
other international theories, unsurprisingly, this concept develops according to the 
changes in the world economy and politics. Hence, the classical sea power theory is 
being replaced by a critical sea power theory. The chasm between the classical sea 
power theory and the critical sea power theory depends on an understanding of the 
notion in the narrow sense or the widest sense. In the narrow sense, sea power is just 
synonymous with naval power and is understood as a mere military term. In the widest 
sense, however, the notion is understood as a broader concept which includes not only 
the military element but also geographical, economic, political, and strategic 
considerations. Obviously, in a context of globalisation, which is characterised by the 
close connection of all the elements of the society, sea power has links with not only 
naval force, but also a lot of the other influencing factors. To that end, the basis of the 
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study is built by providing a more inclusive definition and broader and profound 
insights into this notion.  
 
Secondly, central to EU sea power is its generation and its practice. A framework for 
the elements of EU sea power is established. Based on the critical analysis of the notion 
in general, the elements of EU sea power are more inclusive, which means that the 
economic, political, institutional, and strategic factors all play an important role. 
Regarding the EU, geographically the several rounds of European enlargement led to 
the EU’s shift in the maritime status (Vivero and Mateos, 2004) and stretched the 
maritime borders to the Mediterranean Sea, the Baltic Sea, the Atlantic Ocean and the 
Black Sea. Besides the EU’s geographical reality, the EU’s international and domestic 
trade relies heavily on maritime shipping, while the EU also has a strong Blue Economy. 
This stimulates the EU’s urgent need to create and sustain good maritime order. 
Moreover, the EU’s economic and technical strength provides conditions for the EU’s 
deeper participation in the international maritime security sphere.  However, besides 
the incentives to protect its international-trade-dependent economy, the EU also has a 
political aspiration to play a more active role in the international field and become a 
maritime security provider. Motivated by this ambition, the EU established the cross-
sectoral maritime institutions and naval capabilities both at the EU level and Member 
States level.  All these factors intertwine and form a coherent whole – EU sea power. 
 
However, sea power is not merely the combination of the material and immaterial 
elements, but also the art and the approach to use them (Till, 2013). The practice of EU 
sea power in the past decade is explored in a dynamic approach. The thesis encompasses 
four case studies, including the EU’s three maritime military operations, Operation 
Atalanta, Operation Sophia, and Operation IRINI, EU’s comprehensive maritime 
security approach in the Gulf of Guinea, and the EU’s response to the maritime disputes 
in the South China Sea. Through detailed observation and analysis, a dynamic approach 




Given the fact that opinion is divided on the identity of the EU in the maritime security 
domain, the thesis argues that the EU is a sea power. In doing so, the thesis seeks in a 
systematic way to provide a robust understanding of the EU’s capabilities in the 
maritime security domain. 
 
1.3 Research Design and Methodology 
The analytical framework of this thesis is based on the interpretation and theoretical 
understanding of sea power theory. The critical analysis of sea power is the logical 
starting point for the argument of the thesis. As mentioned in the Second Section of this 
chapter, whether the EU is a sea power depends on how we define ‘sea power’. If we 
define sea power in a narrow sense, considering that sea power equals naval power, 
then the argument that the EU is a sea power is impossible, as the EU does not have an 
integrated naval force. However, if we define sea power in its widest sense, which 
means sea power is supposed to be a much broader concept including geographical, 
economic, political, institutional, and military factors, then the EU definitely can be 
viewed as a sea power.  
 
The theoretical framework involves interpreting the definition of sea power, the 
elements of sea power, and the consequences of sea power. In this stage of the analysis 
of EU sea power, based on the critical sea power features which emerge from the 
definitions of sea power and related analysis, a critical sea power theory is built. 
Modern sea power can be regarded as a matrix composed of two parts. One part is the 
generation of sea power; in other words, it is supposed to have all the essential elements 
which form the sea power, and the elements can be considered the ‘input’ of sea power. 
Another part is the practice of sea power; that is, it is supposed to fulfil all the functions 
that a sea power should have, and the practice of sea power can be considered the 
‘output’ of sea power. As such, a critical sea power theory is established in this way: 
modern sea power is made up of the geographical, economic, political, institutional and 
military elements, and has the capabilities to protect international commerce and the 
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utilisation of oceanic resources, to perform sea control by naval means, and to influence 
the events on land by events at sea.  
 
This framework is then applied to the EU to test whether the EU is a sea power. Firstly, 
it focused on the generation of sea power. As clarified in the theoretical framework, 
modern sea power possesses a few essential elements, including the economic, political, 
institutional and military factors. Starting from this point of observation, the thesis 
outlines the elements of EU sea power. They are the EU’s geographical reality, 
maritime interests, political aspirations, cross-sectoral maritime institutions, and naval 
capabilities. Particularly, this Section clarifies the doubt that the EU does not have an 
integrated naval force. Even though the EU does not have an integrated naval force, its 
ad hoc security and defence mechanism provides it with enough potential to play an 
important role in the maritime domain. 
 
As mentioned above, the two aspects of sea power can be defined as the “input” and 
“output” of sea power (Till, 2013). Having analysed the generation of EU sea power, 
the thesis sets out to explore the ‘output’ of EU sea power in different areas on the 
world stage. The assessment of the EU sea power outcome is similarly based on the sea 
power theory, which means that sea power is supposed to fulfil three functions: to 
protect international commerce and utilisation of oceanic resources, to gain sea control, 
and influence events on land by means of naval forces. Then, through four detailed case 
studies, the thesis carries out a thorough investigation of the practice of EU sea power. 
 
As one of the common ways of undertaking social science research, the case study 
method is the core research method used in this thesis. “A case study is an empirical 
method that investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the “case”) in depth and within 
its real-world context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context may not be clearly evident” (Yin, 2018, p.15). The case study method can be 
considered as “an attempt to understand and interpret a spatially and temporally 
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bounded set of events” (Levy, 2008). As Yin (2009) points out, it is the “preferred 
strategy when how or why questions are being posed, when the investigator has little 
control over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some 
real-life context” (p. 1). The study on the practice of EU sea power meets the 
requirements of the case study method, that is, “describe an intervention and the real-
world context in which it occurred” (Yin, 2018, p.18).  
 
The EU’s intervention in the maritime security domain can be categorised from two 
different angles. On one hand, they can be classified according to the forms in which 
they are conducted, such as CSDP maritime military missions, EU-funded maritime 
security projects, or declaratory diplomacy1. On the other hand, they are conducted in 
different mise-en-scenes, such as in the neighbourhood of Europe, in the waters 
surrounding the African continent, or in the Asia-Pacific region. In this case, a single-
case study does not suffice to illustrate the diversity and complexity of the practice of 
EU sea power. Accordingly, the thesis adopts a multi-cases structure, as “the evidence 
from multiple cases is often considered more compelling, and the overall multi-case 
study is therefore regarded as being more robust” (Yin, 2018, p. 54).  
 
Under this design, four cases are examined in the thesis. The first case study is the EU’s 
first maritime CSDP operation – Operation Atalanta. It is “an autonomous, military, 
anti-piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden off the coast of Somalia” (Dover and 
Kristensen, 2016, p. 252). The second case study is the EU’s second and third maritime 
CFDP operations – Operation Sophia and Operation IRINI. They are discussed as one 
case, as they were launched successively in the Mediterranean Sea, and there is a 
considerable overlap in their operational objectives. The third case study is the EU’s 
 
1  “Declaratory diplomacy is a staple of modern diplomacy. Issuing statements and declarations is meant to convey positions, 
show presence and engagement as well as to apply political pressure. On the contrary of the traditional quiet diplomacy, declaratory 
diplomacy looks for and responds to its audience. In the European Union, the High Representative is in charge of the declaratory 




response to the non-traditional maritime threats in the Gulf of Guinea. The fourth case 
study is the EU’s response to the maritime disputes occurring in the South China Sea.  
 
The rationale for selecting these four cases includes a number of factors. From the 
perspective of ‘output’ forms of EU sea power, these cases reflect the diversity of EU 
sea power ‘output’. Obviously, maritime CSDP operations are the most visible and 
classic way in which the EU practices sea power. Examining maritime operations 
“provides a far more reliable guide to the EU’s role as a security actor in assessing the 
actual strategic and policy choices made by both the EU and its Member States than the 
words emitted from Brussels” (Dombrowski and Reich, 2018, p. 8). However, the 
maritime CSDP operation is by no means the only form of EU sea power practice. The 
third case study and fourth case study outline the other forms of EU sea power practice, 
focusing on the non-military aspects of the EU’s response. These four case studies, 
therefore, outline the basic forms of EU sea power output. 
 
From the perspective of the operational area where EU sea power exists, these four case 
studies cover four different maritime hotspots – the Horn of Africa, the Mediterranean 
Sea, the Gulf of Guinea, and the South China Sea – in all of which the EU has significant 
geostrategic and economic interests. Geographically, the Mediterranean Sea is in the 
EU’s neighbourhood and has a direct impact on the EU and its Member States. The 
Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Guinea are extremely important for EU energy security 
and international commerce. As for the South China Sea, it provides an important 
bellwether for assessing the veracity of the EU’s aspiration as a “global maritime 
security provider” (eeas.europa.eu, 2021).  
 
While each of these four case studies is independent and complete within themselves, 
there is a logical connection between them. The connection between the first case study 
and second case study is that they are both CSDP maritime operations, but in different 
operational areas with different operational objectives. The first case and the third case 
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share the same objective of counter-piracy, but they are different in form. The case 
study of the EU in the South China Sea can be as a “least-likely” case, which is 
“especially tailored to confirmation of a theory, despite being a tough test case in which 
the theory in question is unlikely to provide a good explanation” (Shen, 2012, p.12). It 
is selected by virtue of its geographical location, the characteristic nature of the conflict 
and the EU’s customary response. Therefore, these four case studies constitute a whole, 
which more comprehensively reflects the overall picture of EU sea power ‘output’ from 
different perspectives.  
 
Indubitably, sea power theory is the theoretical framework throughout the whole study. 
In terms of an individual case study, there is a clear need to have a more specific 
framework. For the first and second case studies, the framework ‘ends, ways, and means’ 
is introduced for the study of a military operation. ‘Ends, ways and means’ is a strategic 
framework developed by Arthur F. Lykke Jr. “Strategy is a coherent expression of a 
process that identifies the ends, ways and means designed to achieve a certain goal” 
(Eikmeier, 2007, p.63). “Ends are the objectives or desired outcomes of a given strategy” 
(ibid). “Ways are actions. They are the methods and process executed to achieve the 
ends” (ibid). “Means are the resources required to execute the way” (ibid). Therefore, 
“a strategy is balanced and entails little risk if the selected way (method) is capable and 
has sufficient means (resources) to obtain the desired end (objective)” (ibid). The EU’s 
three CSDP maritime military operations, which appear in the thesis as two case studies, 
are placed in this framework and analysed in depth.  
 
Regarding the third and fourth case studies ‒ the practice of EU sea power in the Gulf 
of Guinea and in the South China Sea ‒ another research framework is introduced – the 
EU’s common working process adopted by the European Union Maritime Security 
Strategy. This framework can be encapsulated as ‘interests, threats and response’. This 
framework begins by identifying the EU’s interests in the maritime domain. Then it 
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describes the maritime threats. Finally, it focuses on formulating a complex and 
multifaceted response to the threats (Council of the EU, 2014a).  
 
1.4 Sources of Empirical Data 
Aligned with a deductive approach, the empirical findings in this thesis are exclusively 
qualitative. Data are gathered via desk-based research as follows:  
 
1.4.1 Documentation 
Concerning the composition and the practice of EU sea power, a comprehensive 
analysis of EU documentation is conducted regarding legal provisions, decision-
making process, institutional arrangements and major actors. By extensively reviewing 
the EU policy documents from the Databases for European Union Studies at the 
University of Canterbury, the European Commission’s library database and information 
online, the generation of EU sea power is presented in the Chapter Three. Qualitative 
content analysis is applied during this process.  
 
The Council of the European Union 
Given the fact that “the Council system is at the institutional heart of decision-making 
in the EU” (Lewis, 2016, P.158), it plays a key role among the EU institutions in the 
maritime security domain.  
The European Council defines the strategic outlook for the EU, adopts common 
strategies, and provides guidelines for the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) on how to 
translate CFSP treaty provisions and strategies into policies and practice (Dover and 
Kristensen 2016, p.247).  
 
The Council’s conclusions and decisions are key materials in forming the basis of 
analysis on the implementation of practical measures in terms of achieving specific 
security and defence policy objectives. The documentation from the Council system, 
such as the Council Decision, Statements, and Conclusions, reflects the concerns and 
decisions of the EU and its Member States regarding maritime security issue. EU 
maritime security strategy (Council of the EU, 2014a) and the two Action Plans 
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(Council of the EU, 2014b; 2018) provide the EU’s basic outlook in the maritime 
security domain. The three CSDP maritime military operations – Operation Atalanta, 
Operation Sophia and Operation IRINI ‒ are still formally intergovernmental, and the 
Council’s decisions on these operations which clearly defined the mandate of these 
actions are extremely relevant. Furthermore, the regional strategy documents launched 
by the Council play a key role in the third and fourth case studies of the thesis, because 
these two case studies both focus on specific regions – the Gulf of Guinea and the South 
China Sea. Therefore, the EU strategy on the Gulf of Guinea (Council of EU, 2014c) 
and Council conclusions on the Gulf of Guinea Action Plan 2015-2020 (Council of EU, 
2015) provide the framework for the study of the practice of EU sea power in the region. 
And the fourth case study is also based on the official statements declared by the 
Council, as the research focused on the EU’s declaratory diplomacy.  
 
The Commission  
The European Commission, which “is clearly involved in the EU’s policy process from 
start to finish” (Egeberg, 2016, p.126) plays a constructive role in implementing the 
maritime security policies at the EU level. The Commission proposals and the 
Commission communications in the maritime domain, such as Green Paper: Towards 
a Future Maritime Policy for the Union: A European Vision for the Oceans and Seas 
(Commission, 2006) and An Integrated Maritime Policy for the European Union 
(Commission, 2007) are basic documents while examining the generation of EU sea 
power in Chapter Three. And the two joint communications to the Parliament and the 
Council, Elements for a new EU strategy on China (Commission, 2016c) and Towards 
a comprehensive Strategy with Africa (Commission, 2020), connect the EU sea power 
to the EU foreign policy in the third and fourth case studies. In addition, statistics in the 
thesis, such as the shipping business of the EU, the capacity of the EU ports in Chapter 
Three, and international trade between the EU and certain countries of the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in fourth case study, come from the Eurostat 




Documentation at national level 
Given the fact that some maritime operations are deployed at a Member State level, the 
documentation at national level is also important in the thesis. In particular, the 
documents from the French Department of Foreign Affairs and the French Department 
of Defence provide information on the maritime operations deployed in the Gulf of 
Guinea and in the South China Sea by the French Navy. The discourse of the then 
French Defence Minister in the Shangri-La Dialogue is also important to an 
understanding of the French stance on the maritime disputes in the South China Sea.  
 
Discourse and interview of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy (HR) 
Given the role the HR plays in security and defence policy, a number of discourses and 
interviews of the HR can be seen as official data in some policy instruments. For 
instance, the HR gives discourse in the Shangri-La Dialogue from 2013, and these 
discourses are important primary data for an understanding of the EU’s strategic 
interests of the Asia-Pacific region, which is part and parcel of the fourth case study of 
the thesis. 
 
1.4.2 Other Empirical Data for case studies 
For the three CSDP maritime military missions, the empirical data is based on the 
archives provided by the Operations Headquarters. For Operation Atalanta, during 
December 2008 to July 2020, the Press Centre in the Headquarters launched about 2300 
Communications on the daily actions of the participating vessels and staff, including 
training, operations, and discourse of their leaders. For Operation Sophia, during July 
2015 to October 2019, there are about 270 Communications launched by the 
Headquarters, and for Operation IRINI, there are about 18 Communications from the 
launch of the operation. These communications cover all the aspects of the operation 




For the third case study – the practice of EU sea power in the Gulf of Guinea – the 
Communications and the Newsletters released by the Critical Maritime Routes (CMR) 
Programme can be seen as a primary source for the research. Since the Commission 
devolves the duty of monitoring, supporting and evaluating the CMR Programme to the 
Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), the RUSI CRIMSON Report can be considered 
as primary data in Case Study Three. 
 
And the fourth case study – the practice of EU sea power in the South China Sea – relies 
heavily on the official documentation from the Council of the EU and the European 
Commission. For the purpose of tracking the comprehensive response adopted by the 
EU, all the declarations issued by the European Commission concerning the South 
China Sea are first-hand materials for this case study. 
 
1.4.3 Secondary Source 
Apart from the primary sources, the academic journals and published books serve as 
secondary sources in the thesis. The research results from the top think-tanks 
specialising in security and defence, such as the EU Institute for Security Studies, 
Chatham House, and Egmont Institute, are used as evidence supporting the findings of 
the case studies in the thesis.  
 
Additionally, a number of research reports from the European Parliamentary Research 
Service, which is an in-house research service and think tank, are also used as secondary 
sources in the thesis. 
 
1.4.4 Timeframe 
This thesis seeks to explore the elements of EU sea power and the practice of EU sea 
power between 2008 and 2020. There are a number of reasons to choose the year 2008 
as a starting point of the study on EU sea power. In 2008 the EU launched the first 
maritime military CSDP operation in the Horn of Aden off the Somali coast. It can be 
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seen as a landmark for EU naval power, which for the first time sailed to the ‘Global 
Commons’.  
 
The launch of Operation Atalanta cannot be seen as an accidental decision of the EU. 
In 2007, the Commission adopted the communication An Integrated Maritime Policy 
for the European Union, in which the EU expounded its vision and planning on ocean 
utilisation and protection, which is from the early focus on regional ocean management 
and governance to active participation in global ocean affairs (Liu, 2015). Among the 
five action areas2 in which an EU integrated Maritime Policy focused, there were two 
action areas reflecting the EU’s ambitions to be a global maritime actor: “promoting 
Europe’s leadership in international maritime affairs” and “rising the visibility of 
maritime Europe” (Commission, 2007, p.13; p.15). Additionally, in the same year, the 
EU finished the Eastern enlargement by accepting ten new Member States 3 . The 
outcome of the EU enlargement led to a significant increase of the EU’s coastline, as 
well as the extension of the EU’s sea borders. Against this backdrop, the EU launched 
the first maritime military CSDP operation for the purpose of playing a more important 
role in the maritime domain. Therefore, the year 2008 can be seen as a starting point 
for the development of EU sea power. 
 
1.5 Summary of Chapters 
This thesis consists of eight chapters. This introductory chapter is followed by a 
presentation of the theoretical framework in Chapter Two. The aim is to develop a 
conceptual framework based on the existing sea power theory. It starts by introducing 
the Mahanian sea power theory, then focuses on the debate on the understanding of the 
notion, and finally develops the concept of modern sea power theory as well as the 
 
2 Action areas for an EU Integrated Maritime Policy: Maximising the sustainable use of the oceans and 
sea, building a knowledge and innovation base for the maritime policy, delivering the highest quality of 
life in coastal regions, promoting Europe’s leadership in international maritime affairs, and raising the 
visibility of maritime Europe (Commission, 2007).  




elements of modern sea power. It comes to the conclusion that sea power can be seen 
as a matrix: one part is the generation of sea power, and it is based on all the 
geographical, economic, political and military elements as input; on the other hand, it 
is a combination of the ability to protect the international commerce, to maintain sea 
control by naval means, and to influence events on land by the events at sea. And this 
notion of sea power implies that the EU is a sea power. 
 
Based on the framework of the elements of sea power in general concluded in Chapter 
Two, Chapter Three outlines the generation of EU sea power from the perspective of 
sea power elements. Following an inductive approach, it comes to the conclusion that 
the EU, like individual sovereign states, has all the vital components of sea power. Its 
geographical reality, maritime interests, political aspirations, cross-sectoral maritime 
institutions, and naval capabilities interacted and led to the generation of EU sea power. 
 
Having presented the ‘input’ of EU sea power, the following four chapters demonstrate 
the different forms of practice of EU sea power through case studies. Chapter Four takes 
Operation Atalanta as a case study. This operation is analysed under the framework of 
‘end, ways and means’. Through the collection, induction and analysis of data, it comes 
to the finding that the practice of EU sea power in the counter-piracy fight in the Horn 
of Africa shows three abilities that sea power should have. It is able to protect 
international commerce and utilisation of oceanic resources, to maintain control of the 
sea through naval presence, and to influence the events on land through naval forces. It 
is noteworthy, however, that the low-intensity nature of the counter-piracy operation 
and cooperation with the western partnership are two indispensable conditions for the 
victory of the EU Operation Atalanta. 
 
Chapter Five takes Operation Sophia and Operation IRINI as case studies. As they were 
launched successively in the Mediterranean Sea, and there is a considerable overlap in 
their operational objectives, they are discussed together in the same chapter. The same 
16 
 
framework ‘ends, ways and means’ is used in this case study. And it comes to two 
findings that while EU sea power matters in the Mediterranean Sea, it is restrained by 
some conditions, such as a feasible operational objective for the purpose of influencing 
the events on land, as well as cooperation from Western partners. 
 
Chapter Six takes the practice of EU sea power in the Gulf of Guinea as case study. 
This chapter seeks to explore the EU’s different approaches to ‘output’ its sea power 
under the EU maritime security working framework ‘interests, threats, and response’. 
As piracy and organised crime in the Gulf of Guinea have seriously harmed the EU’s 
economic and security interests, the EU adopts a comprehensive approach by funding 
and conducting the cooperation projects with local countries in the maritime domain. 
Meanwhile, the EU plans a Coordinated Maritime Presence concept in this region as 
well. Through analysing the EU official documents and observing the practice of EU 
sea power, the findings that maritime security is taken as a foreign policy tool towards 
Africa by the EU, and it implied that the practice of EU sea power in the Gulf of Guinea 
has profoundly affected the EU-Africa partnership. 
 
Chapter Seven takes the practice of EU sea power in the South China Sea as a case 
study. The aim of this chapter is to find out how the EU, as a global maritime security 
provider, uses its sea power in the Asia-Pacific region. The chapter adopts the same 
framework as in the preceding case study. Through an overview of the official 
statements the EU issued on the South China Sea issue, the thesis outlines the EU’s 
economic, partnership and identity interests in this region, and presents the finding that 
the practice of EU sea power in the South China Sea is mainly in the form of soft sea 
power4 by means of the EU’s declaratory diplomacy based on the international law. 
 
4 Hard sea power and soft sea power are two terms coined by Chris Parry in his monograph “super highway: sea power in the 
21th century”. According to Parry, hard sea power and soft sea power are two different ways in which sea power represents. Hard 
sea power is characterised by those components of sea power that enable an individual, group or state to enforce its will at sea or 
to influence decisions on land, by the threat of use of force. Soft sea power, on the contrary, Soft power, on the other hand – 
comprising trade, the exploitation of the resources of the sea, humanitarian aid, fishing, tourism and all other maritime activities 
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Meanwhile, the arms trade between the EU Member States and the claimant countries 
in the South China Sea, as well as the freedom of navigation operations conducted by 
the EU Member States, can be seen as the hard sea power of the EU deployed in that 
region. Moreover, the EU succeeds in incorporating the maritime issue in the South 
China Sea into its overall strategy towards China and making it a powerful lever against 
China. 
 
Finally, the concluding Chapter Eight reviews the main findings of the thesis before 
placing these results in the wider context of the literature on sea power. The relevance 
and contribution of the thesis is explored. Future avenues of research are then discussed. 
  
 
that do not imply the use of force – can be deployed at sea because of the cooperative, permissive trading environment that exists, 
secured by international law and the threat of sanction or force against those seeking to disrupt a system that pretty much works 








This chapter applies sea power theory to the study of EU sea power. The theoretical 
goal is to identify an analytical framework that will be used in the examination of the 
extent to which the EU is a sea power. Arguably, the EU has gradually become an 
important component of the international system composed of nation states. There are 
already multiple International Relations (IR) theories to describe this complex system. 
So one question is: amongst these IR theories, which can be used to understand and 
explain the EUs capability to maintain maritime security and sustain good order at sea? 
 
First of all, the maritime dimension of EU security refers primarily to the EU’s external 
policies. The modern international system is a combination of many countries that live 
on land and use the sea as a link (Shi, 2012). In this system, sea power is usually 
outward. It naturally has a direct and close connection with a country’s foreign 
behaviour, and is an important tool for a country to handle international relations. 
Against this backdrop, the IR theories which are applied in the field of foreign policy 
can be used in the maritime security dimension. 
 
Secondly, to order to answer the question ‘Why the EU is a sea power’, the primary 
step which needs to be taken is to clarify the meaning of the term ‘sea power’, because 
to answer the question whether the EU is a sea power depends on how we benchmark 
‘sea power’. Is this term a narrowly defined military term or it is a broader geopolitical 





The chapter comprises seven sections. Section One is the introductory section, 
providing a brief theoretical background. Section Two examines the relationship among 
realism theory, geopolitical theory and sea power theory. It argues that sea power theory, 
in essence, is a particular form of geopolitics based on the interaction of physical and 
human geography. Section Three introduces the Mahanian sea power theory. By 
critically reviewing the literature, it demonstrates that the Mahanian sea power theory 
is a breakthrough in the historical context of the time. However, in the statement of the 
theory, there is some ambiguity, which has triggered the extensive debates between the 
two opposite interpretations of its content. Section Four probes the modern sea power 
theory. In comparison to the classical theory, the modern sea power theory reflects the 
features of sea power in the globalisation era. Section Five develops an analytical 
framework by detailing the elements of modern sea power, as well as explaining the 
importance of clarifying it. Section Six explores the new features of sea power in the 
era of globalisation. Section Seven is the conclusion, in which the correlation between 
sea power theory and EU’s sea power is presented. 
 
2.2 Realism Theory, Geopolitical Theory and Sea Power Theory 
Sea power theory is a branch of classical geopolitical theory5. “Geopolitics can arguably 
be considered an integral branch of realist theories in International Relations, that is, a 
particular form of realism that is based on the influence of the natural environments 
defined by geography and technology” (Wu, 2018, p.787). Realism, as a widely used 
IR theory, focuses on “power” and “national interest” (Morgenthau, 1972). The thesis 
argues that realism can be used to study EU sea power. The EU, after decades of 
integration, “starts having state-like characteristics … should then be expected to 
defend its common interests internationally” (Laursen, 2020, p.11). As a matter of fact, 
 
5 There are two distinct versions of geopolitics: the critical and the classical. Classical geopolitics “treats geographical space an 
existential pre-condition for all politics”, while critical geopolitics is “devoted to the study of how geographical space is represented 
and signified by political agents as a part of a larger project of accruing, managing and aggrandizing power” (Bassin, 2004, p.620). 
In this thesis, geopolitics is used as a synonym for classical geopolitics unless further clarified. 
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the EU has become an “internationally sea-policy actor” (ibid).  Therefore, it is 
suitable to put EU sea power into a realist theoretical framework. 
 
Specifically, geopolitics is “the spatial study of the relationships among states and the 
implications of these relationships for the morphology of the political map as a whole” 
(Parker, 1994, p. 170). In terms of disciplines, geopolitics was born at the end of the 
19th century. German geographer Friedrich Ratzel (1833-1904) can be seen as the 
father of modern political geography. Ratzel (1897) invented the concept of 
‘anthropogeography’, which integrated geography, anthropology, and politics. To 
Ratzel (1897), the fortunes of states were determined by two key factors, ‘space’ and 
‘position’, and only a powerful country could survive by continuous expansion. 
Ratzel’s views had a profound impact on later generations, and spawned a new 
discipline - political geography (ibid). 
 
Swedish political scientist Rudolf  Kjellen (1917)  coined the term ‘geopolitics’. 
Being strongly influenced by Ratzel, Kjellen defined ‘geopolitics’ as “the science 
which conceives of the state as a geographical organism or as a phenomenon in space” 
(Kjellen, 1917, p.22). For the first time, the concept of “geopolitics” was used to 
describe the geographical basis of state power. Kjellen (1917) believed that “territory 
was considered to be one of the most fundamental factors in state power; thus an 
understanding of the significance of territory was of vital importance to any assessment 
of the best interests of the state” (Parker, 1998, p.171).  
 
Notwithstanding the development of geopolitics, there are two characteristics that 
remain unchanged. On one hand, the basic methodology consists of the “examination 
of states as the building blocks of the world’s political space” (ibid, p.174). On the other 
hand, geopolitics focuses on the “use of geopolitical methods in the resolution of 
problems” (ibid). However, even though states are the main subject of geopolitics, 
Parker (1998) claimed that “groups or cluster of states located with particular 
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geographical areas” can be considered to have the same geographical identities as states 
because they possess not only “common features and interests” but also “certain overall 
geographical characteristics” (p.176). Hence, it is feasible to make the EU the subject 
of study from a geopolitical perspective.  
 
As with realist theories, geopolitics insists on power. For geopolitics, geographical 
locations, strategic orientations, and territorial size and material resource are the 
determinants of great power. Theoretically, there are three main types of geopolitical 
actors: sea powers, land powers and land-sea hybrid powers (Wu, 2018). With a 
geopolitical view, the American naval historian Alfred Mahan coined the term ‘sea 
power’ and developed his “philosophy of sea power” (Sprout, 1939). Meanwhile, the 
British political geographer Halford Johun Mackinder and the American political 
scientist Nicholas John Spykman sequentially developed the “heartland theory” 
(Mackinder, 1904) and “rimland theory” (Spykman, 1944). Arguably, sea power theory 
can be considered an integral part of realist IR theories (Wu, 2018). However, like other 
IR theories, sea power theory is in a process of evolution over time. Based on the 
Mahanian sea power theory, the modern sea power theory is taking shape. Therefore, it 
is important to critically overview the development of sea power theory.  
 
2.3 Mahanian Sea Power Theory 
The term ‘sea power’ was initially brought forward by American historian Alfred 
Thales Mahan in 1890 in The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660-1783. He later 
published The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793–
1812 (1892), The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future(1897), The Life 
of Nelson (1897) and The Major Operations of the Navies in the War of American 
Independence (1913).  All of his books and articles revolved around a single theme – 




2.3.1  Historical Context of Mahanian Sea Power Theory 
Mahan’s sea power theory is an argument based on the development of human 
civilisation, science, and technology, as well as a specific social and historical 
background. The increase of human understanding of the seas, the repeated naval wars, 
and human reflection on the role of sea power provided Mahan with a sound theoretical 
basis. At the same time, the then social environment of the United States encouraged 
Mahan to develop sea power theory.  
 
Firstly, Mahan’s sea power theory is based on the accumulation of the experience of 
human beings’ exploration of the ocean. Before Mahan, the exploration of the ocean 
has been part of  human history. In ancient times, people thought that the sea was the 
edge of the world, but human practice was constantly challenging this traditional belief. 
For instance, Phoenicians in ancient times “sailed throughout the known world” 
(Stavridis, 2018, p. 136). They sailed south around Africa through the Red Sea and the 
Indian Ocean, then returned to Egypt from west to east through the Pillars of Hercules. 
They also started from North Africa to reach Western Europe alongside the shoreline. 
Thus, people began to boldly claim that the Earth is round and the land is surrounded 
by the oceans. As long as people cross the ocean, they can reach the other side of the 
far continent. Subsequently, this conjecture was constantly confirmed by the practice 
of explorers. Christopher Columbus’s ‘discovery’ of the New World (1492), Vasco de 
Gama’s first touch of the Indian subcontinent (1498), and Ferdinand Magellan’s 
circumnavigation (1519-1521) suggest that, since the oceans are the channels between 
continents, conquering the oceans means conquering more lands and the achievement 
of  extraordinary wealth. Mahan’s era is the period of vigorous development of the 
Second Industrial Revolution. Based on the progress of mankind’s perception of the 
oceans, developments in the field of science and technology make people know better 
the oceans than ever before. Hence, Mahan’s theory can be seen as the fruit of the 




Besides the exploration of oceans, Mahan’s theory is based on the experience of naval 
wars in history. In the years of naval battle history, people accumulated a rich 
experience of naval war. In the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries, European 
nations intensified their competition and control over the sea. Early capitalist countries, 
such as Portugal, Spain, and the Netherlands, with superior geographical conditions and 
naval power, turned the ‘new continent’ into colonies, which significantly promoted the 
development and prosperity of their motherlands. Portugal, which was a small nation 
in terms of land area, led in the naval exploration and became the first global 
superpower. Spain had the most powerful maritime force in the world during the 16th 
and early 17th centuries. As a small country, the Netherlands expanded by sea which 
resulted in hundreds of years of global colonial dominance by a powerful navy. To 
compete for world hegemony, these nations launched fierce naval wars. Portugal, Spain, 
and the Netherlands successively ascended the throne of the overlord at sea. Eventually, 
the United Kingdom adopted a successful strategy, defeated Spain, the Netherlands, 
and France in a series of naval battles, and took control of the seas. In Mahan’s era, the 
capitalist nations fiercely competed for colonies as well as sea control. The emerging 
economies, such as Germany, Italy, and Japan, which were not satisfied with the 
existing pattern of colonial distribution, vigorously developed their navies to promote 
the redistribution of overseas colonies. So this rich naval war experience leads to the 
reflection of the sea power’s dominance in the development of a nation, which is a 
central argument in Mahan’s theory. 
 
Rigorous research and contention on sea power’s dominance in history is another 
foundation of Mahan’s theory. “Mahan and his generation benefited from a rise in 
interest in naval history as a repository of experience to process” (Till, 2013, p. 56). 
While developing the then existing naval theory, Mahan also challenged the then 
‘widespread ignorance … about the role and importance of sea power’ (Till, 2013, p. 
57), because in the annals of world history, the struggle between sea power and land 
power always occurs unexpectedly. The account of the dominance of sea power went 
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back to ancient times. Herodotus’s account of the war between the Greek city-states 
and the Persian Empire (449-478 BC), and Thucydides’ account of the Peloponnesian 
War (431-404 BC) between Athens and Sparta recorded the first victories of sea power. 
The battle of Lepanto off the coast of Greece in 1571, as well as the triumph of the 
English navy over the Spanish Armada in 1588, are both examples of how naval battles 
proved to be turning points in conflicts. From 1270 to 1899, there were 17 books on 
naval thought published outside of the United States (Till, 2013, p. 53). Hence, Mahan’s 
theory can be seen as the ground-breaking piece of research based on the heritage of 
the rich maritime culture and naval wars. 
 
Mahan’s sea power theory is also the product of the struggle between isolationism and 
imperialism in the history of the United States. At the end of the nineteenth century, the 
economic strength of the United States had caught up with and surpassed all the 
traditional capitalist countries at that time. Its demand for overseas markets was 
stronger than that of any other nation. However, the decision-making of the United 
States had been restricted by its traditional isolationism. The Isolationists believed that 
the United States should regard the sea as its natural barrier and not be involved in 
European disputes at any time. The reflection of this idea in the military field was the 
indifference towards the development of the navy. Despite the profound influence of 
Isolationism in the United States, however, there were still many people who believed 
that the United States should pursue an expanding overseas policy, participate in the 
division of the world, and actively seek foreign markets. The geographical 
characteristics of the United States, bordered by seas, determine that its external 
expansion must rely on a strong navy. Isolationism was so powerful that neither the 
government nor the Congress had the intention to invest heavily in building a strong 
navy. In 1870, the United States Navy had only 52 ships, ranking 12th in the world. 
Naturally, such a naval force was not able to support the expansion of the United States 
overseas (Gough, 1991). The Imperialists were crying out for a naval theory to convince 
Congress and the government that building a strong navy was essential for the future 
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prosperity of the United States.  Initially, Mahan was also an isolationist. However, in 
the process of carrying out missions abroad as the commander of the warship 
‘Wachusett’, he gradually turned into a firm imperialist, keen on promoting the United 
States to take the road of expansionism. Mahan criticised United States military reform, 
saying it was too slow and conservative and argued for the building of a strong navy as 
well as naval bases abroad. It was the fierce struggle between the Isolationism and 
Imperialism that provided a necessary precondition for the birth of the Sea Power 
Theory. 
 
2.3.2 Mahanian Sea Power Theory 
The sea power Theory established by Mahan can be divided into three parts: the first is 
the philosophy of sea power based on history, which is included in his most well-known 
work, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 (1890); the second is naval 
strategy in a narrower sense, which is included in his book, Naval Strategy (1911); and 
the third concerns the then geopolitical issues closely related to the naval strategy, 
which appear in many works on the subject of international relations and papers 
published in journals. Amongst the three parts, the first one – the philosophy of sea 
power – is not only the most influential, but is also considered the essential contribution 
of Mahan (Gough, 1991). For this thesis, it should be noted that the research focuses 
neither on naval warfare nor on naval tactics from a military perspective. Hence, the 
study rather prioritises the Mahan philosophy of sea power. But for the completeness 
of the theory, the thoughts of Mahan on naval strategy and other aspects are introduced 
briefly in the section as well. 
 
2.3.2.1 Significant Influence of Maritime Strength upon Great Issues 
The most influential argument of Mahan lies in his well-known connection between sea 
power and national power. Mahan (1890) claimed in the Preface of The Influence of 
Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 that “the definitive object proposed in this work, 
is an examination of the general history of Europe and America with particular 
reference to the effect of sea power upon the course of that history”(p. iii). Mahan used 
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a historical methodology and made the connection between his own specific topics to 
general history (Gough, 1991). He made comparisons between the two cases of the UK 
and France –– the former gained power and wealth through strengthening its sea power; 
at the same time, the latter transferred its strategic centre from the sea to the continent. 
He argued that sea power is of considerable significance to the destinies of nations. He 
ascribed Britain’s success over its European rivals to its control of the seas, as well as 
France’s decline as a result of its disregard of the waters. Hence, Mahan made a close 
connection between national prosperity and sea power by claiming “the profound 
determining influence of maritime strength upon great issues” (Mahan, 1890, p. iii).   
 
2.3.2.2 Exchange of Products, Shipping and Colonies are Essential to a Nation’s 
Sea Power 
The seas of the world can be seen as a kind of highway which all nations can use. And 
in comparison with travel and traffic by land, shipping is easier and cheaper, especially 
“in a period when roads were few and very bad, wars frequent and society unsettled” 
(Mahan, 1890, p.25).   But shipping needs protection, which can be considered a 
reason that a navy exists. Moreover, shipping and navy both need trade, refuge and 
supplies, so the birth and growth of colonies became necessary. That is the logic behind 
Mahanian sea power theory. He believed that sea power not only refers to the naval 
power used to control the sea but also includes the maritime trade and shipping. Hence, 
three things are essential to a nation’s sea power; that is: “production, with the necessity 
of exchanging products, shipping, whereby the exchange is carried on, and colonies, 
which facilitate and enlarge the operations of shipping and tend to protect it by 
multiplying points of safety” (Mahan, 1890, p.28). 
 
2.3.2.3 Six Elements of Sea Power 
Mahan (1890) articulated six elements of sea power as follows: geographical position; 
physical conformation, as connected in addition to that, natural productions and climate; 
extent of territory; population size; character of the people; and character of the 
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government. As section 2.4 discusses in detail the elements of sea power, more detailed 
discussion will be found in that section.  
 
2.3.2.4 Some Principles for Naval Strategy and Naval Tactics 
Besides the ‘philosophy on sea power’, Mahan also established some principles for 
naval strategy and naval tactics. Instead of formulating them directly and systematically, 
however, Mahan scattered them across different case studies in his praise of the British 
Navy in contrast to his criticism of the French Navy. The naval thinkers and scholars 
had made great efforts to generalise from his works as follows:  the navy is for the 
purpose of attack and attack is the best defence at sea (Livezey, 1981); the command of 
the sea is the premise of taking the initiative in war and the decisive factor in the war 
(ibid); to realise the command of the sea, the enemy fleet rather than merchant ships 
must be the target of the attack (Shi, 2012); and the concentration of heavy warships is 
considered “the ultimate decider of naval power” (Till, 2013, p. 57). Like Mahan’s 
‘philosophy of sea power’, his thoughts on naval strategy and naval tactics were highly 
influential and adopted by many navies, such as the United States Navy and Japanese 
Navy.  
 
2. 4 Contention on the Understanding of Sea Power 
As mentioned above, the most significant contribution of Mahan is that he made the 
connection between sea power and national power. However, instead of providing a 
precise definition of sea power, Mahan revealed the essence of sea power by 
commenting on various historical facts (Grove, 1991; Tangredi, 2002; Till, 2013). On 
one hand, Mahan (1890) claims that “the history of sea power is large, though by no 
means solely, a narrative of contests between nations, of mutual rivalries, of violence 
frequently culmination in war … largely a military history” (p. 1). On the other hand, 
however, he concluded that the elements of sea power – geographical position, physical 
conformation, the extent of territory, population, the character of people and character 
of government – have little to do with the military. As such, it is not strange that there 
are a myriad of interpretations as well as debates about definitions because, as Grove 
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(1991) argued, “sea power means different things to different people” (p.3). That is the 
reason why there is contention around the understanding of the concept of ‘sea power’. 
The primary debate surrounding sea power involves two perspectives: the narrowest 
and the widest sense. In the narrower sense, sea power can be seen as the command of 
the sea by using the military capability; in contrast, in its wildest sense, sea power is 
composed not only of the naval force but also of other non-military components. And 
if we compare these two competing perspectives, it seems that understanding sea power 
in its widest sense dominates. 
 
2.4.1 Interpretation of Sea Power in the Narrower Sense 
The interpretation of sea power in the narrower sense means to perceive sea power 
through its military nature. According to literature, it seems that support for this 
assertion is not strong. Modelski and Thompson (1988) argued that “in the classical 
definition, sea power means use and control of the sea. Use and control of the sea, or 
the denial of it to an opponent, requires naval forces…” (p.3).They used ‘sea power’ to 
describe “a state disposing of major naval strength,” and “the exercise of junction in 
the global system by the use of naval strength” (p.4). Grove (1990) also considers sea 
power as a military concept, a form of military power deployed at or from the sea. His 
explanation is based on Mahan’s assertion, “the history of sea power, while embracing 
in its broad sweep all that tends to make a people great upon the sea or by the sea … is 
largely a military history” (Mahan, 1890, p.1). 
 
However, there were equally some changes in the interpretation of sea power in the 
narrower sense. Shi (2012) enriched the understanding of sea power theory while 
insisting on the military nature of sea power. Regarding the military aspect of sea power, 
Shi (2012) inherited Brodie’s views on naval weapons and equipment. Brodie (1943) 
noted that while military capabilities are used to control maritime lines of 
communication, no matter on land, at sea or in the air, they should be part of sea power. 
Shi (2012) went further, emphasising that besides warships, all the land-based, air-
based and space-based arms and equipment deployed for the purpose of maintaining 
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maritime security, such as aircraft, the missile, and the satellite for military use, are to 
be considered an indispensable component of sea power. Secondly, Shi (2012) took 
international alignment as part and parcel of sea power. Sea power, as a tool for 
handling international relations with other countries, naturally has a direct and close 
connection with a country’s foreign behaviour. Based on the two arguments above, Shi 
(2012) defined sea power in three dimensions. The first dimension is the “material sea 
power” (p.16), including all the warships, the arms and equipment deployed for the 
purpose of maritime security, and the military that go with these. The second dimension 
is the “conceptual sea power” (ibid), referring to a nation state’s recognition of sea 
power, as well as the thoughts and theories on the practice of sea power. The third 
dimension is the application of sea power on the world stage, that is, the way and 
process by which countries combine the first two dimensions and use sea power to 
achieve specific goals in international relations. These three dimensions are inseparable 
from one other and together form a three-dimensional concept of sea power. 
 
2.4.2 Interpretation of Sea Power in the Widest Sense 
Apart from the understanding of sea power in the narrower sense, there is also an 
interpretation of sea power from a perspective broader than just a military 
understanding. The contemporary usage of sea power is a more inclusive and expansive 
concept than naval power alone. Surprisingly, amongst supporters, there are a lot of 
naval officers who advocate this position. As practitioners of military careers, they gave 
their own experience and came to more convincing conclusions.  
 
Gorshkov (1978), the then Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union and Commander-
in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, claimed that the military aspect of sea power only works 
in the short term( Stubbs and Truver, 2007). Mullen (2006), the then United States 
Navy’s Chief of Naval Operations, argued that  sea power as a notion is defined too 
narrowly (ibid). Tangredi (2002) asserted that “the term sea power is not exclusively 
synonymous with naval warfare” (p.3), and distinguished ‘sea power’, which is 
indivisible with its geo-economic purposes, from ‘land power’ and ‘air power’, which 
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can generally be viewed as purely military terms. While admitting navies as the obvious 
element of sea power, Tangredi (2002) pointed out that “maritime shipping, seaport 
operations, undersea resources, fisheries, and other forms of commerce and 
communications through fluid media can all be seen as integral to a nation’s sea power” 
(ibid, p. 3). Tangredi (2002) defined sea power from the perspective of sea power’s 
capacity, materialising abstract sea power into three concrete abilities: the first is its 
capability to protect international trade and employment of resources; the second is its 
capability to maintain control of the sea; the last is its capability to influence affairs on 
land. As such, Tangredi (2002) gives an inclusive definition of sea power as 
the combination of a nation-state’s capacity for international maritime 
commerce and utilisation of oceanic resources, with its ability to project 
military power into the sea, for the purposes of sea and area control over 
commerce and conflict, and from the sea, in order to influence events 
on land by means of naval forces (p.3).  
 
Till (2013) defined sea power in terms of static and dynamic dimensions. The static 
dimension of sea power consists of “navies, coastguards, the marine or civil maritime 
industries broadly defined and where relevant, the contribution of land and air force” 
(p.25), which can also be seen as an ‘input’. The input of sea power generates dynamic 
output consequences, which refers to “the capacity to influence the behaviour of other 
people or things by what one does at or from the sea” (Till, 2013, p.25). In contrast to 
a static input, the consequences or output are constantly changing. On one hand, he 
attaches more significance to the output of sea power than input. On the other hand, he 
emphasises that sea-based capacity determines the consequences of activities both at 
sea and on land (ibid).  
 
Till (2013) emphasised two dimensions of the concept of sea power. The first is that 
“sea power includes the non-military aspects of sea-use (merchant shipping, fishing, 
marine insurance, ship-building and repair, and so on)” (p.25). The second is that “sea 
power is a relative concept, something that some countries have more than others. The 
real issue is a matter of degree. Nearly all countries have a degree of sea power” (ibid). 
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As such, the relationship between different sea powers matters more than absolute naval 
strength.  
 
Till (2013)’s innovative ‘relative sea power’ is strategically significant in the real world. 
There are two meanings to the relativity of sea power. On one hand, as a clear majority 
of nations possess both sea power and land power, instead of easily but rashly claiming 
a country to be a sea power or not, Till (2013) suggested that “for sea powers, the 
maritime dimension will tend to dominate and to shape the way the state thinks about 
its land forces; in land powers the reverse is true” (p. 26). So the balance between sea 
power and land power is a key factor to consider regarding a nation’s strength. On the 
other hand, the relative nature of sea power leads Till (2013) to the conclusion that “the 
strategic effectiveness of sea power depends importantly on the strengths and 
weaknesses of who it is exerted against” (p.26); in other words, sea power is decided 
by interaction between the competing rivals. This is a more inclusive perspective to 
review the sea power of different countries. It means the measuring of sea power is not 
a mathematical calculation which depends on the quantity of warships or airplanes, but 
the interaction among the strategic environment, the threats, and the sea power itself. 
 
Parry (2014) defined sea power as “the combined investment in the sea of the various 
components and resources of a state or enterprise in the pursuit of favourable outcomes” 
(p.94). Based on the functions of sea power, Parry (2014) divided sea power into ‘hard 
sea power’ and ‘soft sea power’. The former “is associated with the ability to threaten 
or employ violence and coercion as an instrument of policy” (ibid, p.9), while the latter 
“is generally associated with exploitation of the sea’s resources and the movement of 
goods along sea lines of communication” (ibid). In essence, this categorisation reflects 
the different understanding of sea power: hard sea power can be seen as an 
understanding of sea power in the narrower sense, while soft sea power as an 




Parry (2014) agreed on the understanding of the notion ‘sea power’ in the widest sense, 
since he noted that [sea power] “is too often viewed simply and narrowly as the benefit 
gained in a particular time and place by the possession and deployment of naval 
force”(p.97). However, while claiming that a state can have the two kinds of sea power 
at once, he emphasised that “soft power is usable only with the implicit or explicit 
presence of hard power, to prevent disruptions in the international system by states, 
criminals or others”(ibid, p.96). Therefore, Parry (2014) clarified the relationship 
between military factors and other factors, and emphasised the key role which the 
military factor plays in the development of sea power.  
 
What made Parry’s sea power thoughts distinct from other scholars is that he did not 
limit the owner of sea power to a nation state. “Any individual or group able to bring 
force or influence to bear at sea can be said to be demonstrating sea power in one form 
or another” (Parry, 2014, p.96).This can be seen as a breakthrough in the development 
of sea power theory.  
 
2.5 Sea Power in the Era of Globalisation 
Globalisation is an essential feature of the early twenty-first century. It is considered as 
primarily an economic phenomenon, which embodies “rapidly shifting flows of world 
capital, expansion of overseas markets and investments, the global connection of e-
commerce and the Internet” (Tangredi, 2002, p. xxi). The outcome of globalisation is 
that transnational economic and technological trends make inroads into the autarchy of 
national units (Till, 2013). Hence, this “borderless world” shaped by globalisation 
keeps on challenging the external threat perceptions of a nation, that is a system-centred 
approach is replacing the “conventional, traditional, modern state-centred one” (ibid, 
p.29), as globalisation has become the defining aspect of the contemporary international 
system.  
 
There can be no doubt, globalisation has great impact on the seas and oceans. One of 
the most notable changes is that, rather than being the medium for dominion in the era 
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of Mahan, sea and ocean have become “a flow resource –– a means of transportation 
and exchange” (Bekkevold and Till, 2016, p.4). From this perspective, “the sea as a 
transportation route and strategic manoeuver space is comparatively more significant 
today than ever before” (ibid, p.308). Consequently, for the individual nation in the 
globalised system, contributing to collective efforts in addressing transnational 
challenges and preserving the international order at sea has become as important as 
safeguarding national interests.  
 
Globalisation affects sea power in every aspect. Firstly, in terms of the nature of sea 
power, it is becoming less military. “Globalisation, and everything that goes with it, is 
creating a new paradigm of collaborative naval endeavour that needs to be set alongside 
the more competitive naval behaviours of the past” (Till, 2018, p.36). On one hand, as 
discussed in the preceding section, there are more non-military components of sea 
power. While naval forces remain the essential constituent, the geographical, economic, 
political, and institutional factors play an important role in it. Moreover, even for the 
military constituent of sea power, the naval force, there is also the non-military value 
in such a force. Military function, diplomatic functions and constabulary functions 
(Booth, 1979) are all part of the naval function, and sometimes they intertwine. In the 
globalisation era, however, the role of the diplomatic functions and constabulary 
functions of naval force have increased more rapidly than that of military functions. In 
comparison with an army and an air force, a navy has characteristics which are more 
suited to diplomatic functions. Wylie (1991) explained clearly that 
Only navies can have benign as well as an effective general employment in times of 
relative peace because, basically, they operate in the relatively neutral medium of the 
world’s ocean waterways. Navies do not normally intrude upon the sovereignties of 
other and sometimes sensitive nations around the world (p.41).  
 
Meanwhile, the increasingly non-traditional threats require a navy to take more 
responsibility in the constabulary domain in accordance with national and international 




The struggle in the military field used to be a zero-sum game – defeat the rival or be 
defeated. However, against the backdrop of globalisation, while the collaborative naval 
endeavours in the maritime domain increase, the competitive naval behaviour still has 
some way to go to vanish (Till, 2013). For sea power in the era of globalisation, there 
is “a common belief in the freedom of the seas and in the need to maintain a reasonable 
level of order and security in the maritime domain so as to benefit from the advantages 
that freedom of the seas grants states and economic agents” (Germond, 2020, p. 30), 
thus it needs to adopt a collective form to contribute to the global effort. As such, sea 
power in the era of globalisation is less a zero-sum game than ever. It is an incontestable 
fact that the difference in size and capability of every stakeholder is huge, but this does 
not mean that the differences are a barrier preventing the small countries from 
contributing to the more secure maritime order. 
 
From the perspective of an owner of sea power, it is becoming less state-centric. Since 
the appearance of the notion of sea power, its main mechanism has always been the 
individual sovereign state. State-centralism used to be seen as one feature of sea power. 
However, with the advent of globalisation, sea power has changed in accordance with 
the changing international system. The first salient feature is that sea power is no longer 
the privilege of the individual sovereign state. And the reason for this change lies in the 
increase of the functions that sea power needs to fulfil in the era of globalisation. 
Besides maritime security operations, sea power currently also plays the role in 
“maintaining good order at sea and stabilising the liberal world order in the maritime 
domain” (Germond, 2020, p. 29). These functions require a kind of collective sea power 
which relies on cooperation at different levels, from international, regional to a 
transnational level. Hence, it is natural that a growing number of non-state actors have 
become the protagonists of maintaining maritime security and good sea order, while 
the role of individual countries is weakening. The international organisations, the 
regional organisations and the non-governmental organisations have set out to take 
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more responsibilities in the maritime domain. So being less state-centric has become an 
important feature of sea power in the era of globalisation. 
  
2.6 Elements of Sea Power 
This section aims to explore the elements of sea power. As mentioned in the preceding 
section, there are two kinds of understanding of sea power, one which equates sea 
power with naval strength, and one which has a more inclusive interpretation of sea 
power. By logical extension, sea power includes more elements than naval forces. Then, 
there are two questions needed to be answered. What is an element of sea power? And 
what are the elements of modern sea power? 
 
Firstly, the elements of sea power can be seen as the preconditions and the components 
of sea power.  On one hand, they refer to “the principal conditions affecting the sea 
power of nations” (Mahan, 1890, p.28). For instance, geographical reality can be 
considered a precondition of sea power since landlocked countries cannot be a sea 
power. On the other hand, they refer to the “constituents” (Till, 2013), which are 
supposed to make up a sea power, such as a navy. Therefore, the elements of sea power 
refer to all the conditions which enable the sea power to arise and develop.   
 
Based on the existing literature, this section provides an overview of elements of 
modern sea power. Like the definition of the term ‘sea power’ which has evolved in 
accordance with technological and political developments, the content of this term is 
changing as well: some elements have become less critical or even no longer relevant, 
while some other new elements have emerged. Mahan’s Discussion of the Elements of 
Sea Power in the very first chapter of his seminal work, The Influence of Sea Power 
upon History, 1660–1783 (1890), can be seen as the starting point for a discussion of 





2.6.1  Mahan’s ‘Six Elements of Sea Power’ (1890) 
Amongst the six elements of sea power that Mahan (1890) includes in the opening 
chapter of his work, geographical position comes first. Some countries have greater 
geopolitical advantages. For instance, insular countries are in a more favourable 
position than continental countries, as the former can focus on the capacity building of 
their navy, whereas the latter have to accommodate the separate power on land and at 
sea. And an advantageous geopolitical position enhances a country’s ability to manage 
effective attack and defence strategies. Another geopolitical advantage is control over 
the great thoroughfare of global ocean traffic. Last but not least, an extensive coastline 
and good ports are also important to a sea power.  
 
The second element of sea power is physical conformation. Whether a country has a 
seaboard and numerous and deep harbours in part determines its strength and wealth, 
as they are linked to the potential for overseas trade.  
 
The extent of territory is the third element of sea power. Simply, “It is not the total 
number of square miles which a country contains, but the length of its coastline and the 
character of its harbours that are to be considered” (Mahan, 1890, p.43).  
 
The fourth element is the population size. Just as the extent of territory implies only the 
littoral area, the relevant people here refer to the “number following the sea, or at least 
readily available for employment on ship-board and the creation of naval material, that 
must be counted” (ibid, p.45) 
 
The fifth element is the national character. As Mahan (1890) points out, “the tendency 
to trade, involving of necessity the production of something to trade with, is the national 
characteristic most important to the development of sea power” (p.53).In addition, an 




The last element of sea power in the Mahanian theory is the character of the government. 
The government plays a vital role both in peacetime and wartime: in peacetime, it needs 
to encourage its people to explore and benefit from the sea; while in wartime, it must 
maintain a cost-effective navy and naval institutions ( Mahan, 1890). 
Table 1: Mahan’s Six Elements of Sea Power 
Geographical Position  
Physical Conformation 
Extent of Territory 
Size of Population 
Character of the People 
Character of the Government 
 
2.6.2 Grove’s ‘Two Orders of Sea Power’ (1990) 
Given that “Mahan was at his most ‘nineteenth-century’ in outlook” (Grove, 1990, p. 
226), Glove (1990) critiqued and deconstructed Mahanian theory by making the 
following observation. Thanks to technological progress (such as the invention of 
aircraft and rockets), geographical location is not as important as it was in Mahan’s 
time; physical formation and extent of territory and population size can be seen as parts 
of economic strength; national character needs to be divided into three parts (economic 
strength, technological prowess, and social-political culture); and government 
encourages sea power through fostering economic growth or emphasising the defence 
and the navy.  
 
Based on these observations, Grove built up a “new set of Principal Conditions 
Affecting the Sea Power of Nations” (ibid, p. 231). There are two orders or levels of 
sea power in Glove’s theoretical framework. Economic Strength, Technological 
Prowess and Social-Political Culture constitute the three elements of the First Order of 
Sea Power. Geographical Position, Sea Dependence (in terms of seaborne trade, 
merchant marine, shipbuilding, fish catch, and offshore zone), and Government Policy 




In Grove’s theory, economic strength is the most critical element, as it is the foundation 
of all other factors. It also leads to technical prowess, which is related closely to the 
social-political culture, as “certain societies and political systems are better at adapting 
to technological change than others” (Grove, 1990, p. 230).  
 
While the relevance of the conditions of the First Order are emphasised, the conditions 
in the Second Order cannot be overlooked. Geographical position is still of great 
significance, as the land-locked states are not able to have a navy. However, sheer 
position is of less importance, and other geographical factors need to be comprehended 
within the concept of sea dependence. Mahan’s Character of Government is changed to 
Government Policy and Perception.  
 
Based on Grove’s conclusion of the elements of sea power, there are two views that 
confront Mahan’s perspective. While Mahan (1890) pretends that “purely military sea 
power can only be built up by an aggressive despot” (p. 88), Grove (1990) insists on 
the legitimacy of military sea power and emphasises the close association between the 
economic use of the sea and naval power, asserting that “as the economic forms of the 
sea use become ever more internationalised so the military use of the sea may have to 
become more internationalised too” (p.232). 
Table 2: Grove’s “Two Orders of Elements of Sea Power” 
First Order          1. Economic Strength 
                            2. Technological Prowess 
                            3. Socio-political culture 
Second Order      1. Geographical position 
                            2. Sea dependence in terms of: 
                                a) Seaborne trade 
                                b) Merchant marine 















2.6.3 Till’s ‘Direct and Indirect Constituents of Sea Power’ (2013) 
Instead of the term ‘element’, Till (2013) uses the term ‘constituent’ to describe the 
“attributes of countries that make it easier or harder for them to be strong at sea” (p. 
87). Firstly, Till (2013) noted that the constituents of sea power “are constantly on the 
move, shifting and changing in accordance with a variety of social, economic, 
technological and political developments” and “depend very much on a strategic 
context over which national governments have little control”(p. 87).  
 
Secondly, Till (2013) divided the constituents of sea power into two parts: direct and 
indirect. This classification is based on the value and effect of a particular constituent. 
Direct constituents can influence sea power in their own right whereas indirect 
constituents can only influence by “contributing to the effectiveness of one or more of 
the other constituents” (Till, 2013, p.88). According to Till (2013), naval strength is the 
only direct constituent of sea power. Meanwhile, it serves equally as an indirect 
constituent, since it can influence all the other constituents of sea power. 
 
Besides naval strength, there are other indirect constituents, such as maritime people, 
society and government, maritime geography, resources, maritime economy, and 
                                d) Fish catch 
                                e) Offshore zone 
                           3. Government policy and perception 
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technology, as well as the other means (Till, 2013). Therefore, while emphasising the 
key role of naval strength, Till (2013) had more inclusive thoughts on the composition 
of sea power. By connecting all the economic, political, technical, physical and 
institutional factors with the notion of sea power, Till developed the Mahanian sea 
power theory and brought it into line with the strategic context.  









Based on this review of the elements of sea power in the literature, we can observe a 
clear trend in the elements of sea power. The elements of sea power are diversifying, 
that is, more factors are added to the list of elements of sea power. While certain factors 
remain in the list of the composition of sea power (such as naval force, geographical 
position and government policy) the development of a maritime economy and the 
progress of science and technology begin to play a more important role. And this thesis 
seeks to establish the essential elements in the formation of sea power.  
 
Firstly, geography is still an important determinant of sea power. As mentioned above, 
sea power as a concept of geopolitical theory cannot be separated from the geographical 
factors it possesses. The role of geography is “to determine a state’s relationship with 
the sea, its maritime importance, its vulnerability to threats emanating from seaward 
and its need for naval power” (Lindberg, 1998, p.38). Besides the value in the military 
domain, geographical factors are connected with the development of the blue economy 
Direct constituent         Naval strength 
Indirect constituents     Population, society and government 
                                      Maritime geography 
                                      Resources 
                                      Technology 
                                      Maritime economy 
                                      Other means 
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and indeed the overall economy. Therefore, geography is the prime element of sea 
power. 
 
Secondly, the dependence of an economy on the oceans and seas constitutes another 
precondition of sea power. Sea power grows out of the need of peaceful shipping. As a 
resource, as well as a medium of transportation, the sea is more than ever before vital 
to economic growth throughout the world, especially to the countries which rely heavily 
on international commerce and shipping. Therefore, maritime economy is another 
essential precondition for the development of sea power.  
 
Thirdly, political recognition and determination play a key role in the development of 
sea power. This means that “the sea became really important on the political agenda, in 
the popular culture, and in the collective imagery” (Germond, 2015, p.98). Therefore, 
a maritime government with marine strategic thinking is an indispensable prerequisite 
for sea power. 
 
Fourthly, suitable organisational structures and efficient decision-making processes 
constitute an essential part of sea power. Maritime security is a comprehensive policy 
area that includes many policy fields. Suitable organisational structures can be seen as 
the glue which binds the different functions altogether.  
 
Last, but not least, naval forces are still important as the vector of sea power. The 
concept of ‘sea power’ implies a military dimension, whether it is defined in a broad 
sense or narrow sense. While not the only element of sea power, naval forces are 
definitely an important component of sea power. As a matter of fact, the existence of 
naval forces is the vector of sea power and shoulders more functions in the era of 




In summary, the essential elements of sea power include the geographical, economic, 
political, institutional and military factors. All these elements are intertwined, influence 
and interact with one another to form a whole.  
 
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to provide a theoretical framework of sea power. The notion of 
sea power is the key concept of the thesis. It was coined a hundred years ago, and still 
widely used today. As a branch of geopolitical theory, sea power theory focused on the 
abilities that a nation-state or the stakeholder possesses to maintain maritime security, 
exercise sea control and influence the events on land by naval means. 
 
When defining the term of ‘sea power’, the literature highlighted that the interpretation 
of sea power in the widest sense might be more in line with the contemporary global 
environment. Existing research has sought to show the ambiguity in the definition of 
the term ‘sea power’. This thesis favours the broad concept of sea power as “the 
combination of a nation-state’s capacity for international maritime commerce and 
utilisation of the oceanic resource, with its ability to project military power into the sea, 
for the purposes of sea and area control, and from the sea, in order to influence events 
on land by means of naval forces” (Tangredi, 2002, p. 3-4). In the era of globalisation, 
the nature and actors of sea power are experiencing some changes, and sea power is 
becoming less military, less zero-sum game and less state-centric.  
 
The elements of sea power, as the precondition and the components of sea power, are 
clarified in this chapter. This thesis incorporates some basic elements of sea power: 
geographical reality, economic dependency on the sea, political aspiration, maritime 
institution, as well as naval strength which are intertwined and altogether make up a sea 
power. 
 
The final section of this chapter turned to how the research question outlined in Chapter 
One will be answered. Besides the definition, the elements of sea power also play an 
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important role in featuring the developments of sea power. When reviewing the 
different perceptions of the elements of sea power, the existing literature provides a 
useful starting point. The two approaches make a matrix. One approach describes sea 
power from the viewpoint of the generation of sea power, such as maritime economy, 
naval force, and marine geographical position. The other approach adopts a functional 
perspective: the control and use of the sea, projecting power from the sea, and 
influencing the events on land.  As such, the theoretical framework for the study of 
the EU’s sea power is clarified. The first step is to explore how EU sea power is 
generated by examining the elements which are the preconditions and components; in 
other words, by observing the EU sea power from geographical, economic, political, 
institutional and military perspectives. The second step is to examine by means of case 
studies how the EU practises the sea power in the different sea areas. Then the well-
constructed matrix of EU sea power is applied: while the generation of EU sea power 
is demonstrated and analysed, the practice of the EU sea power is explored through four 
case studies. By an in-depth investigation of the ‘input’ and ‘output’ of EU sea power, 








As noted in the Chapter Two, answering the question of why the EU is a sea power 
depends on how we benchmark the term ‘sea power’ –– whether it is a synonym for 
naval power or a broader geopolitical term of IR theory. Based on the overview and 
analysis in the preceding chapter, a modern sea power theory has been built. In this 
theory, sea power is understood in the widest sense, and can be seen as a matrix: on one 
hand, sea power is the “product of an amalgam of interconnected constituents that are 
difficult to tease apart” (Till, 2013, p.87), and these interconnected constituents are the 
elements of sea power; on the other hand, sea power is the capability that a nation-state 
or a stakeholder possesses to achieve military and political ambitions (Tangredi, 2002; 
Parry, 2014).  These twofold perceptions provide the theoretical framework to review 
EU sea power. All the geographical, economic, political, institutional and military 
elements of the EU are amalgamated to generate EU sea power and the EU uses all 
these elements to achieve military and political goals. In order to confirm the EU as a 
sea power, the two preconditions must be clarified: whether the EU has all the elements 
of modern sea power, and whether it can fulfil all the functions a sea power nation 
should serve. By identifying the elements of EU sea power, the thesis outlines the 
process of how the sea power is generated at the EU level. 
 
Having outlined in the previous chapter what sea power is and what the elements of sea 
power are, this chapter seeks to answer the first question: Whether the EU has all the 
elements of sea power, and how these elements interact to generate sea power? Given 
that existing studies on sea power are all based on an individual country, the assumption 
that the EU is a sea power seems challenging, because there are two questions which 
have to be answered. Despite the fact that the EU is an international organisation 
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composed of 27 Member States without integrated naval forces, the EU has all the 
essential elements of a sea power and succeeds in achieving its military and political 
goals by using the maritime resources and capabilities. And this chapter will examine 
the resources and the preconditions that the EU has; namely, the elements of the EU’s 
sea power. The chapter empirically studies the preconditions, or the so-called 
‘elements’, which provide all the material and aspirational conditions for the EU to be 
a sea power. Having examined the framework of the elements of sea power in the 
preceding chapter, it seems clear that the elements which affect the EU’s sea power 
derive from five dimensions. Firstly, the EU is geographically surrounded by four seas 
or oceans. Secondly, the EU’s integrated economy is heavily dependent on 
globalisation and international shipping. Thirdly, the EU’s political aspiration is to be 
a global actor and security provider. Fourthly, the EU has established integrated cross-
sectoral maritime institutions. Fifthly, the EU has made great efforts in the military field 
at both EU level and Member State level. These findings answer the question: How is 
the EU sea power generated? 
 
This chapter is divided into six sections. Apart from the conclusion, each section 
presents one element of the EU’s sea power in the order in which they are listed above. 
Section Two examines the shift of the EU’s maritime status due to enlargement, 
pointing out that the EU’s geographical reality is an intrinsic cause for the pursuit of 
sea power. Section Three explores the relationship between the EU’s integrated and 
globalised economy and sea power, claiming that creating and maintaining good 
international order at sea is another reason for the EU to develop sea power. Section 
Four describes the EU’s integrated cross-sectoral maritime institutions and how they 
work. Section Five elaborates the EU’s naval capability, arguing that in the security and 
defence area the EU has made significant progress, which include a naval component. 
The last section concludes all the elements of EU sea power and reveals the generation 




3.2 EU’s Geographical Reality 
‘Organic sea power’ is a term coined by Till (2013, p. 87) to describe the nations that 
naturally develop sea power due to their geographical locations, such as the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands. Obviously, geographical position plays a key role in one 
country’s orientation to be a sea power or land power. For the EU, its geographical 
location ensures that it has the potential to be a sea power. While taking advantage of 
favourable geographical reality in international commerce and shipping, the EU has to 
strengthen its ability to deal with the problems encountered at sea and from the sea. 
 
The EU is located at the edge of the European peninsula, the western part of the 
Eurasian land mass. Over four decades, the EU, as a regional organisation, has 
experienced five rounds of enlargement, from the six founding members to a total of 
28 Member States6. The EU’s enlargement is a process of territorial extension in all 
directions, stretching from the Mediterranean shores to the Baltic Sea, and from the 
Atlantic Ocean to the Black Sea. Vivero and Mateos (2006) argued: “the maritime 
aspect of this change (the enlargement) is, perhaps, one of the most significant, albeit 
not because of the increase in size caused by the enlargement, but because of the 
resulting shift in the EU’s maritime status” (p.167) .  
 
Map 1: the EU enlargement 
(Source: Nations Online Project) 
 
6  In November 2018, more than two years after the United Kingdom referendum on EU membership, the 
Withdrawal Agreement setting out the terms of the United Kingdom’s exit from the EU and the Political Declaration 
setting out the framework for the future relationship between the European Union and the United Kingdom were 
endorsed and approved by the European Council. The European Court of Justice ruled on 10th December 2018 that 
the United Kingdom can unilaterally revoke its intention to withdraw from the EU. The United Kingdom ceased 






Geographically, there are two outcomes from the process of the EU’s enlargement. The 
length of the EU’s coastline has increased from the original 13933.5 km to 53,563.9 km 
before the UK’s withdrawal. In comparison, the length of the United States’ coastline 
is 19,924 (www.cia.gov, 2020). Moreover, “the length of the EU’s maritime border 
exceeds that of the land border” (Germond, 2015, p. 92). Obviously, the length of a 
country’s coastline affects a country’s strategic choices. A country with a short 
coastline and long land borders is unlikely to pursue sea power because the short 
coastline means a lack of harbours and ports, and long land borders imply a more 
complicated environment which is vulnerable to attacks from land neighbours (Wang, 
2014). After several rounds of enlargement, the EU’s coastline is ranked third in the 
48 
 
world. Figure 3.2 demonstrates the process of the EU’s enlargement with the increase 
of the length of coastline in accord with the accession of Member States. This 
geographical feature offers the EU nations significant strategic advantages to develop 
sea power.  
Table 4: Top 10 lengths of coastline in the world 














 The Canadian Arctic Archipelago - consist ing of 36,563 islands,  several  of them some of the world’s 
largest  -  contributes to Canada easi ly having the longest  coast l ine in  the world.  
No Country Length of Coastline (km) 
1 Canada7 202,080 
2 Indonesia 54,716 
3 EU 53,564 
4 Greenland 44,087 
5 Russia 37,653 
6 The Philippines 36,289 
7 China 32,075 
8 Japan 29,751 
9 Australia 25,760 
10 Norway 25,148 
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Table 5: EU’s enlargement and related changes to maritime status 
(Sources: www.cia.gov, 2020). 
 




Length of Coastline  Extent of EU’s sea border 
Original Six 1950 Belgium 66.5km Baltic Sea  
  France 4,853 km  
(metropolitan France: 3,427 km) 
Atlantic Ocean 
 
  Germany 2,389 km  Mediterranean Sea 
  Italy 7,600 km   
  Luxembourg Landlocked  
  The Netherlands 451 km   
Northern 
enlargement 
1973 Denmark 7,314 km  Baltic Sea 
  Ireland 1,448 km  Atlantic Ocean 
  UK 12,429 km  Mediterranean Sea 
Mediterranean 
enlargement 
1981 Greece 13,676 km   
 1986 Portugal 1,793 km  
 
Baltic Sea  
Atlantic Ocean 
Mediterranean Sea 
  Spain 4,964 km  
 
 
EFTA enlargement 1995 Austria Landlocked  
  Finland 1,250 km  
 
Baltic Sea  
Atlantic Ocean 
Mediterranean Sea 





2004 Cyprus 648 km  
 
Baltic Sea  
  Czechia Landlocked Atlantic Ocean 
  Estonia 3,794 km  
 
Mediterranean Sea 
  Hungary Landlocked Black Sea 
  Latvia 498 km  
 
 





  Malta 196.8 km (excludes 56 km for 
the island of Gozo) 
 
 
  Poland 440 km  
 
 
  Slovakia Landlocked  
  Slovenia 46.6 km  
 
 
 2007 Bulgaria 354 km  
 
 
  Romania 225 km  
 
 
Balkan enlargement 2013 Croatia 5,835 km (mainland 1,777 km, 
islands 4,058 km) 
 
Baltic Sea Atlantic Ocean 
Mediterranean Sea Black 
Sea 
Brexit 2019 Britain - 12,429 km   
 
 
Another corresponding advantage of the long and tortuous coastline is the number of 
harbours and ports. Apart from the landlocked countries, the EU’s new coastal Member 
States also have good ports. Amongst the top 20 ports8 in the EU, Tallinn Port in 
Estonia, Riga Port in Latvia, and Constanta Port in Romania are located in the new 
Member States. They shoulder a huge quantity of the maritime transport in the Baltic 
Sea and the Black Sea. Since most of the new Member States are coastal countries, they 
have extended the EU’s sea borders in every direction. As the EU has expanded to the 
east and the south, it has also extended to the sea. Thanks to the new coastal Member 
States, the EU succeeded in expanding its borders to maritime areas which were 
previously beyond reach, as such the Black Sea or the north of the Baltic Sea. Hence, 
 
8 In 2018, the top 20 ports which handle gross weight goods are Rotterdam (441,474),  Antwerpen 
(212,010),  Hamburg (117, 621),  Amsterdam (99,503),  Algeciras (88,  645),  Izmit  (72,431),  Le Havre 
(64,902),  Valencia (61,972),  Botas (60,  730),  Iskenderun,Hatay (5 7,466),  Immingham (55,617),  Bacelona 
(54,560),  London (53,196),  Genova (51,570),  Bremerhaven (51,160),  Peirias (50,925), Bergen (44,314), 
Sines (44,310),  Dunkerque (40,639),  Goterburg (),  (30,935),Tees & Hart lepool (28,386),  Taranto (20,381), 
Tall inn (20,369).  Sources from Eurostat .  
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the EU’s enlargement has determined its geographicalal reality: “over two-thirds of the 
Union’s borders are coastal and that the maritime spaces under the jurisdiction of its 
Member States are larger than their terrestrial territory” (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2006, p.1). 
 
Additionally, the extension of the EU’s coastline arising from enlargement led to an 
increase in the Exclusive Economic Zone. According to Article 56 of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the exclusive economic zone is a sea zone 
which extends 200 nm (370 km) from the baseline, and a state has special rights 
regarding the exploration and use of marine resources, including energy production 
from water and wind (www.un.org, 1982). “The European Union has the largest 
Exclusive Economic Zone in the world—22 million square kilometres, including 
European Overseas Territories” (en.unesco.org, 2020). These are highly valuable assets 
that serve as a source of security and income for the EU.  The EU’s blue economy 
appeared for the first time in an official document of EU in 2012, referring to all the 
activities that are marine-based or marine-related, but not military activities (European 
Commission, 2012). “The ‘blue’ economy represents roughly 5.4 million jobs and 
generates a gross added value of almost €500 billion a year” (ec.europa.eu, 
2020).  Thus, marine and related industries play an important role in the economic 
development of the EU. 
 
3.3 EU’s Maritime Interests 
Besides geographical reality, maritime interests are another factor that affects the 
development of EU sea power. Due to the EU’s dependence on international trade and 
shipping, there is a clear need for the EU to create and sustain good order at sea. 
Moreover, the EU’s economic strength and technological prowess can be seen as the 
precondition for developing sea power. 
 
 “Because of its effect on the state, and state practices, globalisation is the central fact 
of the strategic environment of the early twenty-first century” (Till, 2013, p.27). This 
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has serious implications for the countries aspiring to be global trade powers. And 
“globalisation depends absolutely on the free flow of sea-based shipping” (Till, 2013, 
p. 29). The countries that benefit from globalisation emphasise the need to maintain 
good international order at sea. The enforcement of maritime security and effective 
marine governance have been the aim of countries in the globalisation era. 
 
For the EU, as the then HR/VP Federica Mogherini pointed out:  
[A]s a global trading power, the EU is vitally dependent on free, open and safe 
maritime shipping: 90% of its external and 40% of its internal trade is seaborne. The 
value of goods transported by sea is 1.8 times higher than that of goods transported by 
air and almost three times higher than that of goods transported overland 
(ec.europa.eu, 2017).  
 
Against this backdrop, like other trade powers, there is a clear need for the EU to 
preserve good order at sea and to provide the optimum conditions for trade (Bekkevold 
and Till, 2016). However, “good order at sea cannot and should not be taken as granted” 
(ibid, p.7). There are two kinds of challenges to the current international order at sea: 
one is structural change, like global power shifts, changing threat perceptions, naval 
modernisation, and naval capability changes, and development of the Law of the Sea; 
while the other concerns non-traditional security threats, such as “piracy, terrorism, 
trafficking in WMD, sustainable over-fishing and environmental degradation” (ibid, 
p.7). Hence, due to the complicated situation with maritime security, the core aim of 
the EU is to protect the international commerce and shipping from the challenges and 
threats at sea. 
 
Regarding international trade and shipping, there are two challenges: the sea line of 
communications (SLOCS) 9  and the choke points. Theoretically, ships can travel 
anywhere at sea. After many centuries of shipping, however, there are to this day some 
 
9 “In modern terms SLOs might properly be conceived as sea l ines of commerce.  Although the tradit ional 
and mili tary term remains sea l ines of communication (SLOCs),  the civi lian mari time community 




constant means of travelling between different ports, called “sea lines of 
communications” (SLOCS). They are based on human experience of shipping and the 
study of “the prevailing wind, ocean currents and weather patterns, as well as the 
geographical configuration of the land and sea” (Parry, 2014, p. 56). And “securing sea 
lanes of communication is more than ever before vital to stability, economic growth, 
and development throughout the world” (Bekkevold & Till, 2016, p.3). There are also 
the choke points on the SLOCS. Maritime choke points can be defined as the narrow 
channels connecting two water bodies along widely used sea routes. For an increasingly 
globalised economy, maritime transport remains the most affordable means of 
transporting bulk goods. So the role of SLOCs and the choke points are vital. There are 
fewer than two dozen choke points located on the global maritime trade routes (See 
Table 6). Amongst them, eight are key including the Panama Canal, the Straits of 
Gibraltar, the Turkish Straits, the Suez Canal, the Straits of Malacca and the Straits of 
Dover. 
 
Table 6:  World Vital Chokepoints 





































For the EU, there are three sea lines of communication that are of extreme relevance 
and importance to international trade and transportation. They are the so-called 
“southern corridor”, “eastern corridor”, and “northern corridor” (Behr, Brattberg and 
Kallio, 2013). The southern corridor is the world’s most important maritime highway 
since it connects Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. It starts from the Gulf of Suez, 
runs through the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, then unites with traffic from the Persian 
Gulf, and continues into the Straits of Malacca. The eastern corridor begins at the Straits 
of Malacca through the South China Sea and around Taiwan to the East China Sea. The 





Map 2: Main Maritime Shipping Routes 
(Source: Rodrigue, 2020) 
 
The ‘southern corridor’ and ‘eastern corridor’ as the essential maritime shipping routes 
are not only irreplaceable for the EU but also challenging to the EU. The potential 
threats come from both the choke points and the water through which the trade routes 
pass. There are in total four main choke points on the trade routes. They are the Suez 
Channel, Straits of Hormuz, Bab-el-Mandeb Straits, and the Malacca Straits. Due to the 
geographical feature of the maritime choke points, they are more likely to be affected 
by political and security risks, including temporary closure resulting from bad weather 
and climate hazards, security and conflict hazards due to war, political instability, 
piracy, organised crime or terrorism. (Wellesley and Preston, 2017).  
Besides the increasing dependency on choke points, the EU has another concern ‒ the 
bodies of water through which its trade routes pass. For instance, the Gulf of Guinea, 
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which is a vast maritime area in the west of the African continent, plays an important 
role in the EU’s international trade and energy supply, because it is a key node area of 
maritime shipping routes connecting Europe and Africa. However, it is equally a hotbed 
of piracy and armed robbery at sea, oil theft and illegal fishing because of poor maritime 










Hence, due to its increasing dependency on international trade and shipping, the EU 
needs to take the maritime security issue seriously for its economic development. 
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Creating and sustaining good order on the sea can be seen as another precondition for 
the EU to develop its sea power.  
 
3.4 The EU’s Political Aspiration 
Besides the motivation derived from its geographical position and the need to protect 
its international-trade-dependent economy, there is another incentive for the EU to 
develop its sea power: the political aspiration of the EU to play a fuller and more active 
role in the international field. If the EU’s geographical reality and its dependence on 
international trade and shipping can be categorised as the material elements of the EU’s 
sea power, the EU’s aspiration for an identity as a global actor and a security provider 
serves as the ideational one. And as Germond (2015) claimed, “material elements of 
sea power are necessary but not sufficient if not backed by ideational ones” (p. 98). 
 
Notably, the EU has aspired to be a global actor in the last decade. This claim is based 
on a critical review of the EU’s core documents and official statements that focus on 
defence and security from Lisbon Treaty10 (2009) until the issue of the second EU 
global strategy in 2016. 
 
The adoption of the Lisbon Treaty is an important step in the history of EU integration 
because it “offers an opportunity for the European Union to take on a world role 
compatible with its status and aspirations” (Vasconcelos, 2010, p.3). With the 
introduction of the Lisbon Treaty, the European External Action Service (EEAS) was 
established. In doing so, the decision-making in external actions can be streamlined 
(Kelly, 2009). 
 
Regarding the EU’s security and foreign policy, official documents have referred to 
different policy areas regarding the EU’s foreign policy and security and defence. For 
instance, Guidelines on the EU’s foreign and security policy in East Asia (Council of 
 
10 Lisbon Treaty 
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the EU, 2012) can be described as the EU’s overall strategy towards another region, 
while European climate diplomacy after COP21: Elements for continued climate 
diplomacy in 2016 (Council of the EU, 2016a) can be seen as the EU’s strategy 
regarding a specific issue. A Shared Vision, Common Action: A Strong Europe, A 
Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy (Council of the 
EU, 2016b) was a first attempt at carrying the EU into uncharted waters (Bomassi and 
Vimont, 2019), since it “nurtures the ambition of strategic autonomy for the European 
Union” (Council of the EU, 2016b, p. 4). All these documents articulate the EU’s 
political aspiration to be a global actor. The then HR Mogherini explains “global” as 
such: “global is not just intended in a geographicalal sense. It also refers to the wide 
array of policies and instruments the Strategy promotes” (Council of the EU, 2016b, 
p.4).  
 
Another aspiration of the EU is to become a security provider. First of all, the 
institutional mechanisms for a European autonomous defence already exist, due to 
Article 42 of the Lisbon Treaty11, which provides for mutual assistance in case of armed 
aggression against the territory of an EU Member State. 
 
Besides this clause of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU can be seen as a security provider in 
many respects. First, the EU’s enlargement has been proven to be effective in spreading 
stability and security across the European continent. Second, through the CSDP, the 
EU has made significant progress in crisis management. Now the EU has a variety of 
instruments from humanitarian assistance and development aid to military operations 
and civilian missions (Drent, Landman and Zandee, 2014). And the EU has been 
involved in all kinds of security areas, such as “civil protection, health security, food 
 
11 Article 42.7 is the solidarity clause that states that if a member of the European Union is the victim of 
“armed aggression on its territory” other states have an “obligation of aid and assistance by all the means 
in their power.” This article was first invoked at the request of the French government following multiple 




security, infrastructure protection, cybercrime, and disaster relief” (ibid, p.7). What is 
more, the EU Global strategy in 2016 “broadened the EU’s level of ambition beyond 
crisis management and capacity building to also include a thought-provoking concept 
called ‘Protecting Europe’” (Fiott, 2020, p. 11).  
 
Maritime security is part and parcel of the EU’s political ambition. In 2014, the Council 
of the EU issued the European Union Maritime Security Strategy and the rolling Action 
Plan. In 2018, the Council of the EU revised the Action Plan. Mogherini 
(www.hstoday.us, 2018) claimed:  
With this action plan, the EU reaffirms its role as a global maritime security provider. 
It promotes international cooperation, maritime multilateralism and the rule of law at 
sea, in line with the strategic priorities identified in the EU Global Strategy.  
 
 
The European Global Strategy of 2016 explicitly stated the relevance of maritime 
security to the EU: 
Connected to the EU’s interest in an open and fair economic system is the need for 
global maritime growth and security, ensuring open and protected ocean and sea routes 
critical for trade and access to natural resources. The EU will contribute to global 
maritime security, building on its experience in the Indian Ocean and the 
Mediterranean, and exploring possibilities in the Gulf of Guinea, the South China Sea 
and the Straits of Malacca. As a global maritime security provider, the EU will seek 
to further universalise and implement the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
including its dispute settlement mechanisms. We will also promote the conservation 
and sustainable use of marine resources and biological diversity and the growth of the 
blue economy by working to fill legal gaps and enhancing ocean knowledge and 
awareness (Council of the EU, 2016b, p.41). 
 
The introduction of the European Union Maritime Security Strategy and a detailed 
Action Plan amounts to a unprecedented step for the EU, as it “serves as [a] 
comprehensive framework, contributing to a stable and secure global maritime domain 
in accordance with the European Security Strategy, while ensuring coherence with EU 
policies, in particular, the Integrated Maritime Policy (IMP), and the Internal Security 




3.5 EU’s Integrated Cross-sectoral Maritime Institutions 
According to Germond (2015), “material and ideational elements of sea power must be 
supported by appropriate organisational structures and efficient decision-making 
process” (p.100). In other words, sea power would not have materialised without 
relevant institutional structures. In light of the EU as a unique regional and 
supranational organisation, it is vital to have consistent, cross-sectoral, and 
comprehensive maritime institutions.  
 
On one hand, as the European Union Maritime Security Strategy noted, the EU 
maritime security sphere covers three existing EU policies, namely, the IMP,  the ISS, 
and the CFSP (Commission, 2014a, p.4). “The maritime dimension of the EU’s security 
extends beyond the institutional boundaries and responsibility of the CSDP; thus, its 
machinery is rather complex” (Germond, 2015, p. 101). The implementation of these 
policies relies on the different institutions as well as the Member States. Additionally, 
the supranational and intergovernmental dimensions of the EU maritime security 
require coordination between the Member States and the EU institutions as well as 
different sectors of the EU institutions. At the supranational level, trade, customs, and 
fisheries are the exclusive areas within the competence of the EU. In the case of naval 
operations, the Council plays an essential role. It means that all EU Member States have 
to reach a consensus on launching a maritime operation under the name of the EU. 
Meanwhile, the Member States are not compelled to participate in the operation 
(Germond, 2015).  
 
There was not an EU cross-sectoral maritime institution at the beginning of the 21st 
century because the EU did not realise the importance of dealing with the maritime 
issue in a top-down way.  “The Union started to manage its maritime assets only later 
and in a piecemeal way, either as subdivisions of sectoral land-focused administrations 
or in reaction to external crises” (Gambert, 2015, p.495). With the coming of the “global 
trend towards applying a cross-sectoral and participatory approach to ocean governance” 
(ibid, p.496), the EU decided to develop a comprehensive maritime policy. In 2007, the 
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Commission published An Integrated Maritime Policy for the European Union (also 
called the Blue Book). The introduction of this important document was based on 
awareness of the importance of the maritime domain to the EU. Firstly, the EU has 
realised that “Europe’s maritime spaces and its coasts are central to its well-being and 
prosperity” (Commission, 2007, p.2). Secondly, the EU admitted that “all matters 
relating to Europe’s oceans and seas are interlinked, and the sea-related policies must 
develop in a joined-up way if we are to reap the desired results” (ibid, p.2). It implies 
that the EU has fully realised the importance of the oceans and seas and has decided to 
adopt a comprehensive and top-down approach to deal with the issues at sea. 
 
Based on these visions and recognitions, the EU developed three horizontal planning 
tools:  a European network for maritime surveillance, Maritime Spatial Planning and 
Integrated Coastal Zone Management, and a comprehensive and accessible source of 
data and information (Commission, 2007). Hence, the EU aimed to “integrate 
horizontally the sector-based policies and activities regarding maritime affairs” 
(Germond and Smith, 2009, p.578). The EU has begun to increase integration in the 
important fields of maritime policy. 
 
In 2014 the Commission launched the EU Maritime Security Strategy followed by an 
Action Plan. This Action Plan detailed the steps to implement the Maritime Security 
Strategy and pointed out the lead actor(s) for every activity. In 2018, the Council 
revised the European Union Maritime Security Strategy Action Plan and called on more 
actors to work closely together. Aside from the Member States, the Commission, the 
European Defence Agency, the High Representative and the EEAS, there are some new 
bodies and actors involved, including the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, 
the European Maritime Safety Agency, the European Fisheries Control Agency, the 
European Police Office, the European Union Satellite Centre, and the European Union 




The European Council and the EU Council represent the Member States’ national 
interests and power at the EU level and make collective decisions (Lewis, 2016). The 
Member States have to reach a consensus to deploy naval power. However, in practice, 
certain Member States, which are more powerful economically or militarily, can rally 
other Member States’ support for their postures (Germond, 2015; Riddervold, 2018). 
“The Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) is the Council formation concerned with the 
CFSP/CSDP” and “makes formal decisions … on the launch of civilian and military 
operations” (Friis and Juncos, 2019, p.285). Within the Council, the highest military 
body is the European Union Military Committee, composed of the Chiefs of Defence 
of the Member States. The EU Military Committee monitors the command and the 
conduct of the three CSDP maritime military operations. 
 
The European Commission, as the executive and administrative institution of the EU, 
plays an essential role in implementing and managing EU policies. As noted above, 
implementing the Action Plan of the EU Maritime Security Strategy covers several 
policy areas in which its competences vary. As Riddervold (2018) claimed, the 
Commission was not only “one of the main drivers’ in developing an EU Maritime 
Security Strategy (p. 112), but does have “strong involvement” in the decision-making” 
(p. 119). The Commission developed a European common maritime picture by 
establishing EU agencies, such as the European Maritime Safety Authority, Common 
Fisheries Protection Agency, European Agency for the Management of Operation 
Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, 
European Space Agency, European Environmental Agency, European Police Office, 
and European Defence Agency.  
 
The EEAS became fully functional in 2011. The role of the EEAS is “to coordinate the 
diplomatic and foreign policies of the member states and, at the same time, to produce 
new and common position and policies … without infringing on the members’ national 
interests and sensitivities” (Friis and Juncos, 2019, p. 286). Germond (2015) claimed 
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that the establishment of the EEAS has “somewhat blurred the distinction between the 
supranational and intergovernmental dimensions of the EU’s foreign and security 
policy” (p.101). Moreover, the EEAS Crisis Response Department, which works with 
the relevant European Commission services and the EU military Committee, can 
respond in a timely manner to crises, including those at sea. 
 
In summary, the EU’s integrated cross-sectoral maritime institutions play an essential 
role in the generation of EU sea power, because they allow the EU to carry out the 
operations and activities related to maritime security as an independent country. In the 
three CSDP maritime military operations, the EU established an independent and 
completed command chain like a nation state’s naval forces. In the other maritime 
security domains, these EU institutions and sectors rally Member States and implement 
the maritime security-related policies (Germond, 2015).  
 
3.6 EU’s Naval Capabilities 
As noted in Chapter Two, the concept of ‘sea power’ implies a military dimension, 
whether it is defined in a broad sense or narrow sense. European sea power rests on 
politico-military pillars, which are represented by the EU and North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO) (Stöhs, 2018). As the Joint Declaration (2016) claimed, “A 
stronger NATO and a stronger EU are mutually reinforcing. Together they can better 
provide security in Europe and beyond” (www.nato.int, 2016, p.1). 
 
However, the CFSP, with its CSDP, is one of the most contentious policy areas for the 
EU. As Friis and Juncos (2019) claimed, threefold tensions are making the CFSP 
complex from the disagreements among the Member States. First, there exists tension 
between the intergovernmentalist and integrationist states. They have opposite 
positions on the permanent and institutionalised EU cooperation through the CFSP and 
CSDP. The intergovernmentalist and integrationist states diverge greatly on the role of 
the CFSP and CSDP for the Member States: while the former take the CFSP and CSDP 
as damaging their national interests, the latter take them as the natural extension of the 
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EU’s function (ibid). Second, there is a tension between the Atlanticist and Europeanist 
states. This divisive focus concentrates on the attitude towards NATO as well as the 
United States presence in European security. While the Atlanticist states insist on the 
irreplaceable value of NATO, the Europeanist states prefer to develop the EU’s own 
security and defence structure. Finally, tension comes from the divergence between the 
more interventionist states, such as France, and those states with a tradition of non-
intervention, such as Germany. Given the intergovernmental nature of the CFDP and 
CSDP, the EU failed to establish a European Army. The intergovernmental character 
of the CFSP places it under control of the EU Council. “The CFSP’s decision-making 
framework was to rest on the Member States’ unanimity, giving each government the 
ability to veto any policy initiative or operation” (ibid, p.243). However, the EU has 
made significant progress in the security and defence area under the deepening of the 
EU’s integration in recent years, especially after the EU Global Strategy issue in 2016. 
Moreover, all the progress has included a naval component. 
 
The forerunner to the CSDP was the European Security and Defence policy (ESDP) 
which was established in 1999.  The Lisbon Treaty replaced the ESDP with the CSDP. 
The EU attached great importance to capacity building and the potential use of naval 
forces from the beginning of the establishment of ESDP. From the outset of this policy, 
there has always been a naval component, as the Maastricht Treaty stated that the ESDP 
should cover “all areas of foreign and security policy” (Article, J.4.1, title V, TEU). 
The 1999 Helsinki Headline Goal set up the targets that the EU should be able to deploy 
forces “military self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence 
capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and additionally, as appropriate, 
air and naval elements” (European Council, 1999, p.2). It also encouraged the EU 
Member States to develop strategic sea lift capacity and amphibious capabilities (ibid, 
2004). For “a better understanding of present and future maritime missions, 
requirements and capabilities” (ibid, 2007, p.6), the Council launched the “EU 
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Maritime Dimension Study” in 2007. The study pointed out the relevance of maritime 
forces as follows: 
Maritime forces have a role to guarantee the free use of the sea, which is key to the 
EU’s economic prosperity and access to the areas of strategic interest. The utility of 
maritime capacity is its ability to use the unique access provided by the sea to enable 
movement, concentration of combat power, surprise or overt presence and 
transportation. It is therefore able to deliver the necessary effect to support the 
achievement of the EU’s political strategic objective, either with a specific limited and 
focussed maritime operation or as part of a larger joint force. (ibid, 2007, p.6).  
 
Given the intergovernmental nature of the CSDP, the EU Maritime Dimension Study 
was aimed at both the EU level and the Member States level. For the EU, this study 
“explore[s], within the ESDP mission spectrum, where maritime military capabilities 
could make a contribution” and “investigate[s] the use of EU Maritime Forces in a 
Rapid Response Capacity”, while for the Member States, it “analyse[s] the effect of 
HLG 201012, RC 0513, the resulting Progress Catalogue and the LTV process14 on the 
future structure and shape of EU Member States maritime forces” (ibid, p.7). 
 
In 2004, Headline Goal was adopted at the Helsinki Council. It stipulated the EU’s 
ambition that “the forces start implementing their mission on the ground, no later than 
10 days after the EU decision to launch the operation. Relevant air and naval 
capabilities would be included” (European Council, 2004, p.2). And it highlighted the 
importance of the strategic sea lift (ibid).  
 
Financially, on 1 March 2004, the European Council established the Athena mechanism, 
which handles the financing of common costs relating to EU military operations under 
the CSDP. All EU Member States, except Denmark, contribute to financing EU military 
 
12 HLG 2010 referred to High Level Group (HLG) on Aviation and Aeronautics Research launched by the EU in 2010.  
 
13 RC 05 referred to the Requirement Catalogue 2005 (RC05), which was the task of the EU to ask Member States to what extent 
they could offer assets and resources to meet the total force requirement. 
14 LTV process referred to the  Loan To Value (LTV) ratio.  
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operations15. The Athena mechanism covered the costs of the EU’s three maritime 
operations –– Operation Atalanta in the Horn of Africa, as well as Operation Sophia 
and Operation IRINI in the Mediterranean.  
 
Following the introduction of the EU Global Strategy, the EU accelerated progress in 
the field of security and defence. To develop defence capabilities on a collective EU 
basis, it launched several specific defence initiatives such as Capacity Development 
Plan (CDP), Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), Permanent Structured 
Cooperation (PeSCo), European Defence Fund (EDF), Military Planning and Conduct 
Capability (MPCC), National Implementation Plans (NIP), European Peace Facility 
(EPF). Even though these initiatives “have not yet led to any tangible shift in the 
Union’s capability base or readiness for deployment” (Fiott, 2020, p.3), they 
demonstrated the determination and willingness of the EU and the Member States to 
achieve a higher goal. There is always a naval component in these policy mechanisms 
contributing to the rise of naval capability. The EU naval capability also benefits from 
the improvement in the EU’s military capabilities as a whole, given the interdependence 
of diverse military systems, including satellites and aircraft. 
 
Among the EU’s defence initiatives above, PeSCo, CDP and EDF have direct impact 
on the EU’s naval capabilities, because  
the priorities set in the CDP would feed into the CARD, which would see Member 
States report on their capability plans, with EU institutions monitoring alignment with 
CDP priorities and identifying opportunities for cooperation among Member States … 
Then, PeSCo would draw on CARD results to plan and implement in support of the 
CDP. PeSCo projects in turn would at least partially draw on the EDF that would make 
EU funds available to support defence research and development, and ultimately 
capability development (The Military Balance, 2020, p.72).  
 
15 Due to the Danish defence opt-out, Denmark cannot participate in the elaboration and the implementation of decisions and 
actions of the Union which have defence implications. In practice, this means that Denmark is unable to participate in EU 
military operations or in the cooperation on development and acquisition of military capabilities within the EU framework, nor 
will Denmark participate in any decisions or planning in this regard. However, Denmark will not prevent the development of 





Since 2008, the European Defence Agency, working with the EU Military Committee 
and the EU Military Staff, publishes updated CDP. “The CDP sets common capability-
development priorities for EU members” (The Military Balance, 2020, p.72). It is “both 
a document and a process that clarifies existing capability shortfalls, plans for future 
technology trends, explores avenues for European cooperation and details lessons 
learned from the EU’s military missions and operations” (Fiott, 2018, p. 2). The 2018 
EU CDP stipulated 11 priorities of which two related to the maritime domain. These 
are naval manoeuvrability and underwater control which both contribute to the EU’s 
capability to resilient at sea.  
 
In December 2017, the EU established the PeSCo, which existed previously in the 
Maastricht Treaty. Due to PeSCo, the EU Member States can develop their capability 
through common security and defence projects. PeSCo aims to “provide a binding 
framework for able and willing EU Member States to work closely in the area of 
security and defence through common projects” (Nováky, p.2). Maritime projects 
represented a considerable proportion: amongst 34 projects approved in 2018, there 
were 5 projects related directly to the oceans and navy:, Harbour and Maritime 
Surveillance and Protection, Upgrade of Maritime Surveillance, Deployable Modular 
Underwater Intervention Capability, Maritime Unmanned Anti-Submarine System and 
European Patrol Corvette (pesco.europa.eu, 2020). There were 14 EU Member States 
involved in these 5 projects, and some of the countries participated in several of the 
projects. In addition, these projects “would be eligible for a higher rate of EDF finding 
than other projects (30% instead of 20%)” (The Military Balance, 2020, p.72). 
Furthermore, in view of the interoperability and functional interdependence of modern 
weapons and equipment for use at sea, on land, in the air and in space these weapons 
and equipment have formed a mutually supporting system. Naval weapons and 
equipment, as part of the overall equipment system, will also benefit from the 




With regard to the naval capabilities of the EU Member States, 22 of the 27 have navies, 
maritime wings or maritime services16 of different sizes. Historically, the naval forces 
of the European states were part and parcel of the overarching maritime strategy against 
the Soviet Union during the Cold War and each navy had specific tasks to fulfil (Stöhs, 
2018).  Sea control was the principle underlying the existence of NATO naval forces 
during the Cold War (ibid). When the Cold War ended, all these European navies faced 
transformation. On one hand, they benefited from the so-called peace dividend, 
undergoing a reduction in size and investment. On the other hand, they had to face the 
new forms of conflict involving the novel approaches to naval operations, such as 
military interventions, stability operations, and peace-keeping missions in distant 
regions (ibid). Despite the limitations of their financial difficulties, EU Member States 
have realised that “effective maritime security implies the need for closer collaboration” 
(McCabe, Sanders and Speller, 2020, p.5) and actively participated in maritime military 
operations led the EU.  
 
Estonia is a noteworthy case. It is a small country on the eastern coast of the Baltic 
Sea in northern Europe, and became an EU Member State on 1 May 2004. With a GDP 
of $31,386b in 2019, Estonia was ranked 25th in the EU17 (www.worldbank.org, 2020), 
yet, surprisingly, it is the Member State which makes the most effort in defence. 
Estonia’s defence spending in 2016 accounted for 2.4% of GDP, which is much higher 
than the EU Member States’ average of 1.4% 18  (www.europarl.europa.eu, 2018). 
Estonia is also one of most active countries on the world security stage. From 1996, this 
 
16 The EU Member States which have navies are: Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden (The United Kingdom as a former Member State has a 
navy). Cyprus and Hungry have the Maritime Wing. Ireland and Slovenia have the Maritime Service. The landlocked countries –
– Austria, Czechia, Luxembourg, Malta and Slovakia –– do not have naval forces.  
 
17 Estonia’s GDP in 2019 was above that of Cyprus (€ 24,565b) and Malta (€ 14.786 b).  
 
18 The countries which followed Estonia were Greece (2.1%) and UK (2.0%). 
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country participated in the US-led military operation ‘Iraqi Freedom’; NATO-led 
international military operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Afghanistan; 
and EU-led military operations in the Horn of Africa, Mediterranean Sea, and Mali. 
There are a number of reasons for this. Estonians have reached a political consensus on 
participation in international military operations. The Estonian parliament “does not 
practise national caveats or have strict rules of engagement for sending troops to 
international military operations” (Mölder, 2014, p.69), and the Estonian public is 
generally supportive of their government’s decisions (ibid). Furthermore, Estonia takes 
participation in international military operations as excellent opportunities to increase 
its credibility and gain recognition for its allies. In the maritime domain, Estonia 
possesses a very small naval force 19 , with only four commissioned ships and 
displacement of under 10,000 tonnes. However, it participated in the EU-led maritime 
military operation Atalanta in 2010 (eunavfor.eu, 2010). Between 2010 and 2013, 
Estonia provided a Vessel Protection Detachment on the EUNAVFOR warships. 
Vessel Protection Detachment, as part and parcel of the EU’s naval capabilities, made 
a great contribution in the fight against piracy in the Horn of Aden. Estonia’s Minister 
of Defence noted: “Estonian vessel protection detachments have held the Estonian flag 
high with their professional performance and have made their contribution to this 
important European Union military operation. Participation in Atalanta has also 
deepened Estonia’s defence cooperation with our strategic partners Germany and 
France” (www.kaitseministeerium.ee/en, 2013). In addition, it participated in the 
Operation Sophia and Operation IRINI. This example shows that, compared with 
military capability, a national government’s political will is a very important factor. 
Through the CSDP military operations, the small EU countries also have the 
opportunities to contribute to the international security and stability domain. 
 
 
19 With only four commissioned ships and displacement of under 10,000 tonnes, the Estonian navy is one of the smallest navies 




In summary, the military dimension of EU sea power is unique compared with that of 
sovereign states. In comparison to the individual state, the EU does not have an 
integrated naval force. However, its ad hoc security and defence mechanism provides 
it with enough potential to play an important role in the maritime domain. The three 
EU-led maritime military operations are emblematic of the EU’s naval capabilities. 
When the EU Member States reached agreement in launching a maritime military 
operation, they showed they have the capability to act as one nation state.  
 
3.7 Conclusion 
As noted in Chapter Two, answering the question of ‘Why the EU is a sea power in the 
making?’ depends on how we benchmark ‘sea power’. As the concept of ‘sea power’ 
has been clarified and the twofold criteria have been explained: on one hand, a sea 
power must have all the elements of sea power, including the geographical, political, 
economic, institutional, and military factors; on the other hand, sea power must have 
the ability to protect maritime interests, maintain good sea order, and influence events 
on land.   
 
This chapter answers the question ‘Why is the EU a sea power?’ from the perspective 
of the generation of EU sea power. Like other sea powers, which are identified as 
sovereign states, the EU has all the vital components of sea power. Its geographical 
reality, maritime interests, political aspiration, cross-sectoral maritime institutions, and 
naval capabilities constitute the EU sea power elements. Firstly, after several rounds of 
enlargement, the EU, with the third ranked length coastline and largest Exclusive 
Economic Zone in the world, has become an ‘organic’ sea power from the perspective 
of geography. Secondly, this geographical reality allows the EU to develop the blue 
economy, as well as the economy highly dependent on international shipping. In order 
to maintain good order at sea and protect its maritime interests, the EU has the need to 
develop sea power. Thirdly, the EU has the political aspiration to become a global 
maritime security provider, and the political will plays a key role in the development of 
EU sea power. Fourthly, driven by the political aspiration, the EU has established 
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integrated, cross-sectoral maritime institutions covering different policy areas in the 
maritime domain. Finally, the EU’s CSDP policy allows the Member States to 
contribute their naval forces to launch maritime military operations in the name of the 
EU, and this unique mechanism makes the EU different from other sea powers on the 
world stage. The intergovernmental nature of CSDP can be seen as a double-edged 
sword. Obviously, it seems a limitation that prevents the EU from being involved in the 
higher end of the operational spectrum due to some capability gap, such as the lack of 
strategic airlift. However, it provides opportunities for the individual European navies, 
especially for the ‘small’ navies, to play a more significant role than its capabilities 
through cooperation. 
 
Based on the analysis of the EU’s sea power elements, it becomes apparent that the EU 
has all the elements that constitute a sea power. However, sea power is not merely a 
mix of all the material and immaterial elements. It is also an art to use these elements 
to achieve certain purposes, such as to protect international commerce and shipping, to 
maintain good order at sea, as well as to influence the events on land by the events at 
sea. Therefore, the next four chapters will focus on the practice of the EU sea power on 




Chapter 4 The Practice of EU Sea Power in the Horn of Africa: Taking 




Having clarified the elements of the EU sea power, this chapter explores the practice of 
EU sea power through a case study. As mentioned in Chapter Two, sea power can be 
analysed as a matrix: it is a combination of maritime elements and maritime abilities. 
On one hand, sea power comprises all the essential economic, political, institutional 
and military components. On the other hand, sea power can be regarded as a 
combination of capacities (Tangredi, 2002; Parry, 2014). The elements of the EU sea 
power were analysed and outlined in Chapter Three. Consequently, the EU sea power 
practice will be examined through case studies in the following chapters. 
 
This chapter focuses on the EU’s first maritime military operation – Operation Atalanta. 
It is composed of five sections.  Section One is the introductory section. Section Two 
introduces the background and context of Somali piracy and Operation Atalanta, 
including the origin of the piracy off the coast of Somalia, the relevant UN Security 
Council Resolutions, and the EU decision‒making process. Section Three focuses on 
the operational factors of Operation Atalanta under the strategic framework of ‘ends, 
ways and means. Section Four assesses the outcome of Operation Atalanta. The last 
section concludes by clarifying the EU’s abilities in the practice of sea power in the 
Horn of Africa. 
 
4.2 Context and background 
The Operation Atalanta was the EU’s first naval CFSP mission. It was launched on 10 
December 2008 by the Council of the EU, and it continues to this day. Operation 
Atalanta is part of an overall strategy which the EU developed to pursue a 
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comprehensive approach to solve the problem of Somali piracy and the broader 
maritime security of the Western Indian Ocean.  
 
4.2.1 Origin of Somali Piracy 
 
Modern piracy is far from a recent phenomenon and has been active over the last decade 
in the South China Sea, the seas off West Africa, and in the Caribbean (www.unodc.org, 
2020). From 2008 onward, Somali piracy became a severe hazard for the international 
community. 
 
Somalia is situated in the Horn of Africa and has the longest coastline on the African 
continent. The then Transitional Federal Government of the Republic of Somalia is 
“internationally recognised but largely ineffective” (Ginkel and Putten, 2010, p.2)20. 
Due to two decades of civil war and lack of governance, it has been labelled as one of 
the worst ‘failed states’ in the world.  
 
The term ‘Somali piracy’ refers to the “activities of Somalia‒based groups who aim to 
generate income by attacking ships at sea” (ibid, p.2). The attackers are gangs of private 
marauders who board the merchant vessels sailing in the Gulf of Aden or the Western 
Indian Ocean, take the crews hostage, and blackmail the ship‒owners. “Between 2005 
and 2013, 179 ships were hijacked off the Horn of Africa, costing approximately $400m 
in ransoms alone” (Dombrowski and Reich, 2018, p.4).  
 
Besides the direct economic costs of piracy, there was a profound impact on global 
trade and security. From the commercial perspective, the waterways through the Horn 
of Africa and the Gulf of Aden play a vital role in the worldwide transport of goods and 
energy. Piracy in this maritime area severely challenged these international trade and 
energy flows. From the security perspective, piracy has become a breeding ground for 
 
20 In 2012, the Federal Government of Somalia replaced the Transitional Federal Government. 
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other maritime security threats, such as the smuggling of arms, drugs, and people. 
Moreover, piracy often intertwines with terrorism, as piracy brings funds and arms, 
which are essential for terrorists. For instance, in September 2008, Somali pirates 
captured a Ukrainian cargo ship carrying arms and ammunition, including even 33 
Russia‒made tanks (Rice, 2008). From the humanitarian perspective, piracy has also 
captured vessels providing humanitarian aid for displaced populations. It exacerbated 
the internal turbulence of Somalia. In summary, Somali piracy has become one of the 
most severe dangers to the international community. 
 
4.2.2 Relevant UN Security Council Resolutions 
 
To ensure the safety of humanitarian aid, to protect the international trade waterways, 
and combat piracy and other illegal activities in this area, the UN Security Council 
passed three successive Resolutions ‒ 1814, 1816 and 1838 ‒ which demand nations 
and international organisations take concerted action.  
 
In UNSC Resolution 1814, the Security Council called upon 
states and regional organizations … to take action to protect shipping involved with 
the transportation and delivery of humanitarian aid to Somalia and United Nations‒
authorized activities … (www.securitycouncilreport.org, 2008).  
 
In UNSC Resolution 1816, the Security Council affirmed that “international law … sets 
out the legal framework applicable to combatting piracy and armed robbery, as well as 
other ocean activities” (ibid, 2008).  
 
In UNSC Resolution 1838, the Security Council commended  
the contribution made by some States since November 2007 to protect the World Food 
Programme (WFP) maritime conveys, and the establishment by the European Union 
of a coordination unit with the task of supporting the surveillance and protection 
activities carried out by some Member States of the European Union off the coast of 
Somalia, and the ongoing planning process towards a possible European Union naval 




4.2.3 EU’s Decision‒Making Process  
To launch a counter‒piracy maritime operation off the Somali coast needs EU Member 
States’ unanimity. Mobilised by France, which was then holding the EU’s presidency, 
together with Spain, the idea of launching an autonomous EU maritime military 
operation was supported by all Member States (Riddervold, 2018). There were two 
reasons for this decision: one for validity, the other geopolitical. 
 
On one hand, although the US had established the Combined Maritime Task Force 
CTF‒151 and NATO had launched the humanitarian operation ‘Allied Provider’, the 
EU Member States formulated an autonomous maritime military operation because 
they believed that, 
The EU is a political organisation and could therefore take a more comprehensive 
approach, coordinate policies across different policy areas, and draw on tools linked 
to policy areas outside of the CFSP framework to establish agreements with third 
countries in the region (ibid, p.212).  
 
 
On the other hand, from the geostrategic perspective, the Western Indian Ocean centred 
on the Somali coast has vital security interests for the EU and its Member States. The 
area is situated in the international ocean shipping channel and has vital strategic 
interests. Given the heavy dependence of the EU and its Member States on international 
trade and overseas energy supply, this area’s safety affects the energy security and 
economic development of the EU. Furthermore, piracy intertwines with other maritime 
non‒traditional security threats, including the smuggling of weapons and drugs 
destined for the European continent, and the linkage between piracy and terrorism, so 
cumulatively all these maritime threats eventually challenge the security and stability 
of the EU and its Member States. Thus, Somali piracy, even far away from Europe, has 
a direct and vital connection to the EU and the Member States, so the EU’s decision to 





4.3 ‘Ends, Ways and Means’ of Operation Atalanta 
‘Ends, ways and means’ is a strategic framework developed by Arthur F. Lykke Jr. “For 
Lykke strategy is a coherent expression of a process that identifies the ends, ways and 
means designed to achieve a certain goal” (Eikmeier, 2007, p.63). “Ends are the 
objectives or desired outcomes of a given strategy” (ibid). “Ways are actions. They are 
the methods and process executed to achieve the ends” (ibid). “Means are the resources 
required to execute the way” (ibid). Therefore, “a strategy is balanced and entails little 
risk if the selected way (method) is capable and has sufficient means (resources) to 
obtain the desired end (objective)” (ibid). 
 
As a long‒lasting maritime military operation, Operation Atalanta is examined under 
this framework of ‘end, ways and means’. In other words, the following questions are 
answered: What were the aims of Operation Atalanta? How did it operate? With which 
resources and assets? 
 
4.3.1    Ends to Operate 
The objectives of Operation Atalanta were articulated in the Council Joint Action 
2008/851/CFSP of 10 November 2008 on a European Union military operation to 
contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed 
robbery off the Somali coast (Council of the EU, 2008).  
 
There are three objectives for Operation Atalanta. The first is to protect the vessels in 
the operating area, including Somali coastal territory and internal waters and the 
maritime areas off the coasts of Somalia and neighbouring countries within the region 
of the Indian Ocean. The priority for the protection mission of Operation Atalanta was 
the vessels of the United Nations WFP that were delivering food aid to displaced 
persons in Somalia. The second objective is to protect other vulnerable vessels cruising 
off the Somali coast were within their protection (Council of the EU, 2008). The third 
objective is to help to address the root causes of piracy and its networks as part of the 




Objective One: To protect the vessels of WFP delivering food aid to displaced 
persons in Somalia 
Before 1991 when the Siad Barre regime was overthrown, Somalia had experienced 
years of civil war, which caused the disastrous 1992‒1993 famine (Maxwell and 
Fitzpatrick, 2012). “By 2009, more than three million people were affected by the 
combination of drought, conflict, and high food price, and required immediate food 
assistance” (ibid, p.6). Therefore, food aid was crucial to the survival of the displaced 
people in Somalia. In 2008‒2009, the volume of food aid for Somalia reached its peak 
since the 1992‒1993 famine (ibid). In 2011, drought, rising food prices, and the conflict 
led to another famine in Somalia.  
 
Piracy is not a new phenomenon in Somalia. Furthermore, misery and unemployment 
pushed more Somalis into the business of piracy. In June 2005, the pirates off the 
Somalia coast hijacked a vessel with WFP relief food for 28,000 victims of the Indian 
Ocean tsunami on‒board and held it for more than 100 days in Somali waters 
(news.un.org, 2007). In October, another UN‒chartered vessel, with an 850‒tonne 
cargo of food aid, was hijacked (ibid). Between 2005 and 2007, there were four UN-
chartered vessels hijacked by Somalia pirates (ibid) and the WFP temporarily had to 
suspend deliveries of food aid by sea. This situation undermined the delivery of relief 
food to vulnerable people in Somalia and further worsened the prevailing precarious 
humanitarian situation. Consequently, the EU set the protection of UN‒chartered 
vessels as their priority and the principal objective of Operation Atalanta.  
 
Objective Two: To protect the vulnerable vessels cruising off the Somalia coast 
The Horn of Africa connects the Suez Canal in the north to Socotra in the south and the 
more expansive Indian Ocean in the east. This geographical reality makes it one of the 
busiest maritime trade routes, through which 30 per cent of world oil and 20 per cent 
of global trade pass. Somali pirates were responsible for no fewer than 939 attacks out 
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of the 3,093 total attacks recorded globally between 2007 and 2016 (www.icc-ccs.org, 
2006‒2017).  Unlike other piracy and armed robbery, the Somali pirates exploit 
loopholes in Somalia law and kidnap the crew members in exchange for ransom, 
something which is much more profitable than just stealing the goods (Kaunert and 
Zwolski, 2014). Therefore, to protect the vulnerable vessels cruising off the Somali 
coast is of great significance, no matter whether from a humanitarian, economic, or 
security perspective. 
 
Objective Three: To help to address the root causes of piracy. 
According to Kaunert and Zwolski(2014), the EU’s response to the piracy off the Horn 
of Africa can be classified under three categories according to their different terms. 
Operation Atalanta’s protection mission is the immediate and medium-term response 
to piracy off the Horn of Africa, while addressing the root causes of piracy is the EU’s 
long-term response. As the largest donor of official development assistance to Somalia, 
the EU adopted a comprehensive approach to solving this country’s problem. 
Economically, the EU provided humanitarian and development aid. Simultaneously, 
politically, the EU supported the UN’s Rule of Law programme in Somalia. In the 
security field, the EU launched several missions, which aimed to strengthen the 
building and training of the coastal police guard of Somalia and related countries in the 
neighbourhood.  
 
As part and parcel of the EU’s comprehensive approach to Somalia, Operation Atalanta 
is not only the crucial element but also the precondition for other steps. Piracy is hugely 
profitable for unemployed Somali people. According to the investigation of the 
International Expert Group on Piracy off the Somali Coast, in 2008 one pirate could 
earn between US$6,000 to US$10,000 for a ransom of US$1 million. This sum is equal 
to two to three years’ salary on average from working a legal job (Kaunert and Zwolski, 
2014). Therefore, deterring unemployed Somali people from engaging in piracy was 




From 2009, complementary missions were incorporated into the Operation Atalanta’s 
mandate. On one hand, apart from the vessels of WFP, the African Union Mission in 
Somalia (AMISOM) was added to the mission list of Operation Atalanta. AMISOM 
had been established in 2007 as per the UN Security Council Resolution 2372(2017) 
and mandated to “perform the police, civil and military operations at all levels as well 
as stabilization, reconciliation and peace building in Somalia” (Jama and Katman, 
p.227). On the other hand, the mandate of operation Atalanta expanded to “the 
monitoring of fishing activities off the coast of Somalia” (Council of the EU, 2014, p.2). 
 
Having clarified how the EU sea power is generated, Operation Atalanta as a classic 
case, demonstrated the ‘output’ of the EU’s sea power. Objective One and objective 
Two of Operation Atalanta (which is to protect the vessels of WFP, of AMISOM, and 
the other vessels), show the EU’s determination to exercise its capacity for international 
maritime commerce and utilisation of the marine resource, as well as the ability to 
project military power into the sea. And the third objective of Operation Atalanta 
(which is to address the root cause of the piracy) is compelling evidence of the EU’s 
intention to influence events on land through naval forces. Therefore, the EU has every 
confidence that its sea power will fulfil the potential to maintain maritime security in 
the Horn of Africa and to influence events on Somalian territory through Operation 
Atalanta.  
 
Having established why the EU launched Operation Atalanta, the next step is to clarify 
the ‘ways’ of Operation Atalanta ‒ the methods and process which the EU executed to 
achieve the ends. 
 
4.3.2 Ways to Operate 
According to the framework ‘end, ways and means’, “ways are actions. They are the 
methods and process executed to achieve the ends” (Eikmeier, 2007, p.63). As argued 
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in the preceding section, the ends of Operation Atalanta are to protect the vessels off 
the Horn of Africa and address the root cause of the piracy.  
 
The problem against which the EU naval force fights is piracy21 and armed robbery22 
off the Somali coast. The Somali pirates operate by diesel/petrol‒powered skiffs, use 
ladders to climb onto the target vessel, and use automatic weapons and a Rocket 
Propelled Grenade to kidnap the crew members and take command of the ship. Even 
when poorly equipped, their knowledge of the sea allows them to hijack a vessel in just 
a few minutes. From the tactical perspective, this represents classic asymmetric warfare. 
One side has the most sophisticated equipment and highly trained combatants, while 
the other side has only basic craft and desperate pirates. However, the EU’s counter‒
piracy operation is deployed in a maritime area of 4,700,000 square nautical miles 
(approximately 8,700,000 square kilometres) covering the Southern Red Sea, the Gulf 
of Aden, and a large part of the Indian Ocean. It would be difficult to deploy any 
operation over such a vast sea to protect travelling vessels and deter, prevent, and 
repress piracy and armed robbery.  
 
Facing such a particular enemy in such a challenging theatre of operations, Operation 
Atalanta adopted the following methods and process:  
 
4.3.2.1 To protect the WFP vessels and AMISOM ships by escorting and by 
autonomous Vessel Protection Detachment 
To protect the vessels of WFP and AMISOM is the primary task of Operation Atalanta. 
During the period of operation, there were two methods that the EU Naval Force 
adopted. On one hand, the EU deployed the warship escorting the vessels of WFP and 
AMISOM. For instance, in December 2008, the Royal Navy’s Frigate HMS 
 
21 Maritime piracy is an act of violence perpetrated against a ship outside of any state’s jurisdiction 
(over 12 nautical miles off the coast). 




NORTHUMBERLAND completed the EU’s first WFP vessel protection by safely 
escorting the MV SEMLOW from Mombasa in Kenya to the Somali port of Mogadishu. 
In one week, it escorted four different WFP ships into three other Somali ports 
(eunavfor.eu, 2009). And from 2009 till mid‒2012, all WFP ships carrying aid to 
Somalia were escorted by EU Naval Force warships.  
 
On the other hand, since mid‒2012, a second method was added whereby some WFP 
vessels were protected by the Autonomous Vessel Protection Detachment, an armed 
security team on board provided by EUNAVFOR (Šoškić, Radojević and Komazec, 
2014). The trained elite military group is stationed directly on the ship in need of 
protection. They protect against reasonably foreseeable threats, detect and respond to 
threats effectively, carry out the vessel’s security operations, deter the attacker, deny 
access to personnel, potential hostages, or critical aspects of the ship, and detain or 
destroy a potential attacker. Due to their existence, the boat, its crew, and the assets on 
board are protected (ibid).  
 
The EU’s achievement in protecting the WFP vessels and AMISOM ships proved the 
unquestioned success of Operation Atalanta. Since the launch of the Operation Atalanta 
in 2008, it has had a total success rate in protecting WFP vessels delivering food and 
aid to the Somali people and AMISOM shipments critical to the African Union’s 
successful operation in Somalia (eunavfor.eu, 2020). It has protected some 147323 
WFP and 704 AMISOM vessels, consequently delivering safely 2,177,155 metric 
tonnes of food by the WFP to Somalia. 
 
 
23 This number is based on the “Key Facts and Figures”, calculated by the author. see:  European 




4.3.2.2 To protect other vulnerable shipping by escorting within the 
Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor and the High Risk Area 
Apart from the protection of WFP vessels and AMISOM ships, to protect the vulnerable 
ships off the Somalia coast is also in the mandate of Operation Atalanta. To effectively 
protect the ships and deter piracy acts, the EUNAVFOR cooperated with shipping 
industries worldwide. On 1 February 2009, EUNAVFOR, the International Maritime 
Board, the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Organisation, and the American Maritime 
Liaison Office reached an agreement which established an ‘Internationally 
Recommended Transit Corridor’. This constituted a navy‒patrolled route through the 
Gulf of Aden, measuring 490 nautical miles (910 km) long and 20 nautical miles (37 
km) wide. Vessels were encouraged to register their voyages through the region with 
the Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa (eunavfor.eu, 2011). The High Risk Area 
includes the Gulf of Aden, Somali Basin, and the Indian Ocean.  
 
The EU and other naval forces’ warships perform escort duties in the Internationally 
Recommended Transit Corridor and the High-Risk Area to ensure the safety of shipping. 
For instance, on 24 July 2009, EUNAVFOR German Maritime Patrol Aircraft 
discovered a suspicious skiff with five suspected pirates on board in the Internationally 
Recommended Transit Corridor between Bossasso and Al Mukalla. The EUNAVFOR 
Italian warship MAESTRALE together with the NATO Turkish warship GEDIZ and 
the Indian warship GODAVARI worked closely together to deter a possible pirate 
attack (eunavfor.eu, 2009). 
 
With the assistance of other actors in the Horn of Africa, Operation Atalanta had great 
success in protecting vulnerable ships and deterring acts of piracy. “At the height of 
Somali piracy in January 2011, 736 hostages and 32 ships were being held by pirates. 
By October 2016 that number has dropped to no hostages and ships being held” 




4.3.2.3 To conduct reconnaissance and surveillance operations 
Reconnaissance and surveillance operations play a vital role in the fight against piracy. 
Apart from the system of reconnaissance and surveillance on board, the primary 
reconnaissance and surveillance missions are carried out by the Maritime Patrol and 
Reconnaissance Aircraft which fly over the theatre of operation, detect suspicious skiffs, 
and guide warships to their position as well as collect intelligence on specific areas. The 
aircraft are equipped with advanced surveillance systems that significantly enhance 
EUNAVFOR’s Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance capability in the Somali 
Basin and the Gulf of Aden.  Their speed and high endurance level make them a key 
asset in the vast area (eunavfor.eu, 2010). Take, for example, on 2 and 3 November 
2010, the EUNAVFOR warship SPS GALICIA, with the support of Maritime Patrol 
and Reconnaissance Aircraft, located and disrupted two Pirate Action Groups 
comprising two skiffs with eleven suspected pirates on board (eunavfor.eu, 2010). 
 
On 2 November, a merchant vessel was attacked – albeit unsuccessfully ‒ twice. The 
SPS GALICIA, positioned 75 nautical miles from the attack location, was immediately 
tasked to locate the skiffs involved. The coordination between the EUNAVFOR French 
Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft and EUNAVFOR’s Spanish SPS 
GALICIA’s helicopter made it possible to find and identify one skiff. The warship’s 
helicopter successfully intercepted this skiff with the ship’s boarding team. Early the 
following day, SPS GALICIA’s helicopter saw two more suspicious skiffs and the 
boarding team quickly intercepted one of the two skiffs. In total, eleven suspected 
pirates and two skiffs were intercepted; one other skiff escaped the scene. This 
disruption hindered further pirate actions and prevented similar attacks on merchant 
and vulnerable vessels from happening again (eunavfor.eu, 2010). 
 
4.3.2.4 To conduct ‘Friendly Approach’ and boarding missions  
Apart from escorting, Friendly Approaches are part of the daily duties of EUNAVFOR 
units. ‘Friendly Approaches’ or boarding missions are conducted to gather intelligence. 
The sailors speak with the fishing communities and trading vessels in operation areas 
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and advise on Best Management Practices for protection against pirates in the region to 
the crew (eunavfor.eu, 2012a). There are two aims of the ‘Friendly Approach’. One aim 
is to console nearby seafarers that Operation Atalanta is on observe to prevent robbery 
movement off the Horn of Africa. The other one is to offer an opportunity for 
EUNAVFOR to gain information about local vessel movements and possible pirate 
activity in the area (eunavfor.eu, 2012b). Taking the Spanish Ocean Patrol vessel ESPS 
METEORE for example, the ship’s boarding team carried out over 75 ‘Friendly 
Approaches’ in just three months in 2012. 
 
4.3.2.5 To deter and disrupt piracy as well as armed robbery, and to apprehend 
the pirates on the high seas 
A significant objective of Operation Atalanta is the deterrence and disruption of acts of 
piracy and armed robbery on the high seas. Warships apprehend suspected pirates 
following intelligence reports of pirate activity or sightings by merchant vessels and 
Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircrafts. For instance, on 29 November 2009, a 
Spanish fishing vessel was attacked by two pirate skiffs, 175 miles east of Victoria, 
Seychelles. The vessel’s security team fired warning shots and broke the attack. 
Luxembourg EUNAVFOR Maritime Patrol Aircraft, operating from Seychelles, was 
tasked to confirm the vessel’s situation and search for the pirate attack group. German 
EUNAVFOR warship FGS Bremen, docked in the port of Victoria, participated in 
searching for and in neutralising the pirates. Portuguese NATO warship NRP Alvares 
Cabral, which was in the same area on counter‒piracy patrol, also joined the search for 
the pirate group. Finally, due to the effort and cooperation, the mother ship and two 
skiffs of pirates were caught, and ten were detained to be handed over to the Seychelles 
Coast Guard (eunavfor.eu, 2009). A total of 171 pirates have been transferred to 
competent authorities with a view to their prosecution (ibid).  
 
4.3.2.6 To provide aid to the vessels in distress 
While escorting, the EUNAVFOR warships come to the aid of vessels in distress. For 
instance, on 28 May 2009, the French NAVFOR warship found eight Somali sailors in 
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a small boat with a malfunctioning engine in the Gulf of Aden. Two were found dead, 
four others were injured, and two remained unhurt. While there was an unsuccessful 
pirate attack nearby, no evidence showed that the Somali sailors were involved in this 
attempted piracy incident. Subsequently, they were rescued by the French warship 
under the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, obligating masters of 
all vessels to help those in distress. The two unhurt sailors and the two dead sailors were 
transferred to Boosaaso and handed over to the Puntland Coast Guard. The remaining 
four injured people were transferred to the French Military Hospital in Djibouti for 
medical treatment, and subsequently transferred to Boosaaso and handed over to a 
Coast Guard vessel (eunavfor.eu, 2009). 
 
4.3.2.7 To support the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO)’s 
programmes to monitor fishing activity in Somali coast 
To address piracy’s root cause, the Operation Atalanta supports the UN Food and 
Agriculture Organisation (UN FAO)24 programmes to deploy 25 Fish Aggregating 
Devices (FAD) to attract high‒value fish to the Somali shores. Besides protection, 
Operation Atalanta provided security and logistical support using their equipment and 
know‒how to position these FADs (eunavfor.eu, 2020). Richard Trenchard, former 
FAO representative in Somalia (2015), pointed out,  
The FAD’s initiative is at the heart of the work by FAO and our partners to boost 
coastal livelihoods, strengthen resilience and tackle the underlying causes of piracy – 
Illegal fishing, degradation of local fisheries, high levels of youth unemployment, and 
food insecurity (www.fao.org, 2015).  
 
 
4.3.2.8 To perform Replenishment at Sea 
The EUNAVFOR’s operational area in the Horn of Africa is vast, and the distances that 
the warships need to cover are significant. Therefore, the ability to replenish at sea is 
essential, as it enables them to remain on task for extended periods, which significantly 
 
24 “FAO is implementing a series of global programmes that are successfully supporting countries to 
develop and implement the policy frameworks and institutional arrangements needed to transform 
policy and create an enabling environment for agricultural development under climate change” 
(www.fao.org, 2020).    
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enhances their operational capability and flexibility (eunavfor.eu, 2011). For instance, 
over three months, the Italian Frigate ITS LIBECCIO conducted eight RAS, with 
several tankers operating under EUNAVFOR (FGS RHOEN, HNLMS AMSTERDAM) 
as well as tankers operating under other forces. Furthermore, conducting 
Replenishment at Sea enhanced the interoperability between the EUNAVFOR and 
different naval forces, which leads to the improvement of the counter‒piracy operations 
(eunavfor.eu, 2012). 
 
4.3.2.9 To train the maritime security forces of Somalia and the other local 
countries 
To eradicate piracy’s root cause in Somalia, the EU carried out a Regional Maritime 
Capacity Building plan (eunavfor.eu, 2012). It is composed of two components 
addressing two main objectives: to strengthen the seagoing maritime capacity of 
Djibouti, Kenya, Tanzania, and Seychelles and to train and equip the Coastal Police 
Force in the Somali regions of Puntland, Somaliland, and Galmudug; and to train and 
protect judges in the Somali region of Puntland (ibid). 
 
The EUNAVFOR participates actively in the maritime capacity building process of 
regional navies and coast guards. Firstly, it established regional coordinated training 
planning which all EUNAVFOR ships need to implement when visiting ports in 
operation (eunavfor.eu, 2012). For example, on 11 May 2012, Spanish ship INFANTA 
ELENA performed training for the Djiboutian Coast Guard. The training schedule was 
intense: the Djiboutian Coast Guard sailors first visited the ship, particularly the 
operating room, then the officers of the warship presented the sensors and weapons and 
instructed how to implement the related measures when under pirate attack. The next 
training session focused on Best Management Practices and protective measures carried 
out by merchant vessels. In doing so, the coast guards will be able to inform the 
merchant vessels cruising offshore or in Djibouti, and thus participate in the fight 
against piracy. Furthermore, the Djibouti navy sailors were trained in an internet‒based 
secure network used as an alert and coordination system by all the anti‒piracy 
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stakeholders, named Mercury, which the Djiboutian Navy operational centre will 
subsequently inaugurate (ibid). 
 
4.3.2.10 To enhance multi‒level diplomatic ties with other naval forces 
Naval forces always have a diplomatic role to play. Given that EUNAVFOR Somalia 
“took the lead in coordinating cooperation among all actors present in the area” 
(Pejsova, 2019), it frequently interacted with other naval forces at sea. Apart from 
traditional partners such as the forces of NATO and those of the US‒led Combined 
Maritime Task Force, it began to enhance communication and cooperation with those 
countries which previously were reluctant to cooperate. For instance, the Chinese 
Escort Task Force, deployed in the Horn of Africa, has had 27 courtesy visits and five 
coordinated Exercises with EUNAVFOR between 2009 and 201925. On 6 August 2018, 
EUNAVFOR’s Operation Commander, Major General Charlie Stickland, met Senior 
Captain Liang Yang, Commanding Officer of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army 
Support Base Djibouti, on board EUNAVFOR’s new flagship, the ESPS CASTILLA. 
There they focused on how to continue and improve the ongoing counter‒piracy efforts 
off the coast of Somalia (eunavfor.eu, 2018)26.  
 
25  Based on the communications of EUNAVFOR, calculated by the author. 
26 Eva Pejsova reported that “the EUNAVFOR Operational Commander was invited to the Chinese 
naval base in Djibouti on 8 August 2018” and that this was “the first and only time Western military 
personnel visited the Chinese overseas base”, See: Pejsova, E., 2019. The EU as a Maritime Security 
Provider. European Union Institute for Security Studies, December 2019. However, according to the 
press news released by Press Centre of Operation ATLANTA, the meeting was on board EUNAVFOR’s 
Spanish warship ESPS Castilla, see: EU NAVFOR Somalia, 2018. EUNAVFOR Discusses Counter‒
Piracy Tactics With Chinese Naval Forces | Eunavfor. [online] Eunavfor.eu. Available at: 
<https://eunavfor.eu/eu‒navfor‒discusses‒counter‒piracy‒tactics‒with‒chinese‒naval‒forces/> 






4.3.3 Means to Operate 
Under the strategic framework of ‘end, ways and means’ of the military operation, 
‘means’ are the resources required for the execution of the ‘way’. Having clarified the 
ends and methods of Operation Atalanta, this analysis now explores which resources 
the EU uses to achieve the objectives mentioned above. 
 
4.3.3.1 Command structure of Operation Atalanta 
Different from individual sovereign states, the EU had an ad hoc command structure 
for the military operation. The political control and strategic direction of Operation 
Atalanta were exercised by EU’s Political and Security Committee. The European 
Union Military Committee ‒ the highest military body set up within the Council ‒ 
undertakes military consultation and cooperation between the EU Member States. It 
monitors the execution of Operation Atalanta while the European Union Military Staff 
provides support and conducts strategic analysis.  
 
The Operation Commander, responsible for planning and the conduct of the Operation, 
oversees EUNAVFOR from the Operational Headquarters. The Deputy Operation 
Commander substitutes if the Operation Commander is absent. The Operation 
Commander and the Deputy Operation Commander rotate once a year and are senior 
officers with long and successful naval careers. The first Operation Commander was 
Rear Admiral Philip Jones from the Royal Naval Force of the United Kingdom. 
 
The first Operational Headquarters of Operation Atalanta was located at Northwood, 
United Kingdom; however, on 29 March 2019, the Operational Headquarters was 
relocated at Rota naval base in Spain, and the Maritime Security Centre for the Horn of 







The Force Commander commands and controls the Operation Area’s military forces on 
a flagship contributed by a Member State. He is responsible for the planning, 
orchestration, and execution of tactical military activities at sea. The first Force 
Commander was Commodore Antonios Papaioannou from the Hellenic Navy of Greece. 
 
4.3.3.2 Military assets of Operation Atalanta 
The EUNAVFOR’s assets deployed for Operation Atalanta are composed of five parts, 
including Surface Vessels, Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircrafts, Unmanned 
Aerial System, Rotary wing aircrafts, Autonomous Vessel Protection Detachment, with 
further provision for military and civilian staff to work at the Operational Headquarters 
or on‒board units. The composition of EUNAVFOR has constantly changed due to the 
frequent rotation of units. In the first four‒month phase of the Operation, there were up 
to six ships and three maritime patrol aircraft contributed by the United Kingdom, 
France, Greece, Spain, and Germany, and approximately 1200 people took part in the 
operation at any one time. However, with the decline of piracy and tactical adjustments, 
there was a decline in the number of warships and aircrafts at sea. Typically, this 
comprised approximately 600 personnel, 1–3 Surface Combat Vessels, and 1‒2 MPRA. 
 
Surface Vessels 
Surface Vessels are an essential component among the assets deployed in the Horn of 
Africa. They play a leading role in escorting the vessels, deterring, and disrupting piracy 
acts, and helping the vessels in distress. The surface vessels rotate every six months. 
The first warships which participated in Operation Atalanta came from the United 
Kingdom and Germany in December 2008. They had previously been operating in the 
maritime area as part of Combined Task Force 150, another multinational coalition 
naval task force deployed across the Horn of Africa. Nine countries contributed their 
warships for Operation Atalanta, including the EU Member States of Belgium, France, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden. Norway was the first non‒




Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircrafts 
Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircrafts play a vital part in EUNAVFOR Somalia. 
They fly over the theatre of operation, detect suspicious skiffs, and guide warships to 
their position. They also collect intelligence for the vessels. The aircraft are equipped 
with several advanced surveillance systems that significantly enhance EUNAVFOR’s 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance capability in the Somali Basin and the 
Gulf of Aden. The MPRAs of Luxembourg, Spain, France, Germany, Sweden, and 
Portugal have been operating together with EUNAVFOR warships. The Maritime 
Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircrafts usually take off from Djibouti, Mombasa (Kenya), 
or Port Victoria (Seychelles).  
 
Unmanned Aerial System 
Spain provided Unmanned Aerial System for Operation Atalanta. In August 2013, a 
Spanish Unmanned Aerial Vehicle was deployed. To become airborne, the Scan Eagle 
is catapulted off the deck using a “super wedge” launcher system, and it is recovered 
using a maritime ‘skyhook’ retrieval system. Scan Eagle can remain airborne for more 
than 18 hours operating day and night and provides images and videos of naval events 
in real‒time. Up until March 2017, Scan Eagle had achieved 500 hours in flight. 
 
Rotary Wing Aircrafts 
As an on‒board component of the warships, Rotary Wing Aircraft are an exceptionally 
versatile component in the Force Commander’s armoury. They provide an ideal 
deterrence, disruption, and a surveillance capability dealing with piracy; they also offer 
the ability to move people and supplies quickly and effectively, often between ships, or 
into remote or inaccessible areas. 
 
Autonomous Vessel Protection Detachment 
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The core task of Operation Atalanta is to protect WFP vessels delivering aid to Somalia. 
EUNAVFOR provides an escorting warship for short‒term chartered vessels, while 
Autonomous Vessel Protection Detachments are used to protect longer‒term chartered 
vessels and can provide 7/24 protection for WFP shipping. Furthermore, they allow 
greater flexibility in using the warships in the fight against piracy, while guaranteeing 
the security of WFP shipments. 
 
The first Autonomous Vessel Protection Detachment deployed on‒board WFP-
chartered vessels came from the Netherlands in June 2012. Germany, Finland, 
Lithuania, Serbia, Croatia, and Montenegro deployed their crack troops to achieve this 
task. 
 
4.4. Outcome of Operation Atalanta 
Operation Atalanta, as the first case study in this thesis, has examined the EU’s 
expression of sea power ‒ as shown in the notion of sea power reiterated in Chapter 
Two, a sea power is supposed to possess the ability to protect the international maritime 
commerce and utilisation of oceanic resources, to project military power into the sea, 
and to influence events on land (Tangredi, 2002). Based on this triple‒ability 
framework, this section examines the outcome of Operation Atalanta. 
 
Operation Atalanta, as one of most successful CFDP missions (Fiott, 2020), shows the 
abilities of the EU’s sea power in this triple‒capability framework. Firstly, the EU can 
protect international maritime commerce and use oceanic resources. Regarding 
Operation Atalanta, although its key task was protecting the vessels of WFP and 
AMISOM, the actions of the EUNAVFOR have significantly deterred and cracked 
down on piracy and ensured the safety of ships passing through this critical channel, 
thereby protecting the international trading system. Furthermore, the vessels which 
benefit from the presence and protection of Operation Atalanta include merchant 
vessels, fishing vessels, cruise ships, and even private sailing boats. Therefore, 
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Operation Atalanta guarantees the regular use of the oceanic resources for the vessels 
off the Somalia coast.  
 
Secondly, the EU can project military power into the ocean for sea and area control. To 
achieve sea control, Operation Atalanta established one Operational Headquarters on 
land and another one at sea. It put into use naval forces, including the surface vessels, 
Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircrafts, Unmanned Aerial System, Rotary wing 
Aircrafts, Autonomous Vessel Protection Detachment, and the provision of military 
and civilian staff to work at the Operational Headquarters or on‒board units. With the 
effort of other naval forces, Operation Atalanta guarantees the maritime area’s safety 
in the Horn of Africa.  
 
Thirdly, the EU can influence events on land using naval force. This ability is reflected 
in the objectives of Operation Atalanta to address the root cause of piracy. Operation 
Atalanta is part and parcel of the EU integrated approach in the Horn of Africa. Apart 
from Operation Atalanta, the EU launched two other missions: a civilian mission, 
EUCAP Somalia, which was augmented with military expertise designed to support 
regional maritime capacity‒building, and a training mission, EUTM Somalia, which 
aims to strengthen the Somali National Government and the institutions of Somalia by 
providing military training to members of the Somali National Armed Forces. 
Operation Atalanta’s effort at sea not only paved the way for the EU’s follow‒up steps, 
but also actively involved in different tasks, making a further contribution to Somalia’s 
security and stability. Furthermore, the EU integrated approach can be considered as 
part and parcel of the EU’s more comprehensive security strategy towards Africa, 
which will be discussed in more detail in the following case studies. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
The success of the Operation Atalanta supports the finding at the EU possesses sea 
power. Under the strategic framework of ‘ends, ways and means”, a military operation’s 
success is just like a stable stool. Its three legs must be balanced: the objectives of the 
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operation are realistic, while the resources and assets of the operation are sufficient, and 
the methods and process of the operation are sound. This triple‒condition is a 
prerequisite for every successful military operation. Regarding the Operation Atalanta, 
its objectives are feasible and holistic, well balancing the short‒medium term response 
and long-term response (Kaunert and Zwolski, 2012); its methods and process are 
realistic, well matching the needs of the conflict; and its resources and assets are 
sufficient, due to the support and contributions made by the Member States.  
 
However, the nature of operation Atalanta is as a counter‒piracy operation, which is 
quite different from traditional naval warfare. Firstly, it is low‒intensity naval 
engagement: the enemy for EUNAVFOR Somalia are the Somali pirates, who have 
nothing but grenades as weapons. As Till(2013) pointed out, “the strategic effectiveness 
of sea power depends importantly on the strengths and weaknesses of who it is exerted 
against” (2013, p.26). Therefore, EU sea power depends on what kind of rival it will 
fight. In the case of the counter‒piracy fight in the Horn of Africa, EU sea power 
dominates. 
 
Moreover, EUNAVFOR Somalia is not the only naval force fighting in the Horn of 
Africa. As mentioned above, the US and NATO forces and the naval forces from 
individual countries (such as Russia, China, India, Japan, and South Korea) all 
participated in the counter‒piracy fight of this conflict zone. Therefore, the success of 
EUNAVFOR Somalia was established in close cooperation with other naval actors. It 
is questionable whether the EU would still be a sea power without these partners, 
especially their western partners.  
 
Is the EU a sea power? If the answer is ‘yes’, then what kind of sea power is it? To 
answer these questions further case study research is warranted. Apart from Operation 
Atalanta, in 2015 the EU launched Operation Sophia, followed in 2020 by Operation 
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Chapter 5 The Practice of EU Sea Power in Mediterranean Sea: 




As demonstrated in the introductory chapter, the thesis adopts a multi-case research 
structure. This chapter is an exposition of the second case study of the thesis. The 
second case study aims to answer the question whether, in the fight against human 
smuggling and trafficking and against the illegal arms exports to Libya in the 
Mediterranean Sea, the EU has the abilities that sea power needs? And if so, to what 
extent? 
 
In the preceding chapter, the study of Operation Atalanta shows that in the counter-
piracy fight in the Horn of Africa, the EU is a sea power in collaboration with other 
partners in the region. This chapter examines the EU’s other two maritime military 
operations, Operation Sophia 27 , and Operation IRINI. As they were successively 
launched in the Mediterranean Sea, and there is a considerable overlap in their 
operational objectives, they are discussed together in the same chapter. 
 
In June 2015, the EU launched the Operation Sophia in response to the migrant crisis 
in the Mediterranean Sea. On 31 March 2020, Operation Sophia ended. It was followed 
by the Operation IRINI, aiming to “implement the UN arms embargo on Libya by using 
aerial, satellite and maritime assets” (Council of the EU, 2020). These twofold 
 
27 Sophia is the name of a baby saved by German frigate Schleswig-Holstein On 24 August 2015. 
Along with the Somali mother of the baby, 453 migrants saved by the EUNAVFOR MED Task 




operations are examined under the same strategic framework of ‘ends, ways and means’, 
as was done in the preceding chapter. 
 
This chapter is organised into four sections. Section One is an introduction. Section 
Two covers the context and the background of the two maritime military operations. 
Section Three focuses on the ‘end, ways and means’ of the operations. And the last 
section concludes the chapter by evaluating the role EU sea power plays in the 
Mediterranean Sea. 
 
5.2 Context and Background 
Due to the rapid economic development in Western Europe at the end of the 19th century 
and beginning of the 20th century, Western Europe has always been a target destination 
attracting immigrants, including immigrant workers, ethnic immigrants, refugees and 
asylum seekers. 
 
However, since the beginning of 2015, the number of refugees and economic migrants 
flocking to Europe has increased dramatically. According to the UN Refugee Agency 
statistics, 137,000 refugees and migrants reached Europe across the Mediterranean Sea 
in the first six months of 2015 (www.unhcr.org, 2015). Furthermore, “many more tried, 
but didn’t make it” (ibid). On 19 April 2015, nearly 700 migrants on a boat off the 
Italian island of Lampedusa lost their lives due to shipwreck. Therefore, from where 
did the migrants crossing the waters come? Why did they want to enter EU countries? 
How has the EU responded? The answers to these questions form the context and 
background of Operation Sophia.   
 
5.2.1 Where did the refugees and the economic migrants crossing the 
Mediterranean Sea come from? 
As Map 5-1shows, there are three migratory routes via the Mediterranean Sea to reach 
Europe: the eastern Mediterranean route from Turkey to Greece across the Aegean Sea; 
the central Mediterranean route from Libya to Italy; and the western Mediterranean 
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route from Morocco or Algeria to Spain (House of Lords, 2016). The migrants risking 
their lives at sea come from the countries suffering from conflicts, such as Syria, 
Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia (www.unhcr.org, 2015). And some of the migrants come 





Map 4: Migratory routes via the Mediterranean Sea to reach Europe 
(Souces: Frontex, 2015) 
 
 
5.2.2 Why did they come to the EU countries? 
The root cause of the European migrant crisis is complicated. First of all, migration has 
been considered a “mega-trend of this century” 28(Swing, www.devex.com, 2016). The 
European migrant crisis is just a microcosm of the international trend.  
 
Secondly, the increase in the migrant problem in Europe is the direct result of the 
instability of Syria and the deteriorating security situation in the Middle East. Four 
million Syrians fled abroad due to the Syrian civil war (BBC, 2015). Another example 
is Libya. Because of the continuous conflicts between the various internal powers and 
poor management of border control, Libya became not only a source of refugees 
flooding to Europe but the main transit channel for refugees in surrounding African 
countries. In June 2015, nearly half a million people gathered at Libyan beaches and 
tried to cross the sea to reach Europe (Hughes, 2015).  
 
 
28 See https://environmentalmigration.iom.int/policy/human-mobility-cop21 
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Thirdly, economic factors are an essential inducement for the trans-regional migration 
of refugees in West Asia and Africa. The economy of Africa has been lagging for a 
long time. Most countries in West Asia and North Africa rely heavily on oil resources, 
and the sharp drop in international oil prices leads to the decline of the national 
economy. Improving living conditions became an important driving force for people to 
move abroad.  
 
Fourthly, Europe is the ideal destination for the people in the countries mentioned above. 
The European countries are not only close to them, but also have developed economies, 
good social benefits, and a ‘welcome culture’ in certain EU Member States (Liebe et al. 
2018). Therefore, all the factors intertwined and led to a spike in the European refugee 
crisis. 
 
5.2.3  How has the EU responded? 
The European migrant crisis was, first of all, a humanitarian crisis. On 3 October 2013, 
360 refugees and other migrants lost their lives due to a shipwreck off the southern 
Italian island of Lampedusa. (BBC, 2013). The Italian government responded and 
launched a Search and Rescue (SAR) operation in the Sicily Channel, entitled “Mare 
Nostrum” (which meant ‘our sea’ in Latin) in the autumn of 2013 (Taylor, 2015). With 
a budget of US$12 million per month, Italian operation Mare Nostrum saved more than 
130,000 lives (ibid). However, the Italian government failed to get more support for 
Mare Nostrum from other EU Member States and it lasted only one year due to financial 
and political unsustainability (Biava, 2020).  
 
As Italy has moved the migration issue to the EU level, the EU replaced it with 
Operation Triton, led by the EU Border Agency – European Agency for the 
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States 
of the EU (Frontex. There were two differences between Triton and Mare Nostrum: 
Triton vessels patrolled just off the Libyan coast, which meant its primary objective 
focused more on the border control than research and rescue; and Triton had a limited 
102 
 
budget (US$ 3.6 million monthly), which was less than one-third of that of Mare 
Nostrum. Therefore, the study (Briva, 2020) showed that “Triton was less ambitious in 
terms of means and mandate compared to Mare Nostrum” (p.84). 
 
Unfortunately, on 19 April 2015, tragedy took place again ---- more than 700 people 
lost their lives by drowning near the island of Lampedusa of Italy (BBC, 2015). This 
event forced the EU to pay more attention to the migrant crisis. On 23 April, the 
European Council convened an extraordinary meeting to tackle the challenge at the EU 
level and finally committed “to strengthen … presence at sea, to fight the traffickers, to 
prevent illegal migration flows and to reinforce internal solidarity and responsibility” 
(Council of the EU, 2015b). To fulfil the points of commitment, the EU decided to take 
active steps, including “to immediately begin preparations for a possible Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operation to this effect” (ibid). On 22 June 2015, 
the EU launched EU NAVFOR Med29, the first CSDP anti-migrant smuggling maritime 
operation in the Mediterranean Sea.  
 
5.2.4 From SOPHIA to IRINI: EU’s Continuous Presence in Mediterranean 
Sea 
From 2015 to 2020, the EU, which was seriously impacted by the migration crisis, has 
taken a comprehensive approach to migration. On the one hand, the EU strengthened 
border control, raised the threshold for receiving refugees, and sped up the screening 
and refugee repatriation procedures. On the other hand, the EU reached a relief 
agreement with Turkey and increased investment in Africa to seek local solutions. With 
the waning of the European refugee crisis, Operation Sophia, as part and parcel of the 
EU’s comprehensive approach, came to an end on 31 March 2020. 
 
However, the root cause of the refugee crisis still exists. The situation of Libya remains 
challenging, as reiterated in the Berlin Conference Conclusions 
 
29 Henceforth Operation Sophia. 
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The conflict in Libya, the instability in the country, the external interferences, the 
institutional divisions, the proliferation of a vast amount of unchecked weapons and 
the economy of predation continue to be a threat to international peace and security by 
providing fertile grounds for traffickers, armed groups and terrorist organizations 
(UNSMIL, 2020). 
 
Against this background, the Council decided to launch another CSDP mission, 
Operation IRINI (Greek for ‘peace’) in the Mediterranean Sea. The core task of the 
mission is the “implementation of the UN arms embargo through the use of aerial, 
satellite and maritime assets” (Council of the EU, 2020).  
 
In reality, the operation IRINI can be considered as the continuous military presence of 
the EU in the Mediterranean Sea, where is a strategically complex maritime area. The 
EU, as well as the Member States, have great geostrategic and economic interests there. 
From a geopolitical perspective, the Mediterranean Sea serves as a bridge connecting 
the rich European countries in the north to the poor African countries in the south. The 
vast differences in economic performance led to the migration flow. Economically, the 
Mediterranean Sea carries around 30% of all global seaborne trade in volume, and 25% 
of worldwide seaborne oil traffic (Till, 2013). Moreover, the southern Mediterranean 
countries are rich in natural gas and oil, which accounts for a large proportion of the 
energy products imported by the EU. Due to the strategic relevance of the 
Mediterranean Sea, sea control matters to the EU. Therefore, after the operation Sophia, 
the EU decided to continue the maritime military presence in the Mediterranean Sea. 
However, Operation IRINI was questioned due to its maritime emphasis in the 
implementation of the UN arms embargo in Libya. Obviously, the channels on land are 
also used extensively to supply arms to the parties involved in the conflict30. 
 
Operation IRINI focuses on the implementation of the Arms Embargo in Libya, which 
is of great strategic relevance to the EU. From a geostrategic perspective, as an EU 
 
30  See “Operation IRINI: Remarks by High Representative/Vice-President Josef Borrell following 
the launch of the operation”. [Online] <http:// 
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neighbouring country separated by the sea, Libya plays a crucial role in the maritime 
security of the Mediterranean Sea. It has been not only the main source of migration 
flow to Europe, but also the transit place of a large number of African migrants of 
neighbouring countries, which exploited the loophole of the poorly managed border 
control. As the Second Report of the Commission (2017) argued, “the existence of a 
unified government in Libya, able to provide security across the country and work with 
the EU on migration, is a precondition for meaningful action against people smuggling 
networks onshore” (House of Lords, 2017). Furthermore, “Libya has the largest proven 
reserves of oil in Africa” (Hope, 2019, p.1). In 2018, 28% of EU oil imports came from 
Russia, 11% from Norway and 6.7% from Libya (ibid).  
 
Libya has a special historical association with European countries, especially France. 
After the outbreak of World War II, southern Libya was controlled by France. Italy 
occupied northern Libya after the Italian Turkish war in 1912. France and Italy did not 
withdraw from the territory of Libya until the declaration of the country’s independence 
in 1951. In 2011, a Britain and France-initiated and NATO-led military intervention 
ended the four decades’ rule of Qadhafi in Libya. Therefore, Britain and France have a 
voice in every relevant issue on Libya among the EU Member States. Under the active 
promotion of France, Germany and other countries, the EU decided to launch a 
maritime military operation against the export of arms towards Libya in the 
Mediterranean Sea.  
 
5.3 ‘Ends, Ways and Means’ of Operation Sophia and Operation IRINI 
As was done in the preceding chapter, Operation Sophia and IRINI are examined under 
this framework ‘end, ways and means’. The following questions are examined: What 





5.3.1 Ends of Operation Sophia 
The objectives of Operation Sophia first articulated in Council Decision (CFSP) 
2015/778 of 18 May 2015 on a European Union military operation in the Southern 
Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED) (Council of the EU, 2015c) were “to 
contribute to the disruption of the business model of human smuggling and trafficking 
networks in the Southern Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR Med)” (ibid, p.3). On 
20 June 2016, the Council launched COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2016/993 
amending Decision (CFSP) 2015/778 on a European Union military operation in the 
Southern Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED operation Sophia) (Council of the 
EU, 2016), which added two supporting tasks, including:  
capacity building and training of, and information sharing with, the Libyan Coastguard 
and Navy, based on a request by the legitimate Libyan authorities taking into account 
the need for Libyan ownership; and contributing to information sharing, as well as 
implementation of the UN arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya on 
the basis of a new UN Security Council Resolution.   (Council of the EU, 2016).  
 
Main Objective: To contribute to the disruption of the business model of human 
smuggling and trafficking networks in the Southern Central Mediterranean 
As Tardy (2015) argued, “the operation focuses on smugglers rather than on the rescue 
of the migrants themselves, even though actions to prevent further loss of life at sea are 
a visible part of the mandate” (p.1). In reality, smuggling from West Asia and Africa to 
Europe has gradually developed into a mature ‘industry’. Human traffickers and 
smuggling organisations have been very skilled in transporting refugees to Europe, 
which vigorously promotes the wave of refugee smuggling. As the root causes of 
Europe’s maritime refugee crisis are the conflicts and poverty in the related countries, 
which cannot be solved in the short term, to disrupt the human smuggling and 
trafficking networks seems like a possible goal to stop the flow of refugees and migrants. 





Supporting Objective One: To build and train the Libyan Coastguard and Navy 
capacity, and to share information with them  
 
Supporting Objective Two: To contribute information sharing and implementation of 
the UN arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya 
As mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the main objective of the Operation Sophia 
is a short-medium term response to the European maritime refugee crisis. However, the 
EU also needs to establish some long-term goals to address the root cause of the crisis.  
As part of the EU comprehensive approach, cooperation with the legitimate local 
government of the region and the local naval force plays a key role in resolving the 
crisis. Additionally, the EU sought to address one of the root causes of the refugee crisis 
- the situation in Libya. Given that Libya is not only the source of refugees but also the 
transit channel for them, it is of great significance to end the civil war and to maintain 
effective governance in this deeply divided country. Therefore, the EU determined the 
implementation of the UN arms embargo.   
 
Regarding EU sea power, as was done in the preceding chapter, sea power theory can 
be used as an explanatory factor to understand the objectives of Operation Sophia and 
Operation IRINI. According to the modern understanding of sea power, as emphasised 
repeatedly in the thesis, sea power can be defined as  
the combination of a nation-state’s capacity for international maritime commerce and 
utilisation of the oceanic resource, with its ability to project military power into the 
sea, for the purposes of sea and area control, and from the sea, in order to influence 
events on land by means of naval forces” (Tangredi, 2002, p. 3-4).  
 
It is clear that the objectives of the operation Sophia covered mostly the last two aspects 
of the output of sea power: projecting military power into the sea for sea control and 
influencing the events on land using naval forces. No matter the rescue of the vessels 
in distress, or disruption of the human smuggling and trafficking, they focus essentially 
on controlling the operational maritime area. And the objective of the capacity building 
and training of the Libyan Coast Guard and Navy and the implementation of the UN 
107 
 
arms embargo contribute to addressing the root cause of the crisis, in other words, to 
influence the events on land. 
 
5.3.1.1 Ends of Operation IRINI 
After the end of Operation Sophia in March 2020, the EU launched the Operation IRINI 
in May. The objectives of Operation IRINI are elaborated in Council Decision (CFSP) 
2020/472 of 31 March 2020 on a European Union military operation in the 
Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED IRINI) (Council of the EU, 2020). There is one core 
objective and two secondary objectives for operation IRINI based on UN Resolution 
1970 (2011) and follow-up resolutions31. 
 
Core Objective: To Implement UN Arms Embargo on Libya with Aerial, Satellite and 
Maritime Assets 
In 2011, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1970 (2011), which decided to 
introduce the arms embargo, travel ban, asset freeze, and designation criteria in Libya. 
In terms of the arms embargo, the Resolution 1970 (2011) reiterated, as  
All Member States are required to prevent the sale or supply to Libya of arms and 
related material of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and 
equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned (with an 
exception for the Libyan government for non-lethal material, technical assistance, 
training or financial assistance); prohibits the export by Libya, and procurement by 
Member States, of all arms and related material (UN Security Council, 2011). 
 
After the fall of Quadafi’s regime, as argued, “(the) interim authorities proved unable 
to form a stable government, address security issues, reshape the country’s finances, or 
create a viable framework for post-Eastern Affairs post-conflict justice and 
reconciliation” (Blanchard, 2020 p.3). Libya became a divided country with two main 
 
31




institutions. One side is the Government of National Accord in Tripoli, with its 
supporters, who retain control of the capital and other key western areas. It is the 
legitimate government. The other side is a rival interim government in eastern Libya, 
supported by the Libyan National Army/Libyan Arab Armed Forces movement. They 
and their local partners manipulate the key oil production and export infrastructure 
(ibid). Additionally, there are the foreign actors, who stand behind the fragmented 
institutions in Libya. Several countries, such as Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, 
Russia and Turkey, export arms into Libya contrary to the UN Arms Embargo 
Resolution. Therefore, the implementation of the UN Arms Embargo addresses the root 
cause of the civil war in Libya. 
 
Secondary objective One: To conduct monitoring and surveillance activities and 
gather information on illicit exports from Libya of petroleum 
 
The decision of the EU to charge operation IRINI this task was based on the UN 
Resolution 1970 (2011) and sequential Resolutions on Libya. UN Resolution 2146 
(2014) required the Member States to  
Inspect vessels designated by the UN that might be carrying illicit crude oil; To ensure 
the return to Libya of any illicit crude oil thereby discovered and to prevent any 
designated vessel carrying illicit crude from calling at any of their ports (UN Security 
Council, 2014).  
 
In the Berlin Conference on Libya, the participants also reached a consensus that the 
“National Oil Corporation is Libya’s sole independent and legitimate oil company” 
(unsmil.unmissions.org, 2020) and objected to 
Any attempt at damaging Libya’s oil infrastructure, any illicit exploitation of its 
energy resources, which belong to the Libyan people, through the sale or purchase of 
Libyan crude oil and derivatives outside the NOC’s control and call for the transparent 




Secondary Objective Two: To assist in the development of the capacities and in the 
training of the Libyan Coast Guard and Navy in law enforcement tasks at sea, in 
particular to prevent human smuggling and trafficking 
 
The objective of capacity-building and training of Libyan Coast Guard and Navy has 
been the objective of Operation Sophia. It implies that the EU seeks to maintain 
continuity of the support and military aid to the legitimate government of Libya. 
 
5.3.2 Ways to Operate 
As argued in the preceding section, the ends of Operation Sophia is “to contribute to 
the disruption of the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks in 
the Southern Central Mediterranean” (Council of EU, 2015c), adding twofold support 
objectives: the capacity building and training of, and information sharing with, the 
Libyan Coastguard and Navy, and contributing to information sharing, as well as the 
implementation of the UN arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya 
(Council of EU, 2016c).   
 
Unlike the EU first maritime military operation – operation Atalanta - Operation Sophia 
was planned and conducted in sequential phases. The main task of the first phase was 
to detect and monitor the migration networks through information gathering, and to 
patrol on the high seas. The second phase aimed to board, search, seize and diversify 
the suspected vessels, and the third phase focused on disposing of the crime vessels or 
rendering them inoperable (Council of the EU, 2016c).  
 
On 27 June 2015, one of the Operation units, the Italian Navy Ship ITS Cavour, which 
departed the harbour of Taranto for the south part of the central Mediterranean Sea, 
started the first phase of the Operation EUNAVFOR Med. On 7 October 2015, the 
mission entered the second phase, which implied that the EUNAVFOR could board, 
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search, seize and divert the suspected vessels on the high seas in accordance with the 
international law. 
 
5.3.2.1 To patrol on the high sea 
In the first phase of the Operation Sophia, the ways to operate focused on patrolling 
and aimed at information gathering and detection. For instance, on 3 July 2015, a 
maritime surveillance aircraft Falcon 50 of the French Navy flew over the central 
Mediterranean for the first operational contribution of France to Operation Sophia. 
Taking off from the French naval air base Lann Bihoué, it flew three hours off Sicily, 
thanks to the fuel refill at Sigonella in Italy. It collected information and transferred this 
to the Force headquarters of the operation on board ITS Cavour 
(www.operationsophia.eu, 2015a). 
 
While patrolling on the high seas, the vessels rescued the ships in distress, as well as 
the on-board migrants. Take the rescue mission of the German Frigate SCHLESWIG-
HOLSTEIN as an example. On July 22, following the request from the Italian Maritime 
Rescue Coordination Centre, the German Frigate SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN, while 
patrolling the operational area, recovered a boat in distress and rescued a total number 
of 249 migrants (www.operationsophia.eu, 2015b).  
 
5.3.2.2 To cooperate with partner agencies 
Intelligence played an essential role in the fight against human smuggling and 
trafficking. The EU enhanced the synergy and cooperation among the EU institutions 
to facilitate the collection and transmission of information. EUNAVFOR Med closely 
cooperated with other EU institutions and partner countries to enhance intelligence 
collecting and sharing by establishing two cross-sectional institutions - the Joint 
Operational Team in Europol and the Crime Information Cell on-board. 
 
In March 2015, the EU established an intelligence-led Joint Operational Team Mare, 
which was based on the cooperation and synergy of Europol, the EU Member States, 
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the United States, Frontex and International Criminal Police Organization. Due to 
Europol’s unique intelligence resources, Joint Operational Team Mare “identifies 
concrete investigative leads, supports its partners in initiating new investigations and 
provides criminal analysis” (www.operationsophia.eu, 2015d). Between March and 
December in 2015, it had initiated over 165 new cases’ data, inserted the data of over 
3000 facilitators into a dedicated database, and identified more than 100 suspected 
vessels (ibid).   
 
Due to the increase of the migratory flow and the involvement of organised crime on a 
large scale, the EU decided in December 2015 to convert the Joint Operational Team 
Mare into the European Migrant Smuggling Centre, which can offer on-the-spot 
support and strengthened analytical capabilities.  
 
On 5 July 2018, following the EU Council decision (Council of the EU, 2018b), the EU 
established the Crime Information Cell, which was composed of five specialised 
experts from EU agencies - Europol, Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard 
Agency, and Operation Sophia. It has been on board the flagship of Operation Sophia, 
Italian Navy Ship San Giusto, moored in Augusta. Functionally, the Crime Information 
Cell connected the EU Common Security and Defence Policy with EU Justice and 
Home Affairs, strengthening the EU’s ability to attack human smuggling and 
trafficking in the Mediterranean Sea. 
 
During the second phase of the operation, conducting rescues was still important. For 
instance, on 27 May 2016, while on patrol, the Luxemburgish aircraft SW3 Merlin III 
spotted a sinking wooden vessel with approximately 100 people on board. The Italian 
Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre, having received this information, requested 
Operation Sophia’s Force Headquarters to act. The Spanish Frigate REINA SOFIA 
headed to the sinking boat. Simultaneously, the Spanish air force aircraft VIGMA D-
4 took off from Sigonella airbase, reached the wooden vessel, and dropped off life 
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jackets and lifeboats. As a result, the Spanish Frigate saved 206 migrants, of whom 77 
were from the sinking vessel and 129 from another rubber boat 
(www.operationsophia.eu, 2016a). Meanwhile, the Frontex-led operation TRITON and 
Italian Coast Guard saved 500 more migrants, who were transferred to Reina SOFIA 
(ibid). There were a total of 706 migrants on board the Spanish REINA SOFIA which 
headed to the harbour of Taranto (ibid). 
 
5.3.2.3 To train the Libyan Coast Guard and Navy 
In June 2016, the Council of the EU added the training of the Libyan Coast Guard and 
Navy as the support mission of the Operation Sophia. For instance, on 23 August 2016, 
the EUNAVFOR Med Operation Commander and the Commander of Libyan 
Coastguard and Port Security signed an agreement for training “at sea, ashore (in EU 
Member States training facilities, or in Libya) and on board Libyan Coast Guard and 
Navy Patrol Boats” (www.operationsophia.eu, 2016b). The operation successfully 
trained about 500 Libyan officers and sailors (www.operationirini.eu, 2020). 
 
5.2.3.4 To Conduct “Friendly Approach” at Sea 
As was done in the Operation Atalanta, a “friendly approach” was conducted during 
the Operation Sophia and Operation IRINI to collect information about suspicious 
vessels and smugglers. For example, in January 2017, the French light Frigate 
Commandant DUCUING conducted four “friendly approach” operations in one week. 
The crew conducted the investigation on a fishing boat and two sailing boats off the 
Libyan coast, and on board a bulk-carrier (www. www.operationsophia.eu, 2017). They 
sought to organise a network with seafarers appearing in the area, which was extremely 
helpful for the information gathering. During the first four months, the crew of 





5.2.3.5 To Provide Medical Aid on High Seas 
For instance, on 23 May 2018, once having received the request for medical support 
from a Tunisian fishing boat, the German Auxiliary ship MOSEL sent a doctor, 
interpreter and the boarding team to the fishing vessel and provide the medical aid 
(www.operationsophia.eu, 2018). 
 
5.2.3.6 To Implement UN Arms Embargo by detecting and boarding the 
suspected vessel 
To implement the UN arms embargo in Libya was the support task of Operation Sophia. 
On 19 June 2017, a warship of the Italy-led Operation MARE SICURO32 detected a 
vessel suspected of smuggling arms to Libya. Due to the close cooperation between the 
different security actors in the Mediterranean Sea, the French Frigate Commandant 
BLAISON of Operation Sophia boarded the suspected vessel, transferred the light 
weapons and ammunition on board the French ship. The arms were to be disposed of 
in due course in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 2357(2017) 
(www.operationsophia.eu, 2017). 
 
Up untill July 2018, according to the statistics from the Operation Press Centre, 
“concerning the arms embargo, Operation Sophia has carried out 1723 hailings, 105 
friendly approaches (31 of them during 2018), 7 Flag enquiries and 3 
inspections”(www.operationsophia.eu, 2018). 
 
For the operation IRINI, implementing the arms embargo is their core task in the 
Mediterranean Sea. Since the launch of the operation, while patrolling the central 
Mediterranean Sea, Operation IRINI conducted more than 600 hailings and 9 friendly 
approaches during the first  four months (www.operationirini.eu, 2020).  With 
respect to monitoring, it monitored “suspect vessels at sea in more than 10 ports and 
landing points”, and “25 airports and landing strips and more than 80 military flights or 
 
32 Operation MARE SICURO was launched by Italian navy in late March 2015. It aimed to monitor 
the Libyan coast, and protect Italian vessels and oil rigs from terrorist attacks.  
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possible military-related air cargos going back and forth to Libya” 
(www.operationirini.eu, 2020). Moreover, Operation IRINI provided 14 special reports 
to the United Nations Panel of Experts “concerning both sides of the conflict in Libya” 
(ibid), underlining the impartiality of the EU.  
 
 
5.3.3 Means to Operate 
As with Operation Atalanta, Operation Sophia involved contributions from Member 
States. All EU Member States (other than Denmark), and around 1100 military and civil 
personnel were involved. 
 
5.3.3.1 Command Structure of Operation Sophia 
On 22 June 2015, the Council of the EU launched the naval operation against human 
smugglers and traffickers in the Mediterranean Sea. The Council planned the operation 
in sequential phases and determined the dates of each phase. 
The Operation Headquarters of Operation Sophia was in Rome.  Rear Admiral 
Enrico Credendino had been appointed Operation Commander and was assisted at 
sea by Force Commander Rear Admiral Andrea Gueglio.  
 
5.3.3.2 Military Assets of Operation Sophia 
The military assets deployed for Operation Sophia were composed of surface vessels 
and air assets, as well as the provision of military and civilian staff to work at the 
Operational Headquarters or on-board units. The composition of Operation Sophia 
constantly changed due to the frequent rotation of units. However, Operation Sophia 
did not deploy surface vessels into the operation from January 2019 for political reasons.  
 
Surface Vessels 
Surface vessels played a key role in the fight against human smugglers and traffickers, 
as well as in the search and rescue mission. Once Operation Sophia launched in 2015, 
the Italian Navy ship ITS CAVOUR was the first flagship contributed by the Italian 
115 
 
Navy. It was equipped with a sophisticated Command and Control system, which 
designed for joint and international operations and its Command Centre hosted more 
than 600 personnel (www.operationsophia.eu, 2015). Germany contributed one Frigate 
SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN and one supply-ship WERRA for the launch of operation. 
The Frigate SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN was equipped with modern technological 
communication systems, fit for a broad range of maritime operations. The supply-ship 
WERRA was charged with logistic support in terms of fuel, food and water. Belgium, 
France, Slovenia, Spain and the UK also sent surface vessels.  
 
Air Assets 
Air assets played a crucial role in Operation Sophia. There were two categories of air 
assets deployed: Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircrafts and shipborne 
helicopters. 
  
As in Operation Atalanta, maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircrafts, with their 
ability to build up maritime awareness in the vast Mediterranean Sea, made a great 
contribution in Operation Sophia. The maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircrafts 
deployed in the Operation includes Falcon 50 of the French Navy, VIGMA D-4 of the 
Spanish Navy, SW3 MERLIN III of Luxembourg Air Force, P-72A and Predator of 
Italian Navy, as well as An - 28B1R BRYZA of the Polish Navy.  
 
In terms of shipborne helicopters, they were capable of operating maritime patrol and 
interdiction, troop ferrying, casualty evacuation, medium lift under-slung loads, search 
and rescue and other contingency tasks.  
 
5.3.3.3 Command Structure of Operation IRINI 
Operation IRINI was launched following a decision by the Council of the European 
Union. “EUNAVFOR MED IRINI shall report to the PSC on all issues and events 
related to such inspections. The PSC may consider any subsequent measures, as 
appropriate” (Council of the EU, 2020). The headquarters is located in Rome at the 
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Centocelle Joint Operations Centre. It comprises 150 staff from 20 EU Member States 
(Toremans, 2020). The Force Commander will be alternatively assigned to Italy and 
Greece every six months. The rotation of the Force Commander will take place together 
with the rotation of the flagship. Admiral Fabio Agostini was appointed the Commander 
of the Operation IRINI. The first Force Commander is Rear Admiral Ettore Socci of 
the Italian Navy. Operation IRINI also established a Forward Logistic Base in Augusta 
and Forward Logistic Site in Sigonella. 
 
5.3.3.4 Military Assets of Operation IRINI 
As the core task of Operation IRINI requires, it contributes to the implementation of 
the UN arms embargo by using aerial, satellite and maritime assets. 7 EU Member 
States (Italy, Greece, France, Germany, Poland, Malta and Luxembourg) have 
committed to deploying military assets to the operation, and a further 20 have provided 
military staff to the Headquarters.  
 
Aerial Assets 
Aerial assets have demonstrated the value in operation Atalanta and operation Sophia. 
The first aerial assets deployed in operation IRINI were contributed by Luxembourg, 
Poland and Germany. Italy will provide an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle. 
 
Maritime Assets 
Maritime assets deployed in operation IRINI will be contributed by France, Greece, 
Italy and Germany. The first maritime assets deployed in the Mediterranean Sea were 
the French Frigate ACONIT and another French anti-aircraft Frigate JEAN BART, 
which has the potential to monitor both the sea lines of communication and the air 
traffic flow (www.operationirini.eu, 2020). On 2 May 2020, the Hellenic Navy Frigate 
HYDRA set sail to join the Operation equipped with a helicopter and a Visit, Board, 
Search, and Seizure team. On 4 June 2020, the Hellenic Navy Frigate SPETSAI took 
part in the operation. It had on board “a boarding team specially trained to conduct 
Maritime Interdiction Operations as well as a Sikorsky S-70B Aegean Hawk helicopter” 
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(www.navalnews.com, 2020a). On 4 August 2020, the German Navy Frigate 
HAMBUR became involved in the operation and was expected to patrol in the 
Mediterranean Sea for almost five months. With two helicopters and a VBSS team on-
board, it is designed as a multi-purpose vessel for escort, protection and maritime 
control. It is equipped with SMART-L radar, which can detect more than 1,000 targets 
at the same time (www.navalnews.com, 2020b). Furthermore, Italy has promised to 
provide a submarine.  
 
Satellite Assets 
The Council of the EU acknowledged for the first time “using satellite assets” in the 
mandate of a maritime operation. However, The European Satellite Centre has worked 
for Operation Sophia for many years (www.satcen.europa.eu, 2020).  
 
The European Satellite Centre was established in 1992, in the vicinity of Madrid, Spain. 
With respect to the role that it can play in the operation IRINI, the Operation 
Commander of operation IRINI stated:  
The EU Satellite Centre is an essential element of Operation IRINI as it provides us 
with the necessary satellite imagery and analysis. … Moreover, the resources made 
available by SatCen are essential for the impartiality of the Operation since they 
facilitate the monitoring of aerial and land routes in the wider context of the arms 
embargo (www.satcen.europa.eu, 2020). 
 
5.4 Conclusions 
Following Operation Atalanta, Operation Sophia and Operation IRINI provided another 
opportunity to observe the EU through the practice of sea power.  
 
Unlike Operation Atalanta, which was regarded as one of the most successful CSDP 
missions (Fiott, 2020), the decision to launch operation Sophia and operation IRINI, as 
well as the outcome of the operations, caused controversy. As the ‘output’ of EU sea 
power, these two maritime military operations need to be examined under the triple-
capability framework of sea power. As the definition of sea power indicates,  
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modern sea power can be defined as the combination of a nation-state’s capacity for 
international maritime commerce and utilization of oceanic resources, with its ability 
to project military power into the sea, for the purposes of sea and area control over 
commerce and conflict, and from the sea, in order to influence events on land by means 
of naval forces (Tangredi, 2002, p.3). 
 
Regarding Operation Sophia, as the Council outlined, the objective of launching the 
operation was to disrupt the business model of human smugglers and trafficking 
networks in the Mediterranean Sea. First of all, the military presence of the EU in the 
Mediterranean Sea had a positive role in sustaining the security of international 
shipping. Additionally, the EU uses military assets, including surface vessels, aircrafts 
and satellites assets, to complete a number of tasks, such as Search and Rescue missions, 
Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure missions, as well as the capacity-building and training 
missions. Obviously, by launching Operation Sophia, the EU has proved that it has the 
capacity to project military power into the sea for the purpose of sea control. However, 
whether the EU has influenced the events on land by the use of sea power remains 
questionable. On the one hand, as far as the crime itself was concerned, the human 
smugglers and traffickers plan and organise the crime onshore instead of at sea; on the 
other hand, the root cause of the migration crisis came from the deteriorating economy 
and poor governance of the countries across Sub-Saharan Africa. Therefore, from the 
perspective of sea power, the practice of EU sea power in the operation Sophia cannot 
be seen as a successful one (House of Lords, 2017), as it lacked the most important 
ability as a sea power, the ability to influence the events on land.  
 
Regarding Operation IRINI, it can be considered as the continuity of Operation Sophia. 
These two operations cover the same operational area. Operation IRINI aims to bridge 
the gap left by Operation Sophia, addressing the root cause of the European 
immigration crisis. Furthermore, the surface vessels, which quit Operation Sophia in 
the last year, returned to the Mediterranean Sea. Thus, the maritime assets, aerial assets 
and satellite assets of the EU form a complete naval force system and can cover the 




Like Operation Atalanta, NATO naval forces were also deployed in the Mediterranean 
Sea. There are three tasks mandated to Operation Sea Guardian of NATO: maritime 
security capacity building, and support to maritime situational awareness and to 
maritime counter-terrorism. As a matter of fact, NATO’s and EU’s naval forces share 
the same tasks and cooperates in the Mediterranean Sea. 
 
This case study highlights that the two maritime military operations of the EU in the 
Mediterranean Sea demonstrate the dual features of EU sea power.  On the one hand, 
EU sea power matters in that sea area; on the other hand, EU sea power is restrained by 
some conditions, such as a feasible operational objective for the purpose of influencing 
the events on land, as well as cooperation from Western partners. 
 
Based on the two case studies of three CSDP maritime military operations led by the 
EU, the thesis reaches the conclusion that the EU is a sea power due to the two 
dimensions, the ‘input’ and ‘output’ of sea power.  EU sea power comprises the 
economic, political, institutional and military components as the ‘input’ of sea power, 
as the means to be capable of maintaining international maritime shipping, and to 
realise the sea control by using naval means and to influence events on land as the 
“output” of sea power.  
 
However, another question arises: is the CSDP maritime military operation the only 
way for the EU to ‘output’ sea power? Are there other forms of the output of the EU 
sea power besides CSDP missions? Consequently, the next chapter will take the EU 
comprehensive approach to maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea as a case study, and 
aim to explore the different ways through which the EU deploys sea power in the 




Chapter 6 The Practice of EU Sea Power in the Gulf of Guinea: EU 




The preceding chapters take the EU’s three CSDP maritime military operations- 
Operation Atalanta, operation Sophia, and operation IRINI as case studies to explore 
the ‘output’ of EU sea power. By examining in a detail the ‘end, ways and means’ of 
the EU’s three CSDP maritime military operations, the thesis concludes that EU sea 
power has to some extent developed the capabilities that a sea power should possess. 
 
However, CSDP maritime military operations are not the only way for the EU to ‘output’ 
sea power. As is implied by the term, sea power does not equal just naval power. There 
are other resources and tools the EU can use. The political ambition to become a global 
maritime security provider gives the EU an impulse to be involved in the peripheral and 
international maritime security. The EU’s superior economic strength allows it to have 
sufficient financial guarantees while participating in regional maritime security 
cooperation. And the EU’s comprehensive cross-sectoral maritime administrative 
institutions enrich its choice of the tool when it cooperates with other maritime security 
actors. In addition, after years of maritime military presence in the Horn of Africa and 
the Mediterranean Sea, the EU has considerable expertise in dealing with piracy, illegal 
trafficking, and various forms of maritime crime. All these resources and advantages 
constitute the prerequisite and foundation for the ‘output’ of the EU sea power. 
 
Therefore, besides the CSDP missions, there are several different forms of the ‘output’ 
of EU sea power. Taking the EU comprehensive approach to maintaining maritime 
security in the Gulf of Guinea as a case study, this chapter aims to explore the different 
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ways through which the EU uses sea power to achieve its goals in the maritime security 
sphere. 
 
Among all the other regions for the EU, Africa is unique. “Africa is Europe’s closest 
neighbour. The ties that bind Africa and the EU are broad and deep as a result of history, 
proximity and shared interests” (European Commission, 2020a, p.1). Additionally, “the 
vast majority of Africa’s economies depend on maritime links for survival” (Styan, 
2016), as the African continent straddles the Atlantic Ocean and the Indian Ocean. 
According to Styan (2016), “European discourse on inter-regional maritime issues 
tends not be about maritime links with or between African states, but rather focuses 
primarily on trade routes around Africa” (p. 113). 
 
The maritime area in the Gulf of Guinea is economically relevant to the coastal and 
landlocked African countries and to the rest of world. From 2012, due to the efforts of 
the EU and other maritime security actors in the Horn of Africa, piracy off the coast of 
Somali has dramatically decreased. In the meantime, “in 2012, the Gulf of Guinea 
surpassed that of the Gulf of Aden …as the region with the highest number of reported 
piracy attacks in the world” (Osinowo, 2015, p.1).  Consequently, this issue gained 
attention internationally. The UN adopted Resolution 2018(2011) and 2039 (2012), 
which  
Emphasised the importance of supporting partner countries and regional organisations, 
through providing training, advice, equipment and resources where appropriate, so 
that they can increasingly prevent or manage crises by themselves (Council of the EU, 
2014).  
 
The EU, who has common interests with the countries of the region, took the issue 
seriously. The European Commission (2013) argued, “The waters surrounding the 
African continent, including the Gulf of Guinea, must receive increased attention and 
an internationally coordinated approach” (p.6). Thanks to the experience shaped by the 
previous practice of sea power, the EU adopts a comprehensive approach to tackle 
maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. It means that besides CSDP maritime military 
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operations, the EU has other choices to deploy sea power in the waters of interest. 
Therefore, this chapter aims to explore the EU’s response to a maritime crisis through 
the lens of sea power ‘output’. As sea power can be seen as  
The combination of a nation-state’s capacity for international maritime commerce and 
utilisation of oceanic resources, with its ability to project military power into the sea, 
for the purposes of sea and area control over commerce and conflict, and from the sea, 
in order to influence events on land by means of naval forces” (Tangredi, 2002, p.3 ),  
 
the EU’s comprehensive approach needs to address the Gulf of Guinea issue in three 
ways, including to increase maritime security and safety of critical maritime routes in 
the Gulf of Guinea, to enhance the military presence of the EU in this maritime area, 
and to address the root causes of piracy and other maritime threats in the region. 
 
In this chapter, the research framework is based on the EU’s common working process 
in the maritime security sphere. This framework begins by identifying the EU’s 
interests in the maritime dimension. Then it describes the maritime threats to the EU in 
detail. Finally, it focuses on formulating the response to the threats (Council of the EU, 
2014). This framework is adopted by the case study in this chapter on the practice of 
the EU sea power in the Gulf of Guinea. It includes five sections. After this introductory 
section, the second section provides an overview of the shared interests of the EU in 
the Gulf of Guinea, especially the interests of the EU in the maritime dimension. 
Section Three explores the maritime threats that the EU faces in the Gulf of Guinea, as 
well as the difference between the two piracy phenomena on both sides of the African 
continent. The fourth section focuses on the EU’s comprehensive approach to the risks 
and threats. The last section concludes by pointing out that the EU’s comprehensive 
approach against the threats at sea in the Gulf of Guinea can be seen as an effective 
practice of EU sea power. 
 
6.2 EU’s Interests in the Gulf of Guinea in the Maritime Dimension 
As part of the Atlantic Ocean southwest of Africa, the Gulf of Guinea is 
geographicalally a vast maritime area in the West of the Africa Continent. Besides the 
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6000 kilometres of coastline, it covers 20 sovereign coastal states and islands, and even 
several landlocked states33. This geographicalal reality of the Gulf of Guinea illustrates 
two interconnected facts: on the one hand, every major issue there may have a maritime 
dimension; on the other hand, the events taking place at sea may have a great impact 
on the events on land. As such, it seems like, from the perspective of sea power, a 
rational choice to take actions at sea in this area, as the goal of using sea power is, as 
Tangredi (2002) argued, to influence the events on land. 
 
The Gulf of Guinea is endowed with several attributes due to the geographicalal reality 
of that area. First of all, it has large reserves of mineral and marine resources, such as 
diamonds, gold and fisheries (Onuoha, 2010). Furthermore, the coastline of the Gulf of 
Guinea is considered as the optimum shipping route. Numerous natural ports are located 
along the coast of the Gulf of Guinea. There are more than 200 deep-water ports 
including Lagos, Abidjan, Dakar and Douala and so on. Moreover, ships travelling to 
these ports do not need to pass through any choke points and are not disturbed by bad 
weather. The maritime area of the Gulf of Guinea is an important node area of 
international routes from Cape Town to London, Cape Town to Dakar, Cape Black to 
Dakar, Dakar to Gibraltar. The advantageous geographicalal location and abundant 
natural resources make the Gulf of Guinea one of the busiest maritime areas in the 
world. According to statistics, the volume of maritime transport in this area is as high 
as 400 million tons per year (Kamaldeen, 2014).  
 
The most prominent feature of this area is its reserve, production, and export of oil. The 
Gulf of Guinea is an important oil producing area. In addition to abundant reserves, the 
crude oil produced in this area is recognised as high-quality, as it contains less sulphide, 
which means there is a low refining cost and less environmental pollution (Cao, 2017). 
 
33 The Gulf of Guinea encompasses 20 countries, namely: Gambia, Guinean-Bissau, Senegal, Guinea, 
Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Sao 
Tome and Principe, Central African Republic, Gabon, Republic of Congo, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC).  
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Moreover, compared with the Middle East, it is relatively easy to transport oil from the 
Gulf of Guinea to the European and American markets, because it does not need to go 
through narrow straits or canals. In this case, the Gulf of Guinea has become the world’s 
major oil export region. In 2018, West Africa’s oil exports accounted for 68.9% of 
Africa’s total oil exports and 9.7% of the world’s total oil exports34 (www.bp.com, 
2020). 
 
As the EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea noted, “the EU and the countries of the region 
have major common economic, developmental, commercial and security interests” 
(Council of the EU, 2014, p.2). On the one hand, the rich resources in the Gulf of Guinea 
are the foundation for the trade with Europe. The regional products, such as iron ore, 
cobalt and timber, and cocoa etc., are all crucial for the European market. On the other 
hand, “Europe imports about 13% of its oil and 6% of gas from West Africa” (Council 
of the EU, 2015a). Europe imports crude oil from Nigeria, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, 
and Gabon, as well as natural gas from Nigeria (ibid). In comparison with the crude oil 
form the Middle East, the oil export from the Gulf of Guinea benefits from the easy sea 
access due to its proximity to Europe.   
 
As such, there is a clear need for the EU to maintain the maritime security off the 
coastline of the countries in the Gulf of the Guinea. First, both trade and energy import 
with the countries of the region depend on the secure shipping lanes in this maritime 
area. “Maritime trade, including energy supply routes to and from the Gulf of Guinea 
is largely conducted by companies based in the EU Member States, the primary export 
market for most countries in the region” (ibid). 
 
 
34 In 2018, the crude production in the African continent was: North Africa, 92.3 million tonnes; West 
Africa, 218.9 million tonnes; and East and South Africa, 6.3 million tonnes. The total production of 
crude in the world was 2249.3 million tonnes. [online] Available at < 
https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-
economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2020-oil.pdf>, accessed on 1 August 2020. 
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Secondly, there is the direct security threat of “trafficking of narcotics, people and 
weapons into Europe” (Anyimadu, 2013, p.2) at sea from the Gulf of Guinea. And the 
EU’s citizens living and working in that area need to be protected from “threats of drugs, 
terrorism, piracy and armed robbery, and other forms of crime emanating from the 
region” (Council of the EU, 2014, p.3).  
 
Finally, this area is equally a target area of European investment in varied sectors. 
Maritime security is inseparable from the peace, security and prosperity of the whole 
region, even the landlocked countries. Therefore, the significant shared interests of the 
EU lead to the sustained attention to and active participation in the fight against the 
piracy, armed robbery at sea, and other maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea.  
 
6.3 Main threats at Sea in Gulf of Guinea 
The EU identified five categories of threats in the Gulf of Guinea, which encompassed 
organised crime, piracy and armed robbery at sea, oil theft, illegal fishing, and 
unemployment (Council of the EU, 2014b). As mentioned in Section Two, almost every 
main issue in the Gulf of Guinea has a maritime dimension: some of the threats take 
place at sea, such as piracy and armed robbery at sea, as well as illegal fishing, while 
some of the threats have a marked maritime dimension, like organised crime and oil 
theft, and the threat of unemployment can be seen as one of the root causes of other 
threats. 
 
6.3.1 Organised Crime 
Organised crime was the primary security threat in the Gulf of Guinea (ibid). It referred 
to “the trafficking of drugs, human beings, arms, rough diamonds, counterfeit medicine, 
illegal waste35, cybercrime and related money-laundering” (ibid, p.4). Organised crime 
can be seen ,as a direct threat to the security of the European countries. Although these 
crimes are organised and carried out in the Gulf of Guinea, the consequences greatly 
 
35 Examples of illegal waste include herbicides and pesticides, oil spill, untreated industrial wastes 
including nuclear and aerosol contaminants (Council of the EU, 2014, p.4). 
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affect the security of the European continent. Take trafficking of drugs from West 
Africa to Europe, for example. “Over the last decade, West Africa has become an 
increasingly important gateway for the smuggling of Latin American illicit drugs 
(mainly cocaine) to the European consumer market” (Luengo-Cabrera and Moser, 2016, 
p.1). Geographicalally, West Africa has become the transit hub for cocaine originating 
from South America, as the drug cartels in Colombia, Venezuela, and Brazil operate in 
collusion with their counterparts in Guinea-Bissau, Ghana, and Nigeria. Because of the 
lack of coastal monitoring capacities and the widespread corruption in these countries, 
transatlantic drug trade in these countries develop rapidly and pose a serious security 
challenge to the EU and the Member States. Therefore, there is a clear need for the EU 
to eliminate these organised crimes at sea and prevent them from happening at source.  
 
6.3.2 Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea 
Piracy and armed robbery at sea is the threat originating at sea. According to the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), the distinction between piracy and 
armed robbery at sea depends on whether the crime occurred within 12 nautical miles 
of the coast or on the high seas. Jacobsen and Nordby (2015) divided piracy and robbery 
at sea in the Gulf of Guinea into four types: kidnapping-for-ransom, petro-piracy, 
unreported piracy, and petty piracy. 
 
Kidnapping-for-ransom, which prevailed off the coast of Somali, is “neither the only 
nor the main form of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea” (ibid, p.21). In comparison with the 
kidnapping happening off the coast of Somali, the kidnapping in the Gulf of Guinea has 
twofold features: the hostages were held for a shorter time, but the kidnappers were 
more violent towards the hostages (Pigeon and Moss, 2020). Petro-piracy can be 
considered as oil theft occurring at sea, which are intertwined with other criminal 
activities on land.  
 
Unreported piracy refers to the attacks which are not included in the statistics of the 
International Maritime Bureau. The attacked boats may lack the awareness of the 
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voluntary reporting system of International Maritime Bureau, or just have to keep silent 
as “they had been involved in a criminal activity at sea” (Jacobsen and Nordby, 2015, 
p.22). For instance, in 2018, it was recorded that there were six hijackings, thirteen 
attacked vessels, seventy-eight kidnapped crew members for ransom, and 130 hostages 
taken at sea in the Gulf of Guinea. The IMB however, believed that the number of 
attacks actually happening was twice the number of recorded ones.  
 
Petty piracy refers to the theft from the vessels in harbour. It is less damaging but 
nevertheless widespread in the Gulf of Guinea. 
 
6.3.3 Oil theft 
Oil theft in the Gulf of Guinea is a kind of crime with organisation and sophistication 
(Jacobsen and Nordby, 2015). As the Council of the EU (2014) pointed out, “these 
activities cost government revenue, increase commercial security costs and discourage 
further investment” (p.4). And there is also the crime of violence towards the 
crewmembers and the pollution of the environment accompanying the petro-piracy.  
 
6.3.4 Illegal fishing 
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated fishing (IUU) fishing damages the environment 
and destroys the fishing industry in the Gulf of Guinea. And the consequence of IUU 
fishing for the EU lies in damage to the normal fishing trade between the EU and related 
coastal countries of the region and in increasing migration pressures due to the collapse 
of the local fishing industry. 
 
6.3.5 Unemployment 
Unemployment is the inevitable result of the above threats. No matter whether it is 
piracy or illegal fishing, the criminal activities lead to the decline of the economy and 
the increase of youth   unemployment rate in the West African countries. Take 
Nigeria as an example. In 2020, “Nigeria’s unemployment rate has climbed to 27.1%”, 
while “underemployment rate—which reflects those working less than 40 hours a week, 
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or in jobs that underutilise a person’s skills, time, or education—has increased to 28.6%” 
(Kazeem, 2020). Additionally, unemployment leads more people to take risks of illegal 
immigration. “The number of migrants from West Africa trying to go to Europe has 
been multiplied by 10 between 2010 and 2016” (Council of the EU, 2020, p.1). 
Therefore, unemployment poses a direct security problem to the EU and the Member 
States. 
 
6.4 EU’s Response – a Comprehensive Approach 
The EU’s response to the maritime threats in the Gulf of Guinea is based on the UNSC 
resolution 2018 (2011) and UNSC resolution 2039 (2012), and the EU Maritime 
Strategy36, which insisted that the EU’s strategy covers the worldwide space (The 
Council of the EU, 2014, p.4). While the Council revised the EUMSS Action Plan in 
2018, a more concrete and sharp action plan on the Gulf of Guinea emerged:  
Continue to support the implementation of the Gulf of Guinea Strategy and Action 
Plan as well as national and regional efforts in the framework of the Yaoundé 
architecture and other regional and international initiatives, in particular the work done 
by the G7++ Friends of the Gulf of Guinea Group and by the EU Senior Coordinator 
for the Gulf of Guinea. Ensure coordination of EU projects in the Gulf of Guinea to 
contribute to maritime security in the area (Council of the EU, 2018a, p.27). 
 
From the perspective of EU sea power, the EU sea power ‘output’ in the Gulf of Guinea 
is quite different from previous ones in the Horn of Africa as well as in the 
Mediterranean Sea. The diversification of maritime security threats in the Gulf of 
Guinea determines that the EU must adopt more diversified measures.  
 
In comparison with piracy off the coast of Somalia, what happens in the Gulf of Guinea 
seems more complicated. Politically, Somalia was considered as a ‘failed’ nation, while 
“most West African countries have established rule of law, functioning state institutions 
 
36 Regarding the global maritime domain, European Union Maritime Security Strategy outlines that 
“The principles enshrined and the objectives identified in this strategy should be embedded in the 
implementation of existing and future regional EU strategies, such as those for the Horn of Africa and 
the Gulf of Guinea” (Council of the EU, 2014). 
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and relatively good governance” (Anyimadu, 2013, p.7) and are “able to contain 
insecurity to some extent” (ibid). From a legal point of view, the Eastern African 
countries, Seychelles, Mauritius, Kenya and Tanzania, “accepted suspects captured by 
navies, and receive international support to ensure that their justice sector is capable of 
proving fair trials and sufficient imprisonment” (ibid, p.8). However, in West Africa 
there is the lack of appropriate justice for the suspected pirates. Regarding the measure 
of anti-piracy, it is a proven fact that private armed security personnel on-board vessels 
was effective against piracy in the Indian Ocean, while they are not allowed by West 
African administrations (Anyimadu, 2013). And there is also a difference in  attitude 
towards regional cooperation: the countries in the Horn of Africa have agreed to 
regional capacity-building, while some West African administrations need to be more 
coherent and more open to international capacity-building in the Gulf of Guinea (ibid).  
 
EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea (Council, 2014) formulated three principles, which 
guide the EU’s approach to deal with the maritime security issue. First, the EU’s 
approach needs to be based on close cooperation with the countries as well as regional 
and international organisations. Secondly, the EU needs to adopt a comprehensive 
approach which addresses security, development, and governance issues at once. 
Thirdly, the EU needs to use its expertise from the previous counter-piracy operation ‒ 
Operation Atalanta (Council of the EU, 2014). 
 
Based on the first principle of the EU strategy in the Gulf of Guinea, the EU’s 
involvement was founded on the Yaoundé architecture, which was set out to coordinate 
all the activities concerning maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. In June 2013, 25 
countries in West and Central Africa signed the Code of Conduct concerning the 
Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery against Ships, and Illicit Maritime Activity in 
West and Central Africa, also known as the “Yaoundé Code of Conduct”. Its objective 
is to promote regional maritime cooperation and a stable maritime environment that can 
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contribute to regional prosperity and provides the structure for joint operations, 
intelligence sharing and harmonised legal frameworks. 
 
At the top of the Yaoundé architecture is the Interregional Coordination Centre, which 
connects the Regional Maritime Security Centre for Central Africa and the Regional 
Maritime Security Centre for West Africa. “The coastal space of the Gulf of Guinea is 
divided into 5 operational maritime zones where activities are coordinated by five 
Maritime Multinational Coordination Centres” (www.gogin.eu, 2020).Additionally, 
apart from deterring piracy and other maritime insecurity activities, the EU has a much 
clearer focus on addressing the root causes of the maritime threats and challenges than 
other foreign actors in the Gulf of Guinea (Jacobsen and Nordly, 2015).  
 
To implement the Strategy for the Gulf of Guinea and its rolling Action Plan, the EU 
has adopted a comprehensive approach, which draws heavily on the instrument 
contributing to Security and Peace and the European Development Fund, and 
encompass a set of Programmes and Projects.  
 
6.4.1 The Umbrella Programme – Critical Maritime Route Programme 
(CMR) 
Among these Programmes and Projects launched by the EU, there is first of all an 
umbrella Programme ‒ The Critical Maritime Routes Programme (CMR), which is 
currently implemented in 40 countries in the Gulf of Guinea, Western Indian Ocean 
and Wider Indian Ocean (www.criticalmaritimeroute.eu, 2020). The Critical Maritime 
Routes Programme encompasses 6 projects, among which three projects are clearly 
targeted at the Gulf of Guinea. They are CMR Gulf of Guinea 2013-2016 (CMRGO), 
Gulf of Guinea Inter-regional Network 2016-2020 (GoGIN), and Improving Port 




6.4.2 Critical Maritime Routes Gulf of Guinea 2013-2016 (CMRGO) 
CMRGO was a project launched by the EU in 2013. It was a capacity-building project 
with the mission of strengthening the operational capabilities of the region. “By 
focusing on training and educational initiatives, the project provided the building blocks 
for improved operational cooperation” (RUSI, 2018, p.50). The results of CMRGO are 
fruitful: there were seven beneficiary countries of the region (Benin, Cameroon, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Nigeria, Sao Tome Principe and Togo), and two associate 
countries (Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana). And it “was highly effective in terms of its ability 
to directly reach beneficiaries” (RUSI, 2018, p.54). Relying on the two regional training 
institutions - Regional Academy of Maritime Science and Technology – Interregional 
Maritime Security Institute in Abidjan of Cote d’Ivoire, and Regional Maritime 
University in Accra of Ghana, it “provided over four academic courses and ten crisis 
response training activities, benefiting almost 800 participants” (ibid). It also set up two 
regional surveillance centres – Regional Maritime Surveillance Centre in Central Africa 
in Pointe-Noire of Congo, and Regional Maritime Surveillance Centre of West Africa 
in Abidjan of Cote d’Ivoire. CMRGO was highly praised by the stakeholders of the 
region. The then Deputy Secretary General of Economic Community of Central African 
States argued,  
The European Union sent us CRIMGO to support us in our fight against maritime 
insecurity, a major challenge for us. CRIMGO has been an essential instrument 
to establish the maritime security strategy at sub-regional level. Without 
CRIMGO, the interregional maritime security mechanism would not have 
worked (Critical Maritime Routes Programme, 2020). 
 
6.4.3 Gulf of Guinea Inter-regional Network 2016-2020 (GoGIN) 
CRMGO was concluded in October 2016, and followed by GoGIN. GoGIN was multi-
functional, and its missions include coordination, capacity-building, development and 
information sharing. The core task of GoGIN is to establish “an effective and 
technically efficient regional information sharing network” (www.gogin.eu, 2020). 
Building on the successes of CRMGO, GoGIN covers nineteen beneficiary countries 
and sets up two regional surveillance centres, three regional institutions, and six 
coordination centres in the Gulf of Guinea. GoGIN has been considered as a “well-
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established project model comprised of technical capacity building through training and 
education” (RUSI, 2018, p.46). The then Ambassador of the EUD in Cameroon noted, 
“Cooperation on security is a necessity, and the response to global and cross-border 
threats must be concerted. The EU’s commitment to this cooperation is taking concrete 
form through the GoGIN project” (criticalmaritimeroutes.eu,2020).  
 
6.4.4 Improving Port Security in West and Central Africa 2019-2022 (WeCAPS) 
WeCAPS was launched in 2019 and will run till 2022. It aims to “help partner countries 
in West and Central Africa to adequately address increasing vulnerabilities related to 
port security” (WeCAPS, 2020). WeCAPS has three objectives: to strengthen 
compliance with International Ship and Port Facility Security standards, to increase 
preparedness and resilience to risks through detection and to handle illicit or dangerous 
goods, substances and activities, and to increase resilience when a crisis event occurs 
(attack, explosion, spill etc.) 
 
WeCAPS covers a wide range of missions, from port governance, improved security 
mechanisms in port operations, public-private partnership, port sustainability to civil 
protection. This project benefits seventeen countries in the Gulf of Guinea. Take, for 
example, the first training activities of WeCAPS. In January 2020, Togo and Côte 
d’Ivoire became the first beneficiaries of the WeCAPS project. WeCAPS organised 4 
training courses in three weeks for staff in the ports of Lomé and Abidjan. The first two 
training courses focused on ‘firefighting’, while two other training courses were 
mandatory under the ISPS Code and were targeted for port security staff, and port users. 
Apart from these 4 training courses, WeCAPS also set up a safety accident management 
exercise in the port for the security officers (criticalmaritimeroutes.eu, 2020). 
 
In 2020, Covid-19 has plunged the entire world into a severe crisis. Facing the threat of 
pandemic, WeCAPS responds rapidly by adopting the measures for the twofold 
purposes: to protect the people working in the port and, in the meantime, to ensure the 
normal operation of the ports. At one time, it educated the staff working in the port to 
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ensure they have knowledge of protective measures and provided them the personal 
protective equipment. WeCAPS’ civil protection experts set up the best practice guide 
for the beneficiary ports, which enable them to keep open 
(www.hellenicshippingnews.com, 2020; www.criticalmaritimeroutes.com, 2020). 
 
6.4.5 From Corymbe to Coordinated Maritime Presence 
While the EU seeks to become a global maritime security provider, it also encourages 
Member States to actively participate into the missions enhancing maritime security. 
The 2018 the EUMSS Action plan reiterated that  
Member States are encouraged to share lessons learned and best practices in their 
respective areas of expertise or regions, and are invited, on a voluntary basis, to step 
forward as ‘champions’ (‘chefs de file’) in the implementation of concrete actions 
identified in the Action Plan, in line with their national priorities or mandate (Council 
of the EU, 2018a, p.9).  
 
Different from the EU’s response to the maritime threats in the Horn of Africa or in the 
Mediterranean Sea, the EU relies more on enhancing cooperation with the countries of 
the region than on launching a CSDP maritime operation in the Gulf of Guinea on its 
own. However, facing the maritime security threats in the Gulf of Guinea, the EU 
Member States, which have no less interest in this maritime area than the EU, sent their 
warships for the purpose of deterring piracy and other forms of organised crimes.  
 
France launched a maritime military operation – Operation Corymbe in May 1990 and 
it celebrated the 30th anniversary of the operation in 2020. According to the French 
Navy, the operation Corymbe has three objectives: to protect French nationals by the 
presence of a building capable of carrying out an evacuation operation and supporting 
French operations on land; to support the Gulf of Guinea countries in securing their 
maritime and regional approaches, in accordance with the Yaoundé process, and to 
strengthen international cooperation in the area (www.defense.gouv.fr, 2020). 
 
During the thirty years, the operation Corymbe warships completed a wide range of 
missions in the Gulf of Guinea. Apart from the operations of sustaining the maritime 
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security alone or with the other actors in the operational maritime area, there is also the 
mutual support between the warships at sea and other French units stationed on the 
territory of Senegal, Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, as well as of the other countries of the region. 
Although the number of naval warships deployed in the Gulf of Guinea is small (one 
or two warships at the time), they are an indispensable component of the entire military 
capability in this region. 
 
Besides the Operation Corymbe, the French government, in collaboration with the 
government the United States, launched in 2011 a project named “Gulf of Guinea 
Maritime Security Sector Reform Support” to help fight maritime crimes in West Africa. 
The project had twofold missions: the training of the maritime administrators and 
information sharing on maritime crime in the region. The French government funded 
this project. Fourteen countries of the region benefited from this project (www. 
citinewsroom.com, 2015).  
 
In 2013, four EU Member States ‒ France, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom ‒ 
launched a joint operation to assist the West African countries to secure their maritime 
routes. The beneficiary countries were Benin, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, 
Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, and Togo. The twofold purposes of the operation were 
to train the coast guards of these countries and to develop an information exchanging 
network (Glock, 2016).  
 
Apart from French Navy, the Spanish Navy also sent warships on a train-and-assist 
mission to defend Spanish interests in the Gulf of Guinea. In April 2019, the Spanish 
Navy patrol vessel SERVIOLA successfully extricated a Nigerian merchant vessel 
from pirates (www.safety4sea.com, 2019). In May 2019, it cooperated with the forces 
of Equatorial Guinea and succeeded in rescuing the Dutch heavy lift ship BLUE 




These experiences have proven that maritime military presence is effective in deterring 
piracy. In fact, “the shipping interests have petitioned Western governments to deploy 
maritime security assets to the region to ensure safety of navigation” (www.maritime-
execusive.com, 2019). It has been proven important that “the maritime interest’s 
capacity to get its case ‘heard’ in the policy-making and strategy-setting process” (Till, 
2018, p778). The shipping industries, such as the Baltic and International Maritime 
Council, International Marine Contractor Association, International Chamber of 
Shipping, Institution of Fire Engineers and Oil Companies International Marine Forum, 
gathered the flag states and agencies from the Gulf of Guinea to deal with the continuing 
danger to seafarers operating. On a symposium on Maritime Security in the Gulf of 
Guinea, Dr. Grahaeme Henderson, Chair of the UK Shipping Defence Advisory 
Committee and Vice President of Shell Shipping & Maritime, declared that “the high 
level of piracy and armed robbery attacks in the Gulf of Guinea is not acceptable. …We 
need to take urgent action now” (www.maritime-executive.com, 2019).  
 
Against this backdrop, the EU adopted the concept of ‘a Coordinated Maritime 
Presence’ in 2019 and the first test place for this concept will be the Gulf of Guinea 
(www.safety4sea.com, 2019). Instead of a CSDP mission, it will complement the EU’s 
traditional military operations. The main difference between the newly planned 
Coordinated Maritime Presence and the CSDP maritime operation exists in the 
command structure, according to Mogherini (2019), in terms of CMP, “each 
participating EU nation would contribute its assets to the mission voluntarily, and those 
assets would remain within each nation’s respective chain of command ‒ not under a 
joint EU command” (www.maritime-execusive.com, 2019).  And the then HR 
Mogherini also noted that all Member States had shown interest in this plan, and that 
Gulf of Guinea would be the first test place for this plan (Chibarirwe, 2019). Regarding 
the choice of the first test place, Mogherini argued that  
the reason why we have imagined to start from the Gulf of Guinea is that obviously 
this would require the ownership and the willingness of the coastal countries to have 
a coordinated approach also with us, and a shared interest in tackling, for instance, 





This chapter focuses on the EU’s and the Member States’ response to the maritime 
threats in the maritime area of the Gulf of Guinea. Arguably, the EU has adopted a quite 
different approach in the Gulf of Guinea from those in the horn of Africa and the 
Mediterranean Sea. 
  
The EU’s comprehensive approach heavily relies on the EU-funded CMR Programme. 
As an umbrella project, it covers three of the most relevant maritime areas for the EU 
– the Gulf of Guinea, the Horn of Aden, and the East South Asia. There are three 
concluded and ongoing projects targeting on the Gulf of Guinea – GRIMGO 
(Concluded), GoGIN, WeCAPS. These three projects cover different areas of maritime 
security, referring to external action, awareness information sharing, capability 
development, risk management and research and training. Facing the increasing piracy 
threat in the Gulf of Guinea, the EU introduced the concept of ‘Coordinated Military 
Presence’ and would apply it first in the Gulf of Guinea. 
  
Having explored in detail the EU’s three CSDP maritime military operations, this 
chapter has focused on the other forms of the EU sea power output. From the 
perspective of sea power, there are various forms and possibilities for the output of EU 
sea power. Under the triple-capability framework of sea power, the modern sea power 
can be defined as  
the combination of a nation-state’s capacity for international maritime commerce and 
utilisation of oceanic resources, with its ability to project military power into the sea, 
for the purposes of sea and area control over commerce and conflict, and from the sea, 
in order to influence events on land by means of naval forces (Tangredi, 2002, p.3). 
 
Hence, this chapter seeks to answer the question whether the EU fulfils the three 
functions of sea power in the Gulf of Guinea. First, the primary objective of the EU’s 
CMR programme is just to protect the international maritime commerce and utilisation 
of oceanic resources. The strategic interests of the Gulf of Guinea for the EU lie on two 
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pillars: energy security and maritime transit hub. Therefore, the EU’s involvement into 
the region completely fulfils the first function of sea power – to protect the international 
maritime commerce and utilisation of oceanic resources. 
 
Second, the EU has decided to launch the Coordinated Maritime Presence in the Gulf 
of Guinea. Maritime military presence implies sea control in order to deter rivals and 
ensure the safety and security of vessels passing in this area. Based on the experience 
the EU gained in other maritime areas, the military presence has been proven effective 
in the fight against the piracy, illegal migration, and other maritime crime. That also 
explains why the EU extended the mandate of Operation Atalanta in the Horn of Africa 
and launched the Operation IRINI in 2020 after Operation Sophia ended. Therefore, the 
EU is determined to keep sea control in the Gulf of Guinea.  
 
Third, as Styan (2016) argued, the strategic value of the African continent lies first on 
the maritime routes around it. The EU’s efforts in the maritime domain in the Gulf of 
Guinea are not isolated, but part and parcel of an overall strategy towards the African 
continent. On 9 March 2020, the EEAS adopted a Joint Communication named 
Towards a comprehensive Strategy with Africa (2020), which was considered as the 
guideline of the EU’s overall policies towards Africa. This document charted the EU’s 
toolbox to maintain peace and security in Africa, including 
top political diplomacy, regular consultations, mediation for conflict prevention and 
resolution, restrictive measures, and cooperation on counter-terrorism, the fight 
against organised crime including trafficking in human beings, and maritime security 
(ibid, p.11).  
 
As an important tool of EU foreign policy, maritime security plays an essential role in 
EU foreign policy with Africa. At the operational level, among the 18 EU-led CSDP 
missions37 in 2020, nine missions and operations were carried out on the African 
 
37 The missions and operations under the EU CSDP framework in 2020 are: ALTHEA/BiH, EU 
NAVFOR Somalia , EUAM Iraq ,EUAM RCA,  EUAM Ukraine, EUBAM Libya, EUBAM Moldova 
and Ukraine (This Mission is not managed by CSDP structures), EUBAM Rafah, EUCAP Somalia, 
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continent, and two maritime military operations ‒ in the Mediterranean Sea and in the 
Horn of Africa. And the CSDP operations and missions cover military and civil aspects, 
as well as varied areas, such as capacity-building and awareness information sharing. 
Additionally, there are two ongoing projects under the umbrella project – CMR 
programme in the Gulf of Guinea. While ensuring the maritime security in the 
surrounding waters of African continent, the EU strengthens and deepens the 
partnership with Africa. 
 
On the other hand, almost every important issue on the African continent has a maritime 
dimension.  “Thirty-eight out of fifty-four African countries have a maritime border” 
(Glock, 2016). The maritime security closely interconnects with the politics, economy, 
and security of the whole continent. Therefore, it is a rational and effective way for the 
EU to resolve the political, economic, and security issues in Africa through the ‘output’ 
of sea power. 
 
The three case studies of the thesis have something in common, that geographicalally 
the three cases all took place in the waters surrounding the African continent. The next 
case study of the thesis will focus on the Asian Pacific Ocean and seeks to answer the 
question how the EU involves itself in the maritime conflict in the South China Sea. It 
seeks to illustrate another form of the ‘output’ of EU sea power in this maritime area 
through the lens of sea power.  
  
 
EUCAP Sahel Mali, EUCAP Sahel Niger, EULEX Kosovo, EUMM Georgia, EUNAVFOR MED 




Chapter 7 The Practice of EU Sea Power in the Asia-Pacific Region: 





Having outlined in the preceding chapter the practice of EU sea power in the Gulf of 
Guinea, this chapter explores the practice of EU sea power in the South China Sea and 
takes it as a case study to demonstrate other forms of EU sea power output through the 
lens of sea power theory.  
 
The thesis has completed three case studies on the output of EU sea power. They 
demonstrate diverse facets of the sea power. Operation Atalanta was the EU’s first 
CSDP maritime military operation for the purpose of counter-piracy in the Horn of 
Africa, while Operation Sophia and Operation IRINI were launched successively in the 
Mediterranean Sea for two purposes:  to disrupt the business model of human 
smuggling and trafficking networks and to implement the UN arms embargo in Libya. 
The third case study focused on the practice of EU sea power in the Gulf of Guinea, 
where the EU conducted a number of projects under the CMR Programme, as well as 
the projected Coordinated Maritime Presence in the near future. Although the three case 
studies focus on different facets of EU sea power, they share two common features. 
First, geographicalally, they all occurred in the waters surrounding the African 
continent or between Europe and Africa. Second, no matter whether piracy, human 
trafficking or the organised crime, they all fall into the category of maritime non-
traditional security threat. Obviously, the struggle over sovereignty and territorial 
delimitation, as well as the strategic rivalry between China and the US in the South 
China Sea, belong to the category of traditional security issues. 
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But the main difference between what took place in the South China Sea and that in the 
Horn of Africa, in the Mediterranean Sea or the Gulf of Guinea lies in the nature of the 
conflict. However, as the EU’s ambition is to be a global maritime security provider 
(Council of the EU, 2014a), the output of EU sea power is supposed to cover waters 
faraway. Therefore, the last case study of the practice of EU sea power focuses on the 
EU’s intervention in the maritime disputes in the Asia-Pacific region. 
 
The South China Sea has been a flashpoint in the Asia-Pacific region in the last decade. 
There are six countries, including China, Viet Nam, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Indonesia and Brunei, that are involved in the disputes concerning overlapping 
sovereignty claims in this maritime area. Apart from the struggle over sovereignty and 
territorial delimitation, the competition between Beijing and Washington for influence 
in the region has increased tension. Moreover, there are numerous other non-traditional 
challenges, such as marine pollution, overfishing and ecological deterioration (Pejsova, 
2016).  
Map 5: Map showing the claimant states in the South China Sea  
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(Source: Voice of America)
 
 
Like other global actors, the EU has invested increasing attention to the development 
of situation in the South China Sea, and in 2012 expressed for the first time its concern 
in an official statement. From 2013 China began military construction on the Spratly 
islands and reefs. And the Philippines instituted arbitral proceedings against China at 
the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the same year. Under the circumstances, the EU 
has sought to deepen its involvement in the South China Sea to avoid becoming 
marginalised in security affairs in the Asia-Pacific region (Su, 2016). However, the EU 
did not launch a clear strategy towards South China Sea, nor did it establish associated 
policy options so far. Therefore, the EU’s policy in this region in the future remains 
indefinite (Liu, 2015). As such, what is the European interest in the South China Sea in 
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the circumstances? And how does the EU exercise sea power there if it wants to be a 
maritime security provider? Based on an overview of a series of EU official statements, 
the thesis explores these questions through the lens of sea power.  
 
This chapter is divided into six sections. The first serves as an introduction to sets the 
scene. The second section provides an overview of the EU’s official statements on the 
South China Sea issue. Section Three focuses on the EU’s interests in this region, 
including those that are economic, partnership based and identity in nature. Section 
Four outlines the EU’s actual involvement in the South China Sea, covering declaratory 
diplomacy, arms trade and arms embargo, and freedom of navigation operations of 
Member States. Section Five focuses on the outcome of the practice of EU sea power 
in the region through the lens of sea power theory. The final section considers whether 
EU ‘soft sea power’ in the South China Sea has had an increasing impact on the EU’s 
comprehensive strategy towards China. 
 
7.2 Overview of EU’s Statements on the South China Sea 
As a matter of fact, it was after the end of the cold war that the then EC set out to invest 
attention in security issues in Asia. The Commission adopted the first official statement 
targeting Asia in 1994, named Towards a New Asia Strategy, Communication from the 
Commission to the Council. As the Communication pointed out, “The main thrust of 
the present and future policy in Asia is related to economic matters” (Commission of 
the EC, 1994, p. 3). Up until then the Asia policy of the EC had focused on the economic 
sphere instead of the political and security domains. It was not until 2007 when the 
Council adopted its first Guidelines on the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy in East 
Asia, that security issues in East Asia were referred to. However, it used the euphemism 
“unresolved historical and territorial disputes” (Council of the EC, 2007, p.2), rather 




In 2012, the Council of the EU launched a second Guidelines on the EU’s Foreign and 
Security Policy in East Asia, marking the first time that maritime security issues in the 
South China Sea were specifically mentioned in an EU official statement. In this 
document, the EU systematically set out its stance and response to this issue. On the 
one hand there were these words: “The EU and its Member States, while not in any 
sense taking a position on these various claims” (Council of the EU, 2012, p.19). One 
the other hand, the EU recognised “the great importance of the South China Sea for the 
EU” (ibid, p.19), and would like to “encourage ASEAN and China to build on this 
foundation and agree on a Code of Conduct”, as well as share the experience of the EU 
and its Member States ibid). Meanwhile, the EU attributed the root cause of the 
deteriorating maritime conditions to the emergence of “competitive nationalism” (ibid, 
p.5). 
 
In 2014, the EU adopted the European Union Maritime Security Strategy and the rolling 
action plan, in which the South China Sea issue was not included. However, in the 
revised Action Plan of EUMSS of 2018, there were four articles concerning the ‘Indian 
and Pacific Oceans’ and ‘South China Sea’ was specified as: 
Support the application of UNCLOS and the establishment of mechanisms for regional 
maritime confidence building measures in the Asia Pacific region, especially in the 
South China Sea. Cooperate in that regard with partner countries and international 
organisations and promote the application of agreed frameworks (in particular 
UNCLOS) to ensure continued uninhibited access to high seas areas. Support regional 
ASEAN-led process and regional mechanisms such as the Regional Cooperation 
Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships in Asia 
(RECAAP). Encourage the swift conclusion of the talks on a code of conduct which 




This indicates that the issue of maritime security in the South China Sea has entered the 
overall framework of EU maritime security, and the EU is willing to play a more active 
role in this issue. 
 
From September 2013, the Chinese government launched an infrastructure construction 
project aimed at actually controlling islands and reefs, arousing strong responses from 
the international community. In March 2016, the EU adopted the Declaration by the 
High Representative on behalf of the EU on Recent Developments in the South China 
Sea (EEAS, 2016a), in which the EU expressed concern about the deployment of 
missiles on islands. In the same year, after the South China Sea arbitration, the EU 
adopted another statement – Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the 
EU on the Award Rendered in the Arbitration between the Philippines and China 
(EEAS, 2016b), in which the EU and its Member States “acknowledge the Award 
rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal” (EEAS, 2016b, p.1). 
 
In 2016, the EU also adopted A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and 
Security Policy. Without directly mentioning South China Sea, it reiterated that  
In East and Southeast Asia, we will uphold freedom of navigation, stand firm on the 
respect for international law, including the Law of the Sea and its arbitration 
procedures, and encourage the peaceful settlement of maritime disputes. We will help 
build maritime capacities and support an ASEAN-led regional security architecture 
(Council of the EU, 2016b, p.38). 
 
Based on the EU’s official statements on the South China Sea, the EU’s basic position 
on this issue can be summarised in four aspects: firstly, the EU does not take a position 
on claims to land territory and maritime space and on sovereignty aspects relating to 
claims (Council of the EU, 2012; EEAS, 2016a; EEAS, 2016b); secondly, the EU 
supports the application of UNCLOS in resolving the dispute, maintaining the maritime 
order, and upholding the freedom of navigation and overflight (EEAS, 2016a; EEAS, 
2016b; EEAS, 2016c; EEAS, 2018); thirdly, the EU acknowledges the Award rendered 
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by the Arbitral Tribunal (EEAS, 2016b); and fourthly, the EU supports maritime 
capacity-building of the region and ASEAN-led regional security (EEAS, 2016; 2018). 
 
7.3 EU’s interests in the South China Sea 
The EUMSS highlights a wide range of interests that the EU pursues in the maritime 
domain. In respect of the South China Sea, it refers to three: shipping and trade interests, 
partnership interests and identity interests. 
 
7.3.1 Shipping and Trade Interests 
Firstly, as Till (2013) pointed out, “Given its location, the South China Sea, as a sea, is 
clearly an area of major strategic importance for its proximity to critical shipping routes” 
(p.328), the EU needs to defend “the preservation of freedom of navigation, the 
protection of the global EU supply chain and of maritime trade, the right of innocent 
and transit passage of ships and the security of their crew and passengers” (Council of 
the EU, 2014, p.7).  
 
According to Liu (2018), “The EU’s interests in the South China Sea are largely in 
shipping and trade” (p.1). Hence, the EU’s economic growth is inseparable from the 
peace and stability of the South China Sea, as China and the other claimants of the 
maritime dispute are all important economic and trading partners of the EU. As far as 
China-EU economic and trade relations are concerned, “China is the EU’s biggest 
source of imports and its second-biggest export market. China and Europe trade on 
average over €1 billion a day” (European Commission, 2020b).  In 2019, China-EU 
trade volume was 560.2 billion euros, accounting for 13.8% of the EU’s total trade, 
second only to the United States (15%) (ibid). In terms of EU-ASEAN relations, 
“ASEAN as a whole represents the EU’s 3rd largest trading partner outside Europe (after 
the US and China) with more than €237.3 billion of trade in goods in 2018. The EU is 
ASEAN’s second largest trading partner after China, accounting for around 14% of 




Secondly, the South China Sea is equally an important channel for the EU to carry out 
foreign trade. The EU has significant interests in maintaining the freedom and safety of 
navigation in the South China Sea, as well as regional security and stability. The EU is 
far from Asia-Pacific geographically, and ocean transportation is the main way for the 
EU to conduct trade with Asia-Pacific countries. 90% of the EU’s global cargo 
transportation needs to be carried out by sea, and 30% of it needs to pass through the 
South China Sea (Will, 2016). As mentioned in Chapter Three, the EU heavily relies 
on twofold maritime shipping routes: the southern corridor and the eastern corridor. 
The eastern corridor begins at the Malacca Straits, passes through the South China Sea 
and around Taiwan to the East China Sea. It connects the EU and its most important 
trading partners in Asia. Therefore, for the EU, the freedom of navigation in the South 
China Sea is related to its economic growth and trade interests, as the then High 
Representative Mogherini pointed out in the Asia-Europe foreign ministers meeting in 
2015, 
The EU is an ‘interested’ party in a dispute putting China against Taiwan, Vietnam, 
the Philippines, Brunei and Malaysia over control of a crucial seaway. We oppose any 
attempt to assert territorial or maritime claims through the use of intimidation, 
coercion, force or any unilateral action which could cause further friction” (Bangkok 
Post, 2015). 
Thirdly, The EU is currently committed to advancing free trade agreement negotiations 
with ASEAN and relevant Southeast Asian countries. Obviously, there is a clear need 
for a good atmosphere in the region for negotiations. In March 2017 an EU-ASEAN 
Joint Working Group was established to define the rules for a future ASEAN-EU 
region-to-region agreement (European Commission, 2017). With respect to individual 
countries of ASEAN, take Vietnam as an example. The EU is Vietnam’s second largest 
trading partner and one of its largest export markets. Vietnam and the EU reached a 
consensus on the EU-Vietnam Free Trade and Investment Agreement in 2015. In 2020, 
the Free Trade Agreement with Vietnam entered into force. It set a good standard for 
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the development of trade relations between the EU and Southeast Asian countries, and 
also injected new ideas into the development of bilateral economic relations. In 2019, 
the Free Trade Agreement between the EU and Singapore came into force and the EU 
is in the process of negotiating with Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia and Myanmar 
(Commission, 2020). The EU, which insists on freedom of navigation in the South 
China Sea and the importance of international law in the settlement of maritime disputes, 
has established a good image internationally and well prepared for the three trade 
agreement negotiations.  
 
7.3.2 Partnership Interests 
The EUMSS highlights a number of maritime security interests that the EU is supposed 
to protect. Among them, there is partnership interests, because the Strategy “emphasises 
the importance of international partners and international maritime cooperation” 
(Council of the EU, 2014, p. 6). For the EU, the pressure and drive of Washington’s 
‘Rebalance of Asia-Pacific’ and ‘Pivot to Asia’ strategy is an important factor affecting 
the EU’s involvement in the South China Sea issue.  
 
Since the end of the Cold War, especially in the early twenty-first century, the status 
and role of the South China Sea in Washington’s Asia-Pacific strategy have been rising. 
Since 2009, the United States launched the ‘Rebalance of Asia-Pacific’ and ‘Pivot to 
Asia’ strategy respectively and gradually intervened in the maritime disputes in the 
South China Sea. The strategic choice of Washington once worried Brussels (Rachman, 
2015). After the American strategic centre of gravity shifted eastward, Europe’s 
position in the alliance was bound to decline. Europe has to keep up with the pace of 
the United States in the Asia-Pacific region, and cannot be marginalised by the United 
States and Asian countries (Ren and Cheng, 2015). 
 
At the same time, the United States also requires the EU to have coordinated actions in 
maritime security issues in the Asia-Pacific region. In February 2012, the then 
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American Secretary of State Clinton appealed to the EU to participate more actively in 
the Asia-Pacific region at the Munich Security Conference (Ohn and Richey, 2012). As 
a result, the then EU High Representative Ashton and Secretary Clinton issued an EU-
United States joint statement in July, declaring that the United States and Europe share 
a common position on the South China Sea issue. In 2014, the EU and the United States 
launched a joint statement, in which they “urge ASEAN and China to accelerate 
progress on a meaningful code of conduct” and call on “all parties to take confidence 
building measures and to settle conflicts without threat or use of force and by diplomatic 
means in accordance with international law, including UNCLOS” (Council of the EU, 
2014). In July 2015, at a meeting of senior United States and European diplomats, the 
United States urged the EU to support Washington’s position in the South China Sea 
against Chinese infrastructure construction and militarisation of islands and reefs 
(Brunnstrom and Ali, 2015). Washington asked Brussels to “be a little more clear in 
terms of backing up these principles, a little bit more forward-leaning approach that 
would support, for example, the idea of a halt to further reclamation, further 
militarization, would be very useful” (ibid). As a matter of fact,  
the US’s failure to ratify UNCLOS is a diplomatic weakness in the sense that it 
deprives the EU of the moral high ground in addressing freedom of navigation issues 
with China, … at the same time, Europeans as external stakeholders with legitimacy 
to defend UNCLOS are only issuing statement that reiterate the importance of 
international law (Duchatal, 2016, p.55-56). 
 
Therefore, there are partnership interests for the EU in coordinating with the United 
States in the maritime disputes of the South China Sea. 
 
Additionally, when the EU manages relations with China, the most crucial player in the 
South China Sea’s maritime disputes, partnership interests equally play a role. The EU 
reiterated that 
EU policy on China shall form part of a rounded policy approach to the Asia-Pacific 
region, taking full advantage, and full account of the EU’s close relations with partners 
such as the United States, Japan, Korea, the ASEAN countries, Australia, New 






7.3.3 Identity Interests 
In the EUMSS and other official documents concerning maritime security, the EU 
reiterates the role of international law, especially the UNCLOS, in the peaceful 
settlement of maritime disputes. The EU has several identities while being involved in 
the South China Sea issue, and these identities drive the EU to play a role.  
 
Firstly, the EU and the Member States have the identity of being a party to UNCLOS. 
In 1998, the EU formally became the first international organisation contracting party 
to the UNCLOS. So far, the EU is still the only organisation contracting party to 
UNCLOS. The EU is also the seat of the International Court of Justice, the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration in The Hague, and the International Tribunal for the Law of the 
Sea which are the three main United Nations agencies for the settlement of maritime 
disputes.  
 
The identity of the EU being a party to UNCLOS made it highly qualified to participate 
in international maritime governance and opened up the basic channels for participating 
in international maritime affairs. While facing issues concerning the South China Sea, 
the status of the EU enables it to put defence of the international law of the sea in first 
place when it intervenes in the South China Sea. Take, for example, the EU’s statement 
issued in March 2016 on the Award rendered in the Arbitration between the Philippines 
and China. In this official response to the ruling of the Arbitration Tribunal, the EU 
insisted the on the stance whereby there is a clear endorsement of the principles of 
international law in the South China Sea, even though several Member States agreed to 
the terms with a certain reluctance. As Fallon (2016) argued, “the EU is founded on 
rules established to settle international relations, so it cannot renege on its very founding 




On the other hand, the EU has the identity of maritime security provider, as the then 
HR/VP Mogherini argued, “There was a growing demand for an EU role as a maritime 
security provider not only in our region, but also further away” (Pejsova, 2019, p.1). 
The EU’s low-key security profile, technical capacity, and reputation as a normative 
power intertwine and promote the EU to play a corresponding role in maintaining the 
security and stability of the South China Sea (ibid). 
 
7.4 EU’s Response in the South China Sea 
As Pejsova (2019) pointed out, “(the South China Sea) is not an existential threat to the 
EU’s security” (p.4). However, as mentioned in the preceding section, given the fact 
that the EU has a considerable economic, partnership and identity interests in the South 
China Sea, the EU needs to adopt a more comprehensive and balanced strategy to 
protect its interests, and to play a more active role in the region. 
 
Obviously, China and the United States are the major countries that profoundly impact 
the development of the situation in the South China Sea. As Pejsova (2019) pointed out, 
the strategic rivalry between China and the US could lead to instability in that region. 
On the one hand, “China’s increasingly imperious assertion of its territorial claims and 
build-up of artificial islands in the disputed South China Sea … is an ongoing source 
of concern for the international community and maritime user-states” (ibid, p.3). On the 
other hand, “The US and other nations (including France and the United Kingdom) 
have stepped up their naval presence to protest against Beijing’s actions and promote 
freedom of navigation, resulting in the increasing militarisation of the regional 
waterways, with the potential to escalate into a more dangerous conflict – especially 
given the current state of US-China tensions” (ibid).  
 
The competition between Beijing and Washington in the South China Sea involves the 
struggle for geopolitical interests and dominance of the regional order. Washington 
interprets Beijing’s infrastructure construction and facility deployment as an attempt to 
control the whole South China Sea maritime area and travels more frequently through 
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the operational area in the name of preserving the freedom of navigation (Wu, 2018). 
As a result, China has accelerated its surveillance and deployment operations in the 
region. The South China Sea has significant relevance strategically for China, as it is 
an essential channel for the Chinese Navy to sail on the high seas. From 2000, China 
began to build the Yulin naval base, which is located at the southernmost tip of Hainan 
Island. With its capabilities of strategic nuclear submarines, attack submarines, and 
surface vessels, it is considered the most strategically important military base in the 





Map 6: Map showing the location of Yulin Naval Base of the Chinese Navy 
 
 
Therefore, the conflict in the South China Sea is a traditional geopolitical conflict, 
which is different from what took place in the EU’s previous maritime military 
inventions in the waters surrounding the African continent. As a result, the EU follows 
a different approach when intervening in the maritime disputes in the South China Sea. 
This approach can be divided into two parts: soft sea power at the EU level, and hard 
sea power at the Member States level. Instead of sending warships into the South China 
Sea, the EU uses its identity of being a passionate defender of international law as a 
kind of soft power and stands on the moral high ground diplomatically. Meanwhile, the 
EU encourages the Member States to be involved in the South China Sea in two ways. 
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France and the United Kingdom (which was at the time a Member State of the EU) 
deployed their warships there to defend freedom of navigation. And the arms trade 
between the EU Member States and the ASEAN countries was increased in order to 
maintain the military balance in that region. 
 
7.4.1 Declaratory Diplomacy Based on International Law 
Issuing reactive statements is the main form of the EU’s response to the security issue 
in the South China Sea (Duchâtel, 2015). “The EU reiterates these general principles 
whenever a major development occurs in the South China Sea” (ibid, p.55). In every 
official statement adopted by the EU on the South China Sea, international law, 
especially UNCLOS, is the basis of the EU’s narrative.  
 
As the first international organisation contracting party to the UNCLOS, the EU 
embraces this identity as part of a foreign policy toolbox. Obviously, the EU occupies 
the moral high ground given that the US failed to ratify the UNCLOS, and China has 
refused to accept the Arbitral Tribunal’s ruling. In terms of the EU’s response to the 
maritime security issue in East Asia, (Duchâtel 2015) outlined the characteristics of the 
EU’s response as “principled neutrality” and the principles here included “international 
law, especially UNCLOS, self-restraint, crisis management diplomacy and the 
importance of clarifying claims” (ibid, p.53).  
 
As a matter of fact, since 2012 the South China Sea issue has appeared constantly in 
the official statements of the EU, including the EU’s regional strategy towards East 
Asia38, the EU’s official statements towards the specific questions39, and the EU’s joint 
 
38 See Council of the EU, “Guidelines on the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia”, 
11492/12, Brussels, 15 June, 2012. 
 
39 See Council of the EU, “Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on Recent 
Developments in the South China Sea”, 126/16, 3 March, 2016; “Declaration by the High 
Representative on behalf of the EU on the award rendered in the Arbitration between the Republic of 
the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China”, 442/16, 15 July, 2016.  
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statements with a third party, such as with the United States40, Japan41, Vietnam42, 
Philippines43 and ASEAN44. Moreover, from 2014, the G7 Group, of which the EU is 
a member, has consistently committed itself to the maritime disputes issue in the South 
China Sea. In 2014 and 2015, the EU equally criticised China on the meeting of 
UNCLOS45.  
 
7.4.2 Arms trade with ASEAN Countries and Arms Embargo against China 
In the first official statement on the maritime issue of the South China Sea, Guidelines 
on the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia (Council of the EU, 2012), the 
EU attributed the deteriorating security trend there to “China’s economic development, 
more active diplomacy, and increasing (and untransparent) defence expenditure” (p.5). 
 
 
40 See Council of the EU, “Joint EU-US Statement on the Asia-Pacific Region”, 12 July, 2012; “EU-
US Summit: Joint statement”, 26 March, 2014.  
 
41 See European Commission, “21st Japan-EU Summit, Tokyo, 19 November 2013 Joint Press 
Statement”, MEMO/13/1015, 19 November, 2013; “The EU and Japan Acting together for Global 
peace and Prosperity, 22th EU-Japan Summit Joint Press Statement”, STATEMENT/14/151, 7 May, 
2014; “23th Japan-EU Summit, Tokyo”, Joint Press Statement, MEMO/15/5075, May 29, 2015; “EU-
Japan Summit Joint Statement, Tokyo”, 17 July, 2018.  
 
42 See European Commission, “Joint press statement between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and 
the European Union”, STATEMENT/14/257, 25 August, 2014; “Press Statement by the President of 
the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker, the President of the European Council Donald Tusk 
and the Prime Minister of Vietnam Nguyen Tan Dung, Brussels”, STATEMENT/14/600, 15 September 
2014. 
 
43 See European Commission, “Remarks by President Barroso following his meeting with President 
Benigno Aquino III of the Philippines”, Brussels, SPEECH/14/600, 15 September 2014. 
 
44 See European Commission, “Joint communication, The EU and ASEAN: A partnership with a 
Strategic Purpose”, JOIN (2015) 22 FINAL, 18 May, 2015.  
 
45 See Council of the EU, “United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea: Report of the International 
Tribunal for Law of the Sea”, 9 June 2014; “United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea: Report of 
the International Tribunal for Law of the Sea”, 8 June 2015. 
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Therefore, the EU seeks to keep a strategic balance in the region by selling arms to 
ASEAN countries, while retaining the arms embargo against China. 
 
One of the EU’s important economic interests in Southeast Asia is the arms trade, in 
which it occupies a considerable share of the Southeast Asian arms market. The EU 
seeks to extend its influence in the South China Sea by strengthening arms sales to 
Southeast Asian countries. Among these countries, “the six states with territorial claims 
in the South China Sea have made the largest commitments to increase their military 
spending” (Wezeman, 2019, p.ix). Furthermore, naval weapons and equipment occupy 
a high proportion of imports in these countries (Heiduk, 2018). For instance, Europe 
surpassed the US and began to “dominate the Southeast Asian market for littoral and 
Frigate/corvette vessels” from 2015 (Minnik, 2015).  
 
Historically, none of the ASEAN countries were equipped with submarines. 
Surprisingly, in 2015, Singapore, Malaysia and Vietnam, Indonesia all began to equip 
their navies with the submarines. Meanwhile, Taiwan, Thailand and the Philippines 
have planned additional procurement. Among these countries, Singapore procured six 
refitted submarines from Sweden and two from Germany, and Malaysia procured two 
French submarines (ibid). As Heiduk (2018) pointed out, “For the six littoral states of 
the South China Sea, the volume of arms imports from the EU’s Member States has 
grown rapidly in an absolute terms between 2007 and 2017” (p.18). Table 7.1-7.5 reveal 
the trend of EU arms export to the claimant states of South China Sea between 2013-
2019. Among these countries, Brunei depended heavily on the German supplier of 
arms (www.army-technology.com, 2017). Indonesia was a major client of 
Eurofighter (Arif and Chairil, 2020). Most of Malaysia’s arms were purchased from 
European states (Wezeman, 2019). There were not many arms imported by the 
Philippines because of that country’s comparatively small domestic economy. Vietnam 
has “remained heavily dependent on Russia for its arms imports but has started to 
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diversify and seek weapons from European states, the USA, India and others” (ibid, 
p.43).  
EU Arms Export to Claimant States of South China Sea between 2013-2019 (M Euro) 
Table 7: EU Arms Export to Brunei 
Year 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Vessels of war, (surface 
or underwater) special 
naval equipment, 
accessories, components 
and other surface 
vessels 
 
4,39 - 2,21 - - - - 
Total Arms Export 
Value 
4,90 2,20 21,60 28,87 1.41 0,50 0,10 
 
Table 8: EU Arms Export to Indonesia 
Year 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Vessels of war, (surface 
or underwater) special 
naval equipment, 
accessories, 
components and other 
surface vessels 
 
3,88 2,32 45,04 0,49 2,01 23,43 19,12 
Total Arms Export 
Value 
135,75 72,89 234,05 248,74 240,56 169,45 80,61 
 
Table 9: EU Arms Export to Malaysia 
Year 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Vessels of war, (surface 
or underwater) special 
naval equipment, 
accessories, components 
and other surface 
vessels 




Total Arms Export 
Value 
218,25 91,21 37,19 44,30 46,95 78,59 24,62 
 
 
Table 10: EU Arms Export to the Philippines 
Year 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Vessels of war, (surface 
or underwater) special 
naval equipment, 
accessories, components 
and other surface 
vessels 
 
- - - - - - - 
Total Arms Export 
Value 
0,03 11,01 52,67 1,99 7,44 16,24 21,21 
 
Table 11: EU Arms Export to Vietnam 
Year 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Vessels of war, (surface 
or underwater) special 
naval equipment, 
accessories, components 
and other surface 
vessels 
 
- 0,93 23,98 - - - 1,07 
Total Arms Export 
Value 
7,16 1,65 105,31 1.43 9,29 18.70 20,94 
(Source: European Commission) 
 
While still selling arms to the ASEAN littoral countries in the region, the EU continues 
to hold onto the arms embargo against China. The EU embargo on arms exports to 
China was imposed in 1989 (Council of the EU, 1989). China has attempted several 
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times to persuade the EU to lift the arms embargo, as the then Chinese Prime Minister 
Jiabao Wen noted in 1999 when meeting the EU leaders in Brussels: “On the two issues 
of lifting the arms embargo against China and recognizing China’s full market economy 
status, we have been working hard for 10 years. But the solution has been elusive” 
(Rettman, 2012). Regarding lifting of arms embargo on China, the EU Member States 
failed to reach a unanimous decision on this issue. As Odgaard (2018) argued, “The 
arms embargo remains an inexpensive way for the EU to signal disapproval of Chinese 
action in the security field …” (p.25). Moreover, the EU decided to further scrutinise 
and limit “exports of specific sensitive equipment and technologies for end-use in Hong 
Kong” (Council of the EU, 2020) after the adoption of the National Security Law in 
Hong Kong by the Chinese Central Government in 2020. Equally, the UK announced 
that it would extend the EU arms embargo to Hong Kong (Department of International 
Trade of UK, 2020). This further demonstrates that the EU has adopted the arms 
embargo against China as an important tool for participating in Asia-Pacific security 
and political affairs. 
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, the elements of sea power include the various factors 
from economic, political, institutional and military perspectives. Admittedly, the EU’s 
ascendancy in the defence technical field and the arms trade, as part of its policy 
instruments, can equally be seen as part of EU sea power. The EU has transformed its 
technological superiority into an ability to balance the regional security situation. 
Through these two instruments - arms trade and arms embargo - the EU achieves its 
goal of intervening in military issues in the Asia-Pacific region and maintaining 
influence. 
 
7.4.3 Freedom of Navigation Operations 
According to Pejsova (2019), “The prospect of the EU deploying a mission or operation 
within its CSDP framework … is highly unlikely, if not impossible” (p.4). As the 
security crisis in the South China Sea does not pose an existential threat to the EU, a 
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consensus on an EU maritime intervention in the South China Sea among all Member 
States will not be feasible. 
 
However, as shown in the preceding case study - the practice of EU sea power in the 
Gulf of Guinea - the EU adopted an approach that, in the absence of action by the EU 
as a whole, encourages Member States to act individually. As a result, France and the 
UK deployed their blue water naval capabilities into the South China Sea for the 
purpose of defending freedom of navigation. As Pejsova (2019) noted, “Although both 
navies operate in their national capacities, their actions effectively protect the interests 
of all European countries” (p.3).  
 
On June 5 2016, at the Shangri-la Dialogue in Singapore, French Defence Minister 
Jean-Yves Le Drian (2016) declared that  
France will continue to support, by operating her ships and flying her aircraft wherever 
international law permits and as determined by operational need. Several times a year, 
French naval vessels pass through the waters in this region and they will continue to 
do so (www.iiss.org). 
 
There are several reasons behind the French decision to patrol in the South China Sea. 
Geographicalally, France is present in the Indo-Pacific region due to its overseas 
territories46 , with   1.5 million French people and 8,000 soldiers stationed there. 
Economically, France relies heavily on the stability and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific 
region: 93% of the French exclusive economic zone is located in the Indian and Pacific 
Oceans (www.diplomatie.gouv.fr, 2020). In terms of international law, France is 
committed to defending the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.  
 
7.5 Outcome of EU Sea Power Practice in the South China Sea 
As was argued in the preceding section, the practice of EU sea power in the South China 
Sea demonstrates two intertwined aspects. As a “soft sea power”, the EU adopts the 
 
46 They are: Mayotte and La Réunion islands, Scattered Islands and French Southern and Antarctic Territories, New Caledonia, 
Wallis and Futuna, French Polynesia and Clipperton. 
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Declaratory Diplomacy Strategy to ensure its involvement at the EU level. As a “hard 
sea power”, the EU maintains the arms embargo against China, while encouraging the 
arms trade between its Member States and ASEAN countries, and the Freedom of 
Navigation Operations launched by the French Navy. However, does EU sea power 
have any impact on the region? And how best to assess this impact?  Given the fact 
that the EU is a sea power, the outcome of EU sea power practice in the South China 
Sea must be examined within the framework of sea power theory. Sea power has been 
defined as possessing three abilities: the ability to protect international commerce and 
the utilisation of oceanic resources, to perform sea control by naval means, and to 
influence the events on land by events at sea (Tangredi, 2003). As a matter of fact, the 
international shipping in the South China Sea keeps normal during the disputes, and the 
EU did not take any military initiative, so the central issue is whether EU sea power 
can influence the events on land. 
 
Obviously, for the EU, China is most important variable in the maritime security issue 
of the South China Sea. There are two reasons for this. On the one hand, China is not 
only the main claimant in the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, but also seen 
as the party responsible for these conflicts. The EU argues that “China’s economic 
development, more active diplomacy, and increasing (and untransparent) defence 
expenditure” (Council of the EU, 2012, p.5) was the major cause of the conflict. On the 
other hand, even the EU does not take a stance on specific disputes in the region and 
the principles that the EU insists on are in conflict with those of China, which bitterly 
opposes the “internationalisation, multilateralisation and judicialisation” of the South 
China Sea issue (Liu, 2015). Against this background, the involvement of the EU in the 
South China Sea becomes part and parcel of the EU’s overall strategy towards China. 
Fallon (2016) described it as “principle pragmatism”, which is “based on a pragmatic 
pursuit of its own interests on one hand and on upholding the principles of international 
law on the other” (p.1). According to Fallon, “the EU certainly has no interest in 




However, the observations in the preceding sections show that the EU’s response to the 
maritime security issue in the South China Sea has become an invaluable tool to handle 
relations with China. On some occasions, the EU seems to use this issue to antagonise 
China deliberately (Liu, 2015). The EU continues to express its concern about the South 
China Sea issue on international and multilateral occasions.  Moreover, the South 
China Sea issue has become an element of EU’s new strategy towards China (Council 
of the EU, 2016). In this strategy the EU highlights two principles - “reciprocal benefit” 
and “rules-based international order” (EEAS, 2016) - and the South China Sea is the 
domain where the EU insists upon the principle of rules-based international order. It 
has become one of the big issues in the meetings between Beijing and Brussels. For 
instance, in 2018 the South China Sea issue was addressed in the Joint Statement of the 
leaders of China and the EU as  
China, the EU and its Member States are parties to the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea and respect the maritime order based on international law. The EU 
welcomes the ongoing consultations between China and ASEAN countries aimed at 
the conclusion of an effective Code of Conduct (CoC) for the South China Sea. The 
EU and China call upon all relevant parties to engage in dialogue, to settle disputes 
peacefully, and to refrain from actions likely to increase tensions (Council of the EU, 
2018c, p.2). 
This meant that China and the EU have negotiated on this issue and reached a certain 
degree of consensus (Liu and Xie, 2018). From this perspective, the EU succeeds in 
influencing the events on land by sea power. 
 
7.6  Conclusion 
This chapter focuses on the EU’s and the Member States’ response to the maritime 
disputes in the South China Sea. Drawing on the discussions presented in this chapter, 
a number of points become clear.  
 
First of all, since 2012, the South China Sea issue began to appear in the EU’s official 
documents. Based on a series of  official EU statements, the EU’s basic position on 
this issue has four elements: a) the EU does not take a position on claims to land 
162 
 
territory and maritime space and on sovereignty aspects relating to claims; b) the EU 
supports the application of UNCLOS in resolving the dispute, maintaining the maritime 
order, and upholding the freedom of navigation and overflight; c) the EU acknowledges 
the Award rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal on the sovereign dispute between China 
and the Philippines; and d)  the EU supports the maritime capacity-building in the 
region and an ASEAN-led regional security architecture. 
 
Secondly, due to the location of the South China Sea, the EU has shipping and trade 
interests, partnership interests and identity interests. China and the other claimants of 
the maritime disputes are all important economic and trading partners of the EU. 
Additionally, the EU is currently committed to advancing free trade agreement 
negotiations with ASEAN and relevant Southeast Asian countries: peace and stability 
in the region will provide a good atmosphere for negotiations. The South China Sea is 
equally an important channel for the EU to conduct foreign trade. Consequently, the 
EU has important interests in maintaining the freedom and safety of navigation in the 
South China Sea, as well as regional security and stability. 
 
Apart from the economic interests, the EU has also partnership interests in the South 
China Sea. The EU always “emphasises the importance of international partners and 
international maritime cooperation” (Council of the EU, 2014). The partnership and the 
coordination with the US are also the EU’s interests in the South China Sea. In order to 
align itself with the United States, the EU also needs to express its support for the 
United States on the South China Sea. 
As the first international organisation party of the UNCLOS, the EU has considerable 
interest in defending international law in the South China Sea. The EU’s aspiration to 
be a global maritime security provider means it wants to play an important role in the 




Having all these interests in the South China Sea, the EU adopts an approach which 
encompasses declaratory diplomacy, arms trade and freedom of navigation operations. 
From the perspective of sea power, the EU’s approach in the South China Sea (in other 
words, the output of the EU sea power in the South China Sea) is unique and 
irreplaceable. 
 
The EU launched maritime military operations in the Horn of Africa and the 
Mediterranean Sea, and uses instruments contributing to Security and Peace (IcSP) and 
the European Development Fund (EDF) to set up various maritime security projects in 
the Gulf of Guinea. In the maritime areas mentioned above, EU sea power comes from 
its naval power and economic power; that is the EU outputs the sea power through both 
military means and financial means.  
 
However, the output of EU sea power in the South China Sea is restricted by a number 
of conditions. First, the main security threat in the South China Sea is different from 
the non-traditional security threats in the surrounding waters of the African continent. 
As a matter of fact, the geopolitical rivalry between China and the US is the most visible 
and precarious security challenge in the South China Sea. In such a case, the EU cannot 
launch any CSDP military maritime operation due to the EU’s decision-making process. 
Hence, the EU outputs sea power through another form. In other words, the EU outputs 
a kind of “soft sea power”. The EU’s identity of party of UNCLOS and defender of 
international law give it irreplaceable influence in the South China Sea. Without 
sending a warship flying the EU flag, the EU spreads norms and regulations in the 
region. 
 
For the other actors in the South China Sea, the EU’s identity as a defender of 
international law matters. The US needs the EU when it confronts China in the legal 
field, because it is not yet a party to UNCLOS. The fact that China refuses to accept the 
Award rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal caused common distrust in the international 
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community, while the EU occupies the moral high ground on the world stage. As the 
claimant countries in the sovereignty dispute in the South China Sea need a neutral 
mediator, the EU is especially qualified for this role because of its image as a defender 
of international law. As previously noted, the practice of EU sea power in the South 
China Sea is mainly in the form of soft sea power through the EU’s declaratory 
diplomacy based on international law. Meanwhile, the arms trade between EU Member 
States and the claimant countries, as well as the freedom of navigation operations 
conducted by the EU Member States, can be seen as hard sea power of the EU deployed 
in that region. 
 
Regarding the EU’s response to the dispute in the South China Sea, there is the thorny 
question of its relations with China. Even though the EU claims not to take sides in the 
maritime sovereign dispute, merely the EU’s involvement will antagonise China, as 
“Beijing has clearly signalled that it considers the territorial disputes in that sea to be a 
series of bilateral issues between China and each of its neighbours, rather than a 
multilateral issue” (Fallon, 2016, p.12). As a matter of fact, the maritime security issue 
in the South China Sea has become a lever in the EU’s comprehensive strategy towards 
China. In 2016, the EU adopted the joint communication, named “Elements for a new 
EU strategy on China”, and expressed its concern on the maritime disputes between 
China and other claimant countries (European Commission, 2016, p.11). As such, the 
South China Sea became a fresh issue on which the EU can exert pressure on China. 
From the perspective of sea power, as one function of sea power is to influence the 
events on land through the events at sea, the EU uses the maritime disputes in the South 
China Sea as a powerful lever in its comprehensive strategy towards China. In recent 
years, the EU has increasingly emphasised the “reciprocal benefit” and “rules-based 
international order” (ibid, p.1) in both political and economic terms in the relationship 
with China. It is foreseeable that the South China Sea issue will appear more frequently 
on the negotiating table between the EU and China. 
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Existing literature shows that the maritime dimension of EU capabilities is relatively 
under-researched. Few studies examine in a comprehensive manner the EU’s 
achievement in maintaining maritime security from the perspective of sea power, a sea 
power which integrates geostrategic, economic, political, and military factors. The EU 
has made significant progress in building maritime security since 2008, when it played 
a leading role in a counter-piracy operation in the Horn of Africa. With that, the EU 
became more visible and proactive in the maritime security sphere. The existing 
literature relating to this subject was inconclusive on a number of issues, and, therefore, 
this investigation has sought to answer the following question: Why is the EU a sea 
power? 
 
By conducting a critical analysis of the sea power theory in general and the EU’s 
resources and capabilities in the maritime security sphere, the thesis has studied not 
only the material and aspirational conditions that the EU possess, but also how the EU 
has used these conditions to play a role as a global maritime security provider in 
different maritime areas such as the Horn of Africa, the Mediterranean Sea, the Gulf of 
Guinea and the South China Sea.  
 
Instead of repeating the findings already presented in each of the preceding chapters, 
Chapter Eight seeks to present a number of conclusions and reflections, including the 
important theoretical and empirical findings, as well as the suggestions for future 
research. Clearly, answering the question why the EU is a sea power in the making 
depends on how we benchmark the concept of sea power. Sea power, as a geostrategic 
term which emerged more than a hundred years ago, needs to be understood in a broader 
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sense. The thesis conducts a historical and critical overview of the notion of sea power 
and outlines the modern sea power theory, which has a far broader meaning than ‘naval 
power’ and includes many elements. Moreover, this thesis proposes an evaluating 
framework from the perspective of sea power in respect to maritime security. Although 
the research object of this thesis is EU sea power, the theoretical findings on sea power 
theory can be applied to other regions and countries in the world. 
 
8.2 Theoretical Findings: Understanding Sea Power 
This thesis has challenged a number of existing assumptions regarding sea power theory. 
As this thesis highlights repeatedly, answering the question ‘why the EU is a sea power’ 
depends on how we benchmark ‘sea power’. As Mahan (1889) used the term ‘sea power’ 
without giving a clear definition, there have been disagreements as to what this notion 
means. The salient divergence on the interpretation of ‘sea power’ is that it is a synonym 
for naval power or it is a more inclusive and expansive concept. Based on the historical 
overview of the concept ‘sea power’, the thesis asserts that the concept of sea power 
should be interpreted in its widest sense in the era of globalisation, that is, ‘sea power’ 
is neither a military term nor a synonym of naval power, but rather a geopolitical term. 
Sea power theory is a branch of geopolitical theory, “the spatial study of the 
relationships among states and the implications of these relationships for the 
morphology of the political map as a whole” (Parker, 1994, p. 170). The geopolitical 
theory, however, is an integral part of realist International Relations theory. Hence, sea 
power theory can be seen as the study of the relationships among states at sea from a 
realist perspective. 
 
‘Sea power’ is the key concept of this thesis. Sea power is composed of two parts. One 
part is the ‘input’ of sea power, implying that a variety of preconditions are necessary 
to generate sea power. The other part is the ‘output’ of sea power or the security and 




The inputs of sea power, or the elements of sea power have been interpreted differently. 
The thesis argues that in the era of globalisation, the geographical, economic, political 
institutional and military factors are the essential elements of sea power.  
 
First, geographical factors still play an important role in the generation of sea power. 
‘Being maritime’, as a kind of geographical reality, can shed considerable light on every 
aspect of a nation state. In terms of security, a nation state with long sea border faces 
the challenges coming from the sea. In terms of the economy, it has access to abundant 
marine resources as well as port resources, thus gaining access to maritime 
transportation. Moreover, in the era of globalisation, SLOCS and choke points are of 
greater importance than ever before. Thus, geographical factors, as important 
determinants in geopolitical thought, are preconditions for the generation of sea power. 
 
Maritime interests are another factor that affects the generation of sea power. There is 
a clear need for those countries which depend heavily on international trade and 
shipping to create and sustain good order at sea. Moreover, those countries that profit 
from globalisation tend to have greater economic power and technological strength to 
develop and maintain their position of sea power. Thus, economic factors play a greater 
role in the generation and development of sea power in a globalised international 
environment. 
 
However, geographical factors and maritime economic interests are only the 
preconditions for generating and maintaining sea power. It is the awareness on a 
national level of the value of the sea and maritime security that is the decisive factor. 
No matter the geography or the maritime interests, they can be seen as the circumstance 
over which a country has little control. There is a clear need for a country to enhance 
the willingness to protect its maritime interest by developing its capability. This clarity 
of vision about the value of the sea and maritime security plays an essential role in the 
national decision-making process. It implies a clear understanding of what is at stake, 
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and what steps must be taken, leading to maritime capacity-building. In terms of 
capacity-building in the maritime security sphere, cross-sectoral institutions are 
constituents of sea power.  
 
Notwithstanding that sea power is not a synonym of naval power, naval forces are 
integral to sea power. From a military perspective, naval force as the most important 
component of sea power is not simply limited to deployment of battleships. Modern 
weaponry has evolved into complex systems where the weapon and equipment at sea, 
on land, in the air, in space, and in the cyberspace connect and make a network. Any 
increase in the overall capability of a weapon system can be considered an increase in 
maritime military capability.  
 
“Sea power cannot be improvised” (Roger, 1997, p.327). No sea power can be 
generated out of thin air. The elements of sea power mentioned above intertwine with 
one other and lead to the generation of sea power. Notwithstanding that the stakeholders 
of sea power have different geostrategic settings, maritime cultures, institutional 
procedures and economic realities; they all have to face the same challenges at sea. In 
the era of globalisation, while the traditional rivalry among great sea powers still exists, 
non-traditional maritime threats pose a serious challenge to a national community that 
relies heavily on good order at sea. Hence, an increasing number of countries and 
international organisations are developing sea power to defend their maritime interests. 
Against this backdrop, it is extremely important and necessary to study the ‘input’ of 
sea power ‒ the preconditions of the generation of sea power, as well as its components 
‒ in the era of globalisation. Therefore, seeking to lay an analytical framework for the 
generation of sea power should be one of the contributions of this thesis. While the 
subject of the thesis is the EU sea power, the analytical framework on the ‘input’ of sea 




Moreover, this analytical framework on elements of sea power provides the basis of 
and criteria for the classification of sea power. Grey (1989) argued, “with the exception 
of a few landlocked states, all countries maintain some power at sea” (p.3). From a 
geographical perspective, there is a difference between natural and artificial sea power. 
The former refers to the countries which have the typical geographical advantages, such 
as the United Kingdom or the Netherlands. “Artificial sea power’ pertains to countries 
such as China or Germany which have a mix of land and sea borders. For the natural 
sea power countries, the generation of sea power is ‘bottom up’, in so far as the 
influence of the sea has infiltrated every aspect of the society, its mindset and culture. 
Having centuries of the accumulation of wealth by fishing, maritime mercantile 
shipping, even naval wars, these “natural” (Richmond, 1930) sea power countries adopt 
a ‘bottom up’ way, which leaves the country’s maritime development “to the market” 
(Till, 2018, p.401).  In terms of artificial sea power, these countries have long been 
struggling between the choice of sea power or land power, and the strategic orientation 
of decision-makers plays a decisive role in the development of sea power. Hence, the 
generation of sea power in these countries follows the ‘top down’ approach, meaning 
that the willingness and the political aspiration at the top of the decision-making 
hierarchy really are key. In the era of globalisation, the value of the seas and oceans 
becomes more prominent and, as a result, there is an increasing tendency for more and 
more nation states and stakeholders to turn their attention to the ocean. In this strategic 
context, the EU’s political ambition of being a maritime security provider seems 
consistent with the general direction of global strategic development.  
 
In the twenty-first century, however, the concept of ‘sea power’ obviously changes with 
the times due to the evolution of the process of globalisation. The following changes 
are worth noting. First, the nature of conflicts at sea has dramatically changed. Instead 
of seeking to defeat opposing fleets, the purpose of sea powers turns to maintaining 
good order at sea. Today, the non-traditional threats of piracy, people-, drugs and arms-
smuggling, illegal fishing, terrorism, environmental degradation, and systematic 
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despoliation of marine resources all pose a more critical hazard to the maritime 
commons. Under current conditions, no single government, not even the most important 
ones, are able to maintain good order on their own. Therefore, a variety of international 
collaboration becomes more frequent. Second, the subject of sea power is no longer 
limited to independent sovereign states, because international organisations can also 
have sea power. This is the inevitable result of increasing international cooperation in 
the field of maritime security in the era of globalisation. Third, naval force is no longer 
the only decisive factor in the development of sea power. Since the purpose of sea 
power has shifted from defeating adversaries to maintaining maritime security, all 
factors that can maintain maritime security can be considered components of sea power.  
 
The ‘output’ of sea power refers to the consequences of the practice of the sea power. 
Sea power is not only the variety of elements which intertwine and interact but also the 
capacity growing out of the interaction of these elements. Thus, from this perspective, 
sea power can be defined as “the combination of a nation-state’s capacity for 
international maritime commerce and utilisation of the oceanic resource, with its ability 
to project military power into the sea, for the purposes of sea and area control, and from 
the sea, in order to influence events on land by means of naval forces” (Tangredi, 2002). 
This triple-capacity framework outlines the role sea power can play in the era of 
globalisation. 
 
As this definition demonstrates, sea power has three functions: to protect the maritime 
commons, to m and to influence the events on land. Arguably, these three are closely 
linked and complement one another. While the first two functions are not difficult to 
understand, the last one deserves more in-depth analysis and discussion. The 
importance of sea power is reflected not only in its ability to solve problems at sea but 
also in its ability to influence matters on land, thus making it an integral part of an 
overall national security strategy. Hence, the practice of sea power should be considered 
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an important means of safeguarding national interests and international maritime 
security. 
 
In summary, the thesis sets out a feasible framework to observe sea power. This 
framework, which can be generally applied to any sea power in the world, provides the 
important lens through which to study the EU’s resources and capacity in the maritime 
security sphere. The generation and practice of EU sea power authenticate modern sea 
power theory. EU sea power grew out of dynamic of the geographical, economic, 
political, institutional and military factors and, as an important tool for the EU, was 
used to protect the surrounding waters, to maintain control of the sea, and to influence 
the events on land by naval means. For the traditional sea power, such as the United 
States, the research question may shift away from ‘how to generate a sea power’ 
towards another one ‒ ‘how to maintain a sea power’. The modern sea power 
framework applies also to the emerging sea powers, such as China, Russia or India. 
 
8.3 Empirical Findings: Understanding EU Sea Power 
Based on the critical understanding of sea power in the era of globalisation, the thesis 
proposes using sea power theory to explain the EU’s resources and capabilities in the 
maritime security sphere. Arguably, the EU has become more proactive and visible on 
the international maritime security stage in the last decade. While studying these 
maritime initiatives of the EU, there is a clear need for a theoretical base to understand 
the EU’s motivations as a maritime security provider.  
 
The rationality of choosing sea power theory to explain the EU’s efforts in the maritime 
dimension of European security as following. First, although the EU maritime security 
sphere covers three existing EU policies, namely, the Integrated Maritime Policy, the 
Internal Security Policy, and the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the last named 
plays the most important role. Sea power, as an important tool for the EU to handle 
international relations, can be explained by the realist theory. Second, the EU, after 
decades of integration, “starts having state-like characteristics … should then be 
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expected to defend its common interests internationally” (Laursen, 2020, p.11). As a 
matter of fact, the EU has become an “internationally sea-policy actor” (ibid) and a 
“maritime security provider” (EEAS, 2021).  Therefore, it is suitable to put EU sea 
power into a realist theoretical framework. It is important to note, however, that using 
realist theory to explain the EU’s maritime security policy does not mean that the EU 
is seen as a ‘power’ in the realist theory. The object of this thesis is strictly limited to 
the EU’s role in the maritime dimension of global security. 
 
8.3.1 Understanding the generation of EU sea power 
The EU is unique. However, it still can be put into the framework of sea power theory, 
as is proposed in 8.2 above. There are two preconditions for the generation of EU sea 
power: the geographical factor and the maritime interests of the EU. Five rounds of 
enlargement have shifted the EU’s maritime status. The EU has extended its borders to 
the shores of the Mediterranean Sea, the Baltic Sea, the Atlantic Ocean, and the Black 
Sea. The EU has not only the third longest coastline in the world, but also the largest 
Exclusive Economic Zone. The EU is a global trading power dependent heavily on free 
and safe maritime shipping and has the economic imperatives to develop its capability 
to maintain maritime security. However, the maritime interests of the EU which derived 
from the geography and blue economy cannot automatically be transferred into sea 
power, if there is not a solid awareness of the importance of maritime security and an 
enhanced willingness to develop the capability to defend good order at sea. 
 
One of the main differences between the EU and other nation states which have a 
profound history of maritime exploration is the way the sea power was generated. The 
EU has adopted a ‘up-bottom’ way to generate sea power. The first step of the EU is to 
develop a comprehensive maritime policy for the purpose of increasing integration in 
the important fields of maritime policy. In 2007, the Commission published An 
Integrated Maritime Policy, which set out the EU’s objectives and principles for 
promoting the integration of the maritime economy and maritime security and based on 
which a cross-sectoral maritime authority was established and an integrated maritime 
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management mechanism was formed. The second task to achieve for the EU is to 
identify where needed to be concerned and which steps needed to be taken. In 2014 the 
Commission launched the EU Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) followed by an 
Action Plan. In terms of military aspects, due to the intergovernmental nature of CSDF, 
it is the EU Member Stated who decide whether to launch the military maritime 
operation if necessary. However, once the decision of launch a naval CSDP mission is 
made, an independent and completed command chain like a nation state’s naval forces 
is established at the EU level.  
 
Based on the study of the process and the preconditions of the generation of EU sea 
power, the thesis asserts that the emergence of EU sea power is not only the strategic 
choice of the EU and the Member States, but also the result of the dynamic of EU 
integration in the era of globalisation. The thesis assumes that the building of EU sea 
power began in the 21st century and the EU first used the sea power in the counter-
piracy mission ‒ Operation Atalanta. However, the EU had started the integration in 
the maritime domain much earlier. In the 1970s and the 1980s, the then European 
Economic Communities developed the Common Fisheries Policy 47  (CFP), the 
Common Transport Policy48 and EU coastal and environmental policy49 as well as 
maritime safety policies50. The EU’s effort made on integration in these maritime fields 
finally led to integration in EU ‘High Politics’ fields ‒ namely the security concerns. In 
 
47
 “The CFP was first introduced in the 1970s and went through successive updates, the most recent of which took 
effect on 1 January 2014” (ec.europa.eu, 2020). [online] Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp_en, accessed 
on 1 May 2020. 
48
 EU Maritime Transport Policy took place in 1986.  
49 To protec European coasts and marine waters in a comprehensive and integrated manner, the EU adopted two 
instruments, the 2002 EU Recommendation on Integrated Coastal Zone Management and the 2008 Marine Strategy 
Framework Directive.  
50 The EU adopted the Third Maritime Safety Package in 2009, which covered all chains of responsibility in the 
maritime sector. The European Commission can rely on the technical and scientific assistance of the European 
Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) (ec.europa.eu, 2020). [online] Available at: 
/ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/urban/cycling/guidance-cycling-projects-eu/challenges-cities-face_en, accessed on 
1 May 2020. 
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this sense, the generation of EU sea power can be seen as the natural outcome of the 
EU integration, as well as the high noon of the integration process. 
 
Meanwhile, the generation of EU sea power is also a positive response by the EU to the 
changing global strategic balance. The United States has been and will remain a global 
super sea power. However, the post-World War II order dominated by the United States 
and Western partners is being challenged by emerging power, such as China and Russia. 
The maritime dimension is also the battlefield where the West and these emerging sea 
powers confront one another. The United States has been moving its geopolitical focus 
to the India-Pacific area. The EU and its Member States had to face the reality that the 
United States’ strategic priority is moving towards the East, and the EU must face 
directly the challenges presented by the emerging countries in the maritime dimension. 
Europe needs to develop its own capacities to protect its surrounding waters. To remain 
playing a significant and influential role in the world, the EU had no other choice but 
to build its own sea power.  
 
Therefore, the generation of EU sea power is the EU’s proactive choice to cope with 
the changes in the global geopolitical environment, and it is also the necessary way for 
the EU to realise its political ambitions. In 2019, the newly elected President of the 
European Commission Von de Leyen announced in her speech in the European 
Parliament Plenary Session an intention to build “the geopolitical Commission” 
(ec.europa.eu, 2019). And among the priorities proposed by the Commission, “to 
increase the EU’s focus on external action” is arguably an important one (Subotić, 
2019). Therefore, sea power, as an invaluable tool for the EU to engage in the external 
action, will be attracting more attention and resources. 
 
8.3.2 Understanding the practice of EU sea power 
The aim of the EU’s decades-long effort to build sea power is so that sea power is able 
to be harnessed to maintain international maritime security. The four cases analysed in 
the thesis demonstrate the different forms of EU sea power ‘output’. CSDP maritime 
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military missions are the most visible and direct form of EU sea power. By virtue of 
the intergovernmental nature of EU decision-making in the security and defence sphere, 
the decision to launch such an operation is dependent on the unanimity of all EU 
Member States. The Somali piracy in the Horn of Aden and the refugee crises in the 
Mediterranean Sea posed substantial and immediate threats to the EU’s maritime 
security. All EU Member States perceived the urgency to take common action. The EU 
has had the willingness and confidence to pursue the role of ‘maritime security 
provider’. Using sea power has become a tool in the EU’s diplomatic toolbox. In terms 
of the EU’s three CSDP missions ‒ Operation Atalanta, Operation Sophia, and 
Operation IRINI ‒ the assessment of outcome of these operations is based on the triple-
capacity framework mentioned in the preceding section. Will these operations protect 
maritime commerce and shipping? Will they maintain control of the sea? And will they 
influence the events on land through naval means? These three questions set up the 
criteria to benchmark the role of the EU in these areas. It is noteworthy that these three 
maritime military operations are not the only means that the EU uses to face the security 
challenges off the Somali coast and in Libya. Other means include financial aid and 
support for improved infrastructure. Maritime military operation is only part of the 
EU’s overall strategy in the Horn of Aden or in the Mediterranean Sea. However, sea 
power, as an integral component of the EU’s strategic strength, plays an increasingly 
important role. Meanwhile, The EU also explored alternative options when CSDP 
actions could not be taken. The EU’s Coordinated Military Presence concept, as a 
replacement for the CSDP operation, will be deployed firstly in the Gulf of Guinea.  
 
Besides CSDP missions, the EU sea power also takes other forms while involved in 
critical geostrategic crises. The strong economic power and technical advantages of the 
EU can be considered as ‘soft sea power’ in maintaining maritime security. The EU-
funded CMR programme in West Africa or the military arms sale to the ASEAN 
countries are both the examples of the practice of the EU ‘soft sea power’. Moreover, 
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the EU also has identity advantage as being a party to UNCLOS and has used it in 
engagement in the sovereignty conflict in the South China Sea. 
 
Based on the empirical research of the practice of EU sea power, the thesis asserts that 
there is a significant difference of roles pursued by the EU sea power and by the other 
sea powers. Instead of the pursuit of maritime hegemony, the EU chose a different 
direction from the United States and the emerging sea powers, that is, the role of 
defender of good order at sea. To date, the practice of EU sea power has all focused on 
the non-traditional security threats at sea, such as the fight against piracy, smuggling at 
sea, or research and rescue operations. The EU has not been involved in a traditional 
maritime confrontation. Meanwhile, the EU insisted on a rules-based order at the sea, 
which is consistent with the way the EU attempts to achieve on land. Therefore, EU sea 
power represents a new direction, and a revision of traditional sea power which was 
always sea hegemony. The paradigm of traditional sea power that emphasises 
competition and confrontation will only lead the world into an endless maritime arms 
race, rather than real peace and stability. EU sea power, on the other hand, with its 
mission to combat non-traditional threats and its emphasis on cooperation and rules, 
can indeed bring about a peaceful maritime environment that is safe and free for all 
nations of the world. 
 
8.3.3 Understanding the characteristics of EU sea power 
The EU is unique, and EU sea power is also unique. Which makes the EU sea power 
different from other sea powers in the world? The most salient feature of EU sea power 
is the decision-making procedure while naval force is involved. Instead of the EU, it is 
the 27 Member States who decide whether to deploy naval force. Therefore, the military 
capacity of the EU is determined by the military capacity of the individual Member 
States. As a result, the EU must focus on the surrounding waters which are of strategic 
importance. In this sense, the EU sea power is a regional sea power with limited military 
strength. This characteristic of EU sea power restricted the EU from being involved in 
high intensity naval operations. Until now, whether in the Horn of Aden or in the 
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Mediterranean Sea, the main operational actions of the EU naval forces have been 
limited to the low-risk, low-cost and low-conflict missions. This seems to be at odds 
with the EU’s ambitions. To meet the requirement of a global maritime security 
provider, the EU needs to contribute more resources to sea power related fields, such 
as research into and development of naval capabilities. 
 
However, the lack of military capabilities has prompted the EU to rely more on non-
military means while involved in maritime conflicts. The EU is keen to apply its 
normative power at the sea as the EU does on land, which is obvious in the involvement 
of the EU in the South China Sea. There is also an increasing tendency for the EU to 
use all the resources at its disposal to maintain a secure maritime environment. The EU 
emphasises the need for a comprehensive approach when dealing with security issues. 
And EU sea power occupies an important and integral role in the EU’s comprehensive 
approach. As this thesis asserts, the generation and the development of EU sea power 
is part and parcel of the EU’s overall security strategy, a powerful tool for the EU to be 
a global security actor in the world. 
 
Moreover, it is noteworthy that cooperation occupies an important place in the concept 
of the EU sea power. There are various levels of cooperation between the EU and other 
stakeholders of the world. The cooperation with NATO and the Navy of the United 
States is at the top level of the cooperation hierarchy. The EU’s maritime military 
operation off Somali coast and in the Mediterranean Sea were both supported by NATO 
allies. Hence, the EU’s partnership with its Western allies is the cornerstone of EU sea 
power. In the meantime, the EU also cooperates with third parties. In the operation in 
the Horn of Africa, the EU works closely with local neighbouring countries. In the Gulf 
of Guinea, the EU relies heavily on the close cooperation of local governments. In the 
South China Sea, there is an increasing trend in cooperation between the EU and the 
ASEAN countries. There are two reasons for this. The cooperation with Western 
partners bridges the military deficit of the EU. The EU’s naval force is supported to 
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ensure the success of the maritime military operations. This reflects the multilateralism 
which the EU favours in international affairs.  
 
8.3.4 Understanding the significance of EU sea power 
The impact of EU sea power on the international maritime security is significant. The 
emerging EU sea power is beneficial to international maritime security. In the era of 
globalisation, sea and oceans play an unprecedented role in almost all aspects of the 
international community, and there is a global trend that international cooperation is 
rising. In today’s world, besides the traditional sea powers, such as the United States 
and the United Kingdom, there are emerging sea powers including China, Russia, and 
India. Since Operation Atalanta in 2008, the EU naval force has contributed to the 
security of the Global Commons by saving lives and deterring the crimes at the sea. 
 
Moreover, EU sea power is beneficial to the security and prosperity of Europe itself. 
The EU introduced ‘strategic autonomy’ in 2016 and seeks to improve its autonomous 
capability to defend Member States. The maritime dimension of European security 
deserves more attention. Hence, EU sea power as an important defender of European 
interests is vital to the future of the EU and its Members States. 
 
EU sea power is also the link between the EU and the African continent. Three of the 
four cases that the thesis discusses are off the coast of the African continent. Currently 
the EU is devising a new foreign strategy towards Africa and has taken maritime 
security as a diplomatic tool to manage relations with the African countries. Arguably, 
a stable and prosperous African continent is vital to the future of the whole of Europe.  
 
Meanwhile, EU sea power is becoming the new bargaining counter when engaging in 
the Indo-Pacific region. From the beginning of the twenty-first century, the EU set out 
to engage in the Asia-Pacific region. The South China Sea is a contested region, and 
the EU is inevitably engaged in this issue. While the naval forces of the EU Member 
States patrol in the disputed waters, the EU diplomats bargain at the negotiating table. 
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As maritime issues enter Sino-European relations, EU sea power is not only involved 
in the conflict in the South China Sea through various forms, but also the leverage 
available to the EU.  
 
8.3.5 Understanding the limitations of EU sea power 
Every coin has two sides. “The EU is neither a state nor a traditional international 
organisation, yet neither is it a fully-fledged supranational entity” (Dover and 
Kristensen, 2016, p. 253). The limitations of EU sea power epitomise those of the EU 
as a security agent. Due to the intergovernmental nature of CSDP, political differences 
and divergent interests among the EU Member States lead to a difficult and time-
consuming process before deciding to launch any CSDP mission. This directly affects 
the efficiency of the EU while conducting military interventions at sea or launching any 
decision in the maritime security sphere. Each EU Member State has its own 
geostrategic setting, cultural expectation, institutional procedure, economic 
requirement and resources. All these factors influence the making of the vision on the 
maritime security of a Member State. Although the EU has made great progress in 
developing a collective recognition of the importance of seas and oceans, it needs more 
cooperation and coordination from all the Member States to make the EU sea power 
stronger and faster. 
 
Faced with the unalterable intergovernmental nature of the decision-making process in 
the security and defence spheres, the EU has sought to take some flexible steps to break 
these limitations. Firstly, it encouraged a multi-speed approach in the development of 
military capacity. One of the most convincing examples is the launch of PESCO, 
because “the process of PESCO allows a sub-set of EU member states to engage in 
further defence cooperation, and thus can avoid the tyranny of the slowest” (ibid, p.250). 
Secondly, it adopted a more flexible decision-procedure while targeting urgent 
circumstances. For example, regarding the deteriorating maritime security environment 
in the Gulf of Guinea, the EU adopted the CMP concept, which allows the EU Member 
States present in this maritime area to share awareness, analysis and information. As 
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such, a permanent and visible European maritime presence and outreach around the 
world can come to fruition. Thirdly, individual Member States were encouraged to act 
against a background in which a collective involvement at EU level was hard to achieve. 
As noted in the third and the fourth case studies, the EU has been encouraging those 
Member States which are more interested to act individually. However, since the 
contradiction between the intergovernmental nature of CSDP and a more integrated 
naval strength seems to be a chronic problem, it will take a long time for EU sea power 
to achieve a breakthrough in progress.  
 
8.4 Future Research: Improvements and Suggestions 
The remaining section isolates some areas in which future consideration is needed. 
Firstly, the application of the arguments regarding sea power should be applied to other 
nation states or stakeholders. The thesis lays the framework on the ‘input’ and the 
‘output’ of sea power, and this framework can be applicable to another region of the 
world. It would be particularly interesting to identify whether a nation state or a 
stakeholder is a sea power. From the perspective of the generation of sea power, new 
research should begin by exploring the preconditions on which the sea power is based. 
Does a country have a national maritime policy at the top of its decision-making 
hierarchy?  Does a country have a maritime strategy which reflects the willingness 
and determination of the decision-makers? Regarding the ‘output’ of sea power, the 
triple-capacity framework is also applicable to explain how sea power works. 
 
In addition to exploring the four cases studied in the thesis, it would also be beneficial 
to explore how the EU is dealing with the maritime issues in other parts of the world. 
While the other surrounding seas are less important strategically, the EU may deal with 
the maritime security issue in different way. As such, applying the findings of this thesis 
to the other maritime areas could further strengthen the arguments made here or result 




Beyond the application of the findings to differing cases, it would be of interest to 
explore the factors which will influence the development of EU sea power in the future. 
Brexit is an extremely important change for the EU from the aspects of decision-making 
and maritime capacity building. The withdrawal of the United Kingdom with one of the 
most powerful European navies will have a significant long-term impact for EU sea 
power.  
 
Covid-19 swept the world starting in late 2019 and no country was spared. As the 
writing of this thesis comes to a close, the whole world is still under the shadow of the 
pandemic. Covid-19 may drastically change many aspects of today’s world. The impact 
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